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← 208 F.2d 93 - Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin

Croton Watch Co. v. Laughlin’s Empirical Analysis

208 F.2d 93 · 1953

Citation profile

23
cited by 23 later decisions
April 1997
most recently cited

11 federal appellate · 4 district ·

How this case has been cited

Cited by 23 later decisions — most recently April 1997

11 federal appellate · 4 district ·

5019531960197019801990decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 1124 (§ 42 of the Trademark Act of 1946 (Lanham Act)) · 19 U.S.C. § 1526 (Tariff Act of 1930) · 28 U.S.C. § 1583

Relies on Williams v. Fanning · Le Blume Import Co. v. Coty · Patchogue-Plymouth Mills Corp. v. Durning · Fred Gretsch Mfg. Co. v. Schoening

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 23 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““ * * * By the 1939 contract the Movado company agreed that if ‘Gren-chen’ were added to ‘Nivada,’ watches so marked might come in. This was an admission that there would be no confusion between them and the registered mark ‘Movado.’ True, Movado did not expressly so state, and it is possible that it only meant to surrender what it thought to be its right for a consideration limited to that particular occasion. But it does not give any such explanation of its consent, and its consent was not confined to a particular importation but was general. * * * In the absence of evidence to the contrary, we think the claim is wholly unjustified that watches so marked will result in confusion. * * * “ * * * The agreement would be equally effective as an admission, even if the plaintiff were not the successor of Horowitz, the promisee. However, a mandatory injunction directing the Movado company to file its written consent to the importation would be justified only if the plaintiff has succeeded to the contract rights of Horowitz. * * * ””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
  2. ““Reliance on 28 U.S.C.A. § 1583 to establish that the Customs Court has exclusive jurisdiction is misplaced. As stated in the Reviser’s Note, this enactment was merely declaratory of prior statutes appearing in Title 19. See Patchogue-Plymouth Mills Corp. v. Durning, 2 Cir., 101 F.2d 41 . We think the section inapplicable to such an action as the one at bar.””
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.