¶2This court, in the opinion previously rendered, held that the existence of a stop sign, though unofficial, and the failure of the plaintiff to heed the sign, were relevant matters in a consideration of the diligence and negligence of the parties, and that the trial court erred in striking the defendant’s amendments pleading the unofficial stop sign.
¶3Counsel for the plaintiff in their motion for rehearing argue that the effect of the court’s ruling is to hold “that an unofficial stop sign may be shown to have been placed for the purpose of changing the rules of the road and giving priority to traffic on a certain road and that such stop sign had been so recognized in most instances by the public, and thus charge the plaintiff with negligence in failing to abide by said custom . . ." This conclusion by counsel is wholly unauthorized by any language employed by this court in the opinion, and whether or not such contention might find support in certain language of the amendments need not be determined. Counsel are now treating the amendments as though they were demurred to specially, but this position finds no support in the record. The amendments were stricken on an oral motion to strike, upon the grounds that they failed “to set out any valid defense,” and failed to set out any “fact legally material or germane to the defendant’s answer or defense.”
¶4An oral motion to strike in the nature of a general demurrer may be made at any time before verdict. Kelley v. Strouse, 116 Ga. 872 (43 S. E. 280). The question on an oral motion to strike is not whether some particular allegation may have been defectively pleaded, or whether some allegation might be subject to special demurrer, but whether the pleading is insufficient in its entirety. Minnesota Lumber Co. v. Hobbs, 122 Ga. 20, 21 (49 S. E. 783); Haynes v. Thrift Credit Union, 192 Ga. 229 (2) (14 S. E. 8d, 871); Fuller v. Fuller, 197 Ga. 719, 723 (30 S. E. 2d, 600); Kanes v. Koutras, 203 Ga. 570, 573 (47 S. E. 2d, 558); Meads v. Williams, 55 Ga. App. 224 (189 S. E. 718); Roadway Express Inc. v. McBroom, 61 Ga. App. 223, 227 (6 S. E. 2d, 460); Braddy v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 64 Ga. App. 682, 683 (14 S. E. 2d, 130); A. E. Speer Inc. v. McCorvey, 77 Ga. App. 715 (2) (49 S. E. 2d, 677).
¶5*34In the present case the plaintiff elected to stand on a motion to strike in the nature of a general demurrer, and since the amendments contained matter that was not subject to a general demurrer, the court erred in striking the amendments. This court was not required to go further and examine the amendments to determine whether or not some allegation or statement might be subject to special demurrer.
¶6The motion for rehearing is denied.