This action was brought by plaintiff as a judgment creditor to set aside as fraudulent and void certain transfers made by defendant Charles S. Levy to the defendant Bertha Levy a few days prior to their marriage, and less than a month prior to the docketing of plaintiff’s judgment.
Key passage — most relied on by later courts
““The rule stated in Smith v. Reid, 134 N. Y. 568 [ 31 N. E. 1082 ], that a voluntary conveyance by one indebted at the time is presumptively fraudulent as against existing creditors is the law of this state, rather than the rule laid down in Kain v. Larkin, 131 N. Y. 300 [ 30 N. E. 105 ].””
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
¶1
While we hold that the rule stated in
Smith
v.
Reid
(134 N. Y. 568) that a voluntary conveyance by one indebted at the time is presumptively fraudulent as against existing creditors is the law of this state, rather than the rule laid down in
Kain
v.
Larkin
(131 N. Y. 300), still we are of opinion that the evidence
*110
in the case presented questions of fact, the determination of which by the trial court it was within the power of the Appellate Division to review and reverse. Therefore, as the order of reversal recites that it was made on the' facts as well as on the law the plaintiff’s appeal must fail, the order granting new trial must he affirmed and judgment absolute rendered against the appellant on the stipulation, without costs in any court.
