206 N.C. App. 205 - State v. Oxendine’s Empirical Analysis
2010
Citation profile
3
cited by 3 later decisions
1
states following
April 2014
most recently cited
3 state decisions
Relationships
Relies on State v. Artis · State v. Green · International Union of Operating Engineers, Local 406 v. Guidry · 197 N.C. App. 461 - State v. Bare · 198 N.C. App. 363 - State v. Kilby
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 3 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In McCravey , the defendant argued “that the statutory definition of ‘aggravated offense’ in N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6 (la) is unconstitutionally vague because it does not specify what constitutes ‘use of force[.]’ ” [McCravey] at_, 692 S.E.2d at 418 . This Court considered the context and purpose of the SBM statute and the case law which has defined “the force required in a sexual offense of this nature.” Id. at_, 692 S.E.2d at 419-20 . In McCravey , we held that The language of N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6 (la) - ‘through the use of force or the threat of serious violence’ - reflects the established definitions as set forth in case law of both physical force and constructive force, in the context of the sexual offenses enumerated in N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 14-27.2 , 14-27.3,14-27.4, and 14-27.5. (emphasis added). The legislature intended that the same definition of force, as has been traditionally used for second-degree rape, to apply to the determination under N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-208.6 (la) that an offense was committed by ‘the use of force or the threat of serious violence.’ Id.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, rape is always, and under any circumstances, deemed as a matter of law to be a crime of violence. United States v. Bell, 25 M.J. 676 (A.C.M.R. 1987), rev. denied, 27 M.J. 161 (C.M.A. 1988); United States v. Myers, 22 M.J. 649 (A.C.M.R. 1986), rev. denied, 23 M.J. 399 (C.M.A. 1987). As stated in Myers , military courts “specifically reject the oxymoronic term of ‘non-violent rape.’ The more enlightened view is that rape is always a crime of violence, no matter what the circumstances of its commission.” Myers, 22 M.J. at 650 . “Among common misconceptions about rape is that it is a sexual act rather than a crime of violence.” United States v. Hammond, 17 M.J. 218 , 220 n.3 (C.M.A. 1984).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence“(a) A person is guilty of rape in the second degree if the person engages in vaginal intercourse with another person: (1) By force and against the will of the other person; or (2) Who is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless, and the person performing the act knows or should reasonably know the other person is mentally disabled, mentally incapacitated, or physically helpless.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the concurrence
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.