majority"> AdaMs, J.

It is needless to call attention to the several amendments of the statute that was first enacted in this State for the disbarment of attorneys. Public Laws, 1870-1, chap. 216, sec. 4. They were all repealed and superseded by the act of 1929 (Pub. Laws, chap. 64), which was in effect at the time the orders complained of were made respectively by Judge Devin and Judge Harris, who presided in the Superior Court. The following are the material and pertinent clauses of the statute: “No attorney at law shall be disbarred for crime unless after conviction or confession in open court, State or Federal, of a criminal offense showing him to be unfit to be trusted in the duties of his profession. After conviction of a felony showing him to be unfit to be trusted in the duties of his profession he must be disbarred by the court; and if any attorney be convicted of or confess to the commission of a felony of such nature in a State court, the presiding judge of such court . . . shall cause *89 a judgment to be entered and docketed in tbe office of tbe clerk of tbe Superior Court in wbicb such attorney is convicted, or in wbicb sucli attorney is practicing, disbarring said attorney, and tbe clerk of tbe Superior Court in wbicb tbe same is docketed shall forthwith transmit a certified copy of said judgment to tbe clerk of tbe Supreme Court; whereupon tbe Supreme Court shall revoke tbe license and tbe right of such attorney to practice law in this State.”

If, therefore, tbe defendant pleaded guilty to the commission of a felony “showing him to be unfit to be trusted in tbe duties of bis profession” be subjected himself to tbe imperative duty of tbe court to debar bis further practice of tbe law.

Did tbe defendant “confess to tbe commission of a felony?” He was indicted and prosecuted for violation of section 4255 of tbe Consolidated Statutes, and each of tbe several offenses therein mentioned is denominated a misdemeanor. Nomenclature, however, does not always determine tbe grade or class of a crime: a felony is a crime wbicb is or may be punishable either by death or by imprisonment in the State prison and any other crime is a misdemeanor. Calling an offense a misdemeanor does not make it so when tbe punishment imposed makes it a felony. S. v. Newell, 112 N. C., 933; S. v. Hyman, 164 N. C., 411.

All misdemeanors for wbicb a specific punishment is not prescribed shall be punished as misdemeanors at common law; but if tbe offense be infamous, or done in secrecy or malice, or with deceit and intent to defraud, tbe offender shall be punished by imprisonment in tbe county jail or in the State prison. 0. S., 4173. The indictment charges tbe defendant with wilfully, feloniously, secretly, and maliciously giving-aid and assistance to bis codefendant by “manufacturing false and spurious evidence,” by erasing, mutilating, altering, and destroying-original records in tbe office of tbe Commissioner of Revenue, and composing and forging letters and carbon copies purporting to have been written by tbe Commissioner of Revenue — all with intent thereby to prevent tbe conviction of bis codefendant. This offense is punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary, and by admitting- his guilt the defendant confessed that be bad committed a felony. S. v. Ritter, 199 N. C., 116, 120.

"Whether tbe offense committed by tbe defendant shows him unfit to be trusted in tbe duties of bis profession is not a fact to be found by the Court; it is a conclusion of law to be deduced from facts which are revealed to the court. McLean v. Johnson, 174 N. C., 345. Tbe case is that of a licensed attorney who, after appointment to tbe bench, turned from tbe exercise of judicial functions to tbe private inspection and tbe secret and deceptive mutilation and destruction of momentous public records. That the court thought him unfit to be further “trusted *90 in tbe duties of bis profession” is implicit in Judge Devin’s judgment. The motive actuating the defendant, the impelling thought, is not decisive of the question.

Sitting as a Court with jurisdiction only to review upon appeal decisions “upon any matter of law or legal inference” we can reach only one conclusion: in the light of Unquestioned facts Judge Devin by the terms of the statute was charged with the performance of an imperative duty, and with his judgment Judge Harris rightly declined to interfere. Disbarment necessarily followed the defendant’s conviction; it was an essential part of the judgment, and no previous notice to the defendant was required. In McLean v. Johnson, supra, disbarment was enforced upon conviction of a misdemeanor. Other questions suggested in the briefs need not be considered. Judgment

Affirmed.

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