¶1The consent order entered at the December Term, 1933, which provided for a jury trial upon certain issues, would seem to be valid. Deaver v. Jones, 114 N. C., 649, 19 S. E., 637, Stump v. Long, 84 N. C., 616. True, it could not have been entered except by consent. Driller Co. v. Worth, 117 N. C., 515, 23 S. E., 427; Lance v. Russell, *475157 N. C., 448, 73 S. E., 151; Flemming v. Roberts, 77 N. C., 415. But baying been entered by consent of tbe parties and without objection, it became a valid order in tbe cause. Weaver v. Hampton, 204 N. C., 42, 167 S. E., 484; Morisey v. Swinson, 104 N. C., 555, 10 S. E., 754; Deaver v. Jones, supra.
¶2Tbis order was not subject to review at a subsequent term of court. Caldwell v. Caldwell, 189 N. C., 805, 128 S. E., 329; Phillips v. Ray, 190 N. C., 152, 129 S. E., 177; Dockery v. Fairbanks, 172 N. C., 529, 90 S. E., 501; S. v. Lea, 203 N. C., 316, 166 S. E., 292. It was error, therefore, for tbe court to strike it out ex mero motu, or to disregard it. Tbe remaining exceptions are not considered.
¶3New trial.