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208 Mich. 147

Gagush v. Hoeft

Michigan Supreme Court

Decided April 3, 1919

Michigan Supreme Court · decided 1919-04-03

<p>1. Trial — Conduct of Counsel — Instructions — Saving Questions fob Review.</p> <p>A remark by counsel for plaintiff that he would stipulate that witness for defendant, who was with difficulty giving testimony through an interpreter, would say what counsel for defendant wanted her to say, where, upon objection, the trial judge instructed the jury to pay no attention to the remark, in view of uncertainty in the appellate court as to the intended and accepted meaning of the remark, and the manner in which it was treated by the trial judge, held, not reversible error.</p> <p>"2. Appeal and Error — Argument of Counsel — Instructions— Trial.</p> <p>In an action for breach of marriage promise, where counsel for plaintiff, in his argument as to the measure of damages, said “She is entitled to the same share in his property” — when he was interrupted and the judge stated that he would attempt to define the measure of damages when he got to it, and no complaint is made of the charge of the court thereafter given, there was no reversible error, although counsel finished his remarks as to his understanding of the measure of damages, stating that if he was wrong he would stand corrected.</p> <p>3, Trial — Argument of Counsel — Opinion Based on Testimony.</p> <p>In an action for breach of marriage promise, where plaintiff’s damages were aggravated by her seduction, her counsel did not exceed the limits of proper argument dn stating to the jury that he was impressed, and that he thought the jury ought to be, that upon the record plaintiff was shown to be a virtuous woman, where his expressed opinion was based upon testimony.</p> <p>4. Same.</p> <p>It was error for the court to refuse to counsel the right to comment in his argument upon certain alleged contradictions in the testimony given upon the former and upon this trial without producing a transcript of the testimony given upon the last trial or having the reporter read what was desired from his notes.</p> <p>5. Appeal and Error — Argument of Counsel — Limiting Argument.</p> <p>Error in limiting the argument of counsel, where prejudice did not result, held, not reversible.</p> <p>On Rehearing.</p> <p>1. Appeal and Error — Assignments oe Error — Sufficiency.</p> <p>An assignment of error to the charge of the court without pointing out any specific erroneous statement therein, held, not sufficiently specific.</p> <p>2. Trial — Argument of Counsel — Based on Testimony.</p> <p>The argument to the jury should he based on the testimony ‘submitted at the trial.</p> <p>S. Same — Right to Comment on Contradictory Testimony Given at Formes Trial.</p> <p>Counsel had the right during the new trial to interrogate witnesses as to the testimony given by them on the former trial, either from a transcript of such testimony, or from notes taken by him, or from his personal recollection of what they then testified to, and if the witnesses admitted the giving of such testimony and it is contradictory, counsel may comment on it in his argument to the jury without producing a transcript, or he may submit to the jury his recollection of the questions asked and answers given, and he should not he prevented from doing so, unless on objection, tbe trial judge is convinced that counsel is mistaken in bis statement of such testimony.</p> <p>i. Appeal and Error — Comment on Contradictory Statements Not in Record.</p> <p>Counsel cannot complain of not having been permitted to comment on contradictory statements of witness on the former trial, where he neglected to call her attention to them when she was on the stand.</p> <p>5. Same — Errors Appearing in Record.</p> <p>The Supreme Court can only consider the errors which appear on the printed record.</p> <p>6. Sasde — Conduct of Court — Prejudice.</p> <p>Alleged error in the use o£ the word “rebuke” by the trial judge when commenting on the contradictory nature of the testimony, where not alluded to in the brief, held, not prejudicial in view of the fact that the verdict was less than on the former trial.</p>

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently July 1927

2 state decisions

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

““He may submit to the jury his recollection of the questions asked and answers given, and he should not be prevented from doing so-, unless, on objection, the trial judge is convinced that counsel is mistaken in his statement of such testimony.””

quoted by 1 later decision, including People v. Kramer

Relies on Bennett v. Beam

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Affirmed · Decided 1919-04-03

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

¶1On Rehearing.

Sharpe, J.

¶21. In considering appellant’s claim that the jury were prejudiced by the remarks of plaintiff’s counsel as to the damages to which she would be entitled, Mr. Justice Ostrander, who wrote the opinion. said:

*154“No complaint is made of the charge of the court thereafter given. A party is more often harmed than aided when his counsel asserts a legal proposition which the court denies.”

¶3.It is claimed that' he overlooked the fact that error was alleged on the charge as given relative to the measure of damages. While it is true that error was so alleged, counsel then failed, and now fail, to point out any specific erronéous statement therein. As we read it, we think it fairly stated the matters which the jury should consider in assessing plaintiff’s damages. Bennett v. Beam, 42 Mich. 346.

¶42. In the opinion filed it was said:

“It was error for the court to refuse to counsel for the appellant the right to comment in his argument upon certain alleged contradictions in the testimony given upon the former and upon this trial.”

¶5The conclusion was reached after examining the testimony, and especially the alleged contradictory statements of witnesses, that—

“It is wholly improbable that the limitation of the argument affected in any way the result.”

¶6The argument to the jury should be based on the testimony submitted at the trial. Counsel had the right during such trial to interrogate witnesses as to the testimony given by them on the former trial, either from a transcript of such testimony, or from notes taken by him, or from his personal recollection of what they then testified to. If the witnesses admitted the giving of such testimony and it is contradictory, counsel may comment on it in his argument to the jury. He need not produce a transcript of the testimony taken while the trial is in progress to entitle him to do so. He may submit to the jury his recollection of the questions asked and answers given, and he should not be prevented from doing so, unless, on *155objection, the trial judge is convinced that counsel is mistaken in his statement of such testimony.

¶7The alleged erroneous ruling occurred during the argument of defendant’s counsel to the jury. We quote from the record:

“Mr. McHugh: Now in the first trial the same witness was questioned upon that subject and this is what she said: ‘Q. I went there’ — that is on direct examination now by her own counsel, she was not being cross-examined, she was not annoyed or heckled by opposing counsel, but was being questioned in a nice, kind way by her own mother’s attorney and this is what she says, page 85:
“The Court: Is that in the record in this case?
“Mr. McHugh: Yes, your honor, it was called to the witness’ attention and read to her.”

¶8On objection, and after some discussion, counsel assured the court that “these identical questions were asked of the witness when she was on the witness stand.” Whereupon the court ruled that he might proceed.

¶9We have examined the printed record with care and cannot find that any such question as counsel was seeking to read to the jury appears therein.

¶10Later in counsel’s argument, the record shows:

“Mr. McHugh: First we find that Mrs. Gagush testified that she put the children to bed on the 13th of July; you will remember she claimed that Mr. Hoeft came to her home and that she left him and went in and put the children to bed, and upon that subject she was questioned along these lines: ‘Q. When did they go to bed? A. Half-past nine.’”

¶11Upon objection being made, defendant’s counsel said: “I submit, your honor, it was called to the witness’s attention.” The court expressed a clear recollection that no such question was put to the witness on the trial and ruled that counsel could not read from the transcript of the former trial.

¶12*156A careful examination of the record shows that the court was right and counsel mistaken. Unless much care be exercised in marking the passages in the transcript of the testimony given on a former trial, counsel may mark parts thereof which he intends to ask the witness concerning but fails to do so. This, apparently, is what occurred. But he cannot now complain of not having been permitted to comment on contradictory statements which do not appear in the present, record.

¶13In defendant’s brief now filed, several pages consist, of parallel columns claimed to be statements made by plaintiff and several other witnesses on the present trial contradictory to those given on the former trial. For the purpose of the comparison, the record of the former trial and in one case the stenographer’s minutes are quoted from. We can only consider the errors which appear on the printed record before us. From, it we reach the conclusion that no prejudicial error was committed by the trial court in the rulings complained of.

¶148. Defendant’s counsel insist that this court overlooked his claim of error in the trial judge using the word “rebuke” when commenting on the contradictory nature of the testimony and that the jury were influenced thereby in their allowance of damages to plaintiff. It is, perhaps, sufficient to say that this alleged error was not in any way alluded to in the brief filed by defendant, but, in view of the fact that the verdict at the last trial was less than that rendered at the former trial, it seems apparent that no prejudice was created thereby.

¶15The judgment must stand affirmed, with costs to plaintiff.

Bird, C. J., and Moore, Steere, Brooke, Fellows, Stone, and Kuhn, JJ., concurred.
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