¶1 Tbe finding that the defendant did not adopt as his seal the word “(Seal)” appearing at the end of the line, unless he did so by writing his name on said line, is a finding, as we understand it, that the maker had no intention at the time of executing a sealed instrument, which perforce renders it a simple contract. Yarborough v. Monday, 14 N. C., 420; Baird v. Reynolds, 99 N. C., 469; Pickens v. Rymer, 90 N. C., 282; Caputo v. Di Loreto, 148 Atlantic (Conn.), 367.
¶2 Whether a mark or character is to be regarded as a seal depends upon the intention of the executant. Jacksonville, etc., Railway v. Hooper, 160 U. S., 514; Lynam v. Califer, 64 N. C., 572; 3 R. C. L., 923; 24 R. C. L., 695; 1 Daniel on Negotiable Instruments, 31.
¶3 The note is one which could be, indifferently, a simple contract or a sealed instrument. Note, 19 Ann. Cas., 674. A different result might follow if it were required by law to be under seal. Devereux v. McMahon, 108 N. C., 134, 12 S. E., 902; Hopkins v. Lumber Co., 162 N. C., 533, 78 S. E., 286.
¶4 The case of Ducker v. Whitson, 112 N. C., 44, 16 S. E., 854, is not authority for plaintiff’s position. The question now presented was not mooted in that case. For history of seals, see Ingram v. Hall, 2 N. C., 193; Cromwell v. Tate's Executors, 7 Leigh (Va.), 305.
¶5 The defendant’s plea of the statute of limitations would seem to be good. C. S., 2988; Caldwell v. Rodman, 50 N. C., 139.
¶6 Reversed.