majority"> ScheNCK, J.

The appellant’s first exception is to the court’s refusal to allow one Goodman to testify that he had employed the defendant to try to discover or locate a magneto that was stolen from him. We fail to see the relevancy of this evidence to the issue involved. It could not have been considered as corroborative of the defendant’s testimony, since it was offered before the defendant took the stand as a witness in his own behalf.

We have examined the defendant’s several exceptions to the charge and find no reversible error. If the defendant desired more specific instructions he should have' made request therefor. “It is a well understood rule of practice, upon appeals, reasserted time and again by this Court, that error cannot be assigned and become the subject of review in an omission or neglect to give specific instruction, even when proper in itself, unless asked, and thus called to the attention of the judge, in order that he may rule thereon. This is just to the court and opposing counsel, and indispensable to a fair trial and to prevent surprise.” S. v. Bailey, 100 N. C., 528.

There was ample evidence in this ease to sustain a verdict of guilty of larceny, and the charge as it relates to that count, in the absence of requests for more specific instructions or a more detailed and complete statement of the contentions of the defendant, meets the requirements *251 of tbe statute, C. S., 564, and tbe practice of our courts. Tbe jury returned a general verdict of guilty, and sucb verdict is imputed to tbe first count, and tbe judgment must be sustained. It is said in S. v. Toole, 106 N. C., 136, “When there are several counts in tbe bill, and there is a general verdict of guilty (or not guilty), that is a verdict, as to each of tbe counts, of guilty (or not guilty, as tbe case may be). If it is a general verdict of not guilty, tbe defendant is entitled to bis discharge. If it is a general verdict of guilty upon an indictment containing several counts, charging offenses of tbe same grade, and punishable alike, tbe verdict upon any one, if valid, supports tbe judgment, and it is immaterial that tbe verdict as to tbe other counts is not good, either by reason of defective counts or by tbe admission of incompetent evidence, or giving objectionable instructions as to sucb other counts, provided tbe errors complained of do not affect tbe valid verdict rendered on this count.” See, also, S. v. Cross, 106 N. C., 650, and cases there cited.

Affirmed.

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