Ralph Abed v. John J. Armstrong, Commissioner, Department of Corrections, State of Connecticut’s Empirical Analysis
209 F.3d 63 · 2000
Citation profile
1 federal appellate · 1 district · 8 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 20 later decisions — most recently July 2024
1 federal appellate · 1 district · 8 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Wolff v. McDonnell · Landgraf v. USI Film Products · Sandin v. Conner · Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex · Weaver v. Graham
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 20 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“Article I, Section 10 of the U.S. Constitution provides that no State shall . . . pass any . . . ex post facto Law. This prohibition rests upon the notion that laws, whatever their form, which purport to make innocent acts criminal after the event, or to aggravate an offense, are harsh and oppressive. Most issues concerning the Ex Post Facto Clause involve claims, as here, that a law has inflicted a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed. Such laws implicate ex post facto concerns because of the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated. Although the presumption against retrospective legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence, the Ex Post Facto Clause of the Constitution applies only to penal statutes which disadvantage the offender affected by CT Page 1034 them. To violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, therefore, a law must be retroactive — that is, it must apply to events occurring before its enactment — and it must disadvantage the offender affected by it, by altering the definition of criminal conduct or increasing the punishment for the crime.”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“argument that the [d]irective increased his punishment by restricting his eligibility to earn good time credit assumes that before the [d]irective [ General Statutes §] 18-7a (c) automatically entitled all inmates to be eligible to earn good time credit. That assumption is erroneous. Unlike the statutes at issue in both Weaver and Lynce , [§] 18-7a (c) does not automatically confer the right to earn good time credit on all inmates. Rather, the statute [provides] only that inmates 'may' earn good time credit ... thereby rendering good time credit a discretionary matter....”
1 later decision quote this exact passage“[u]nlike the statutes at issue in both Weaver and Lynce, [this statute] does not automatically confer the right to earn good time credit on all inmates [but r]ather . . . only that inmates 'may' earn good time credit, thereby rendering good time credit a discretionary matter”
1 later decision quote this exact passage
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.