¶1dissenting:
¶2For the reasons set forth in my partial concurrence and partial dissent in People v. De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d 426 (2003), I disagree with the majority’s conclusion that defendant cannot avail himself of the United States Supreme Court’s holding in Apprendi. The requirement that each element necessary to prove a crime be submitted to the trier of fact for proof beyond a reasonable doubt has been in place for at least two centuries. See De La Paz, 204 Ill. 2d at 454-55 (Kilbride, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 361, 25 L. Ed. 2d 368, 373-74, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1071 (1970) (though expressed from ancient times, the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard seems to have developed by 1798 and is now the accepted “ ‘measure of persuasion by which the prosecution must [prove] all the essential elements of guilt,’ ” quoting C. McCormick, Evidence § 321, at 681-82 (1954)). I continue to believe that the failure to comply with this basic tenet of constitutional law is an error so injurious to our fundamental civil liberties that no sentence meted out in derogation of Apprendi should be allowed to stand. See People v. Swift, 202 Ill. 2d 378, 392 (2002) (finding that defendant’s crime was brutal and heinous unconstitutionally made by a trial judge); People v. Thurow, 203 Ill. 2d 352, 378 (2003) (Kilbride, J., dissenting); People v. Crespo, 203 Ill. 2d 335, 351 (2003) (Kilbride, J., dissenting). Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.