¶1Mr. Marcus Borchardt, Washington, D. C., for appellant.
¶2Mr. E. Riley Casey, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., with whom Mr. Ross O’Donoghue, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at time of argument, was on the brief for appellee. Messrs. Charles M. Irelan, U. S. Atty., and William R. Glendon, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at time brief was filed, were also on the brief for appellee. Messrs. Joseph M. Howard and William E. Kirk, Jr., Asst. U. S. Attys., Washington, D. C., at time record was filed, entered appearances for appellee. Messrs. Leo A. Rover, U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., also entered an appearance for appellee. Mr. William J. Peck, Asst. U. S. Atty., Washington, D. C., at time of argument, also entered an appearance for appellee.
¶3Before CLARK, PROCTOR and BAZ-ELON, Circuit Judges.
¶5Appellant sued to have his removal from the classified Civil Service declared illegal and for reinstatement therein. He charged that his removal pursuant to *495 U.S.C.A. § 652(a)1 “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of such service” was effected (1) through fraud, bad faith and collusion of certain disciplining officials, and (2) in violation of the “performance-rating plan” provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 2005.2 Appellee moved to dismiss the complaint.
¶6With the complete record of the administrative removal proceedings before it as an exhibit to the complaint, the District Court held the sort of charges of fraud, bad faith and collusion involved here insufficient to warrant judicial review on the merits of the administrative action. It also decided, despite appellant’s failure to raise the issue in the administrative proceedings, that § 2005 was inapplicable to a case of this kind.
¶7We agree with the District Court’s disposition of the issues of fraud, bad faith and collusion.3 We cannot agree, however, with its disposition of the issue relating to § 2005.
¶8Appellant was removed under 5 U.S.C.A. § 652(a) which authorizes removal from the classified Civil Service “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of such service.” Section 2005 of the same title of the code provides that while an “unsatisfactory performance” rating “shall serve as a basis for removal,” no such rating shall be given “without a ninety-day prior warning and a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate satisfactory performance.” The “Notification of Personnel Action” issued to appellant ambiguously stated: “Reason for Removal : Unsatisfactory services” and “Performance Rating: Satisfactory.” Appellee contends that disciplining officials are not bound to apply § 2005 to all cases. He says, in effect, that even if the words “unsatisfactory performance” used in § 2005 and “unsatisfactory services” given as the reason for appellant’s removal are synonymous and the specific basis for removal consists of the sort of matter usually associated with the quality of an employee’s performance or services, § 2005 is inapplicable unless the disciplining officials wish to retain the employee’s services; that since they did not wish to retain appellant’s services, his removal could be effected under § *50652(a) without observing the provisions of § 2005 for warning and “a reasonable opportunity to demonstrate satisfactory performance.” Appellant vigorously contends that appellee has no such choice and condemns this view as plainly contrary to the statutory command.
¶9Appellee did not object to the District Court’s consideration of the § 2005 issue on the ground that appellant had failed to raise it in the administrative proceedings. On this appeal, however, appellee insists such failure is fatal to judicial review, upon the familiar principle stated by the Supreme Court in Hormel v. Helvering that “[o]r dinar ily an appellate court does not give consideration to issues not raised below.”4But in that case, the Supreme Court also warned that “[t]here may always be exceptional cases or particular circumstances which will prompt a reviewing or appellate court, where injustice might otherwise result, to consider questions of law which were neither pressed nor passed upon by the court or administrative agency below. See Blair v. Oesterlein Machine Co., 275 U.S. 220, 225 [48 S.Ct. 87, 72 L.Ed. 249.] ”5
¶10It might fairly be argued that this is one of those “exceptional cases or particular circumstances” to which the Supreme Court referred. The issue raised for the first time in the District Court involves a substantial question of law — construction of a statute which appears to require disciplining officials to follow certain specific procedural directions. If appellee has acted illegally by ignoring these statutory directions to him, our failure to decide the issue might result in serious injustice to appellant. Although we believe the issue must be resolved, we think it inadvisable to do so in this case without benefit of a prior ruling by the administrative agency involved. The issue is of major importance in the administration of civil service laws. Yet, it has never, to our knowledge, been considered in this or any other case by the administrative agency. In such circumstances, to decide it now would be unwise for the court, and unfair not only to the present parties but to those who would inevitably be affected by the outcome. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment appealed and remand to the District Court with instructions to provide appropriate opportunity for an administrative determination of the issue involved in the first instance.
¶11Reversed and remanded.
¶12PROCTOR, Circuit Judge, died before the decision in this case and took no part in its consideration.