dissent">Kaul, J.,

(dissenting): I must respectfully dissent from the court’s decision reversing the trial court’s judgment in favor of the State Department of Social Welfare.

Limited time permits a statement of my views only in general terms. In my judgment the majority opinion extends the coverage contracted for between the State Department of Social Welfare and the Great American Insurance Company far beyond the terms of the policy, the intentions of the parties and the contemplation of the pertinent statutes.

There is nothing ambiguous about the policy. Automobiles covered are described therein as follows:

“All Owned Automobiles as Defined in K. S. A. [74]-4701 (a) and 74-4707 to 74-4713 Inclusive (Section ‘G’ Thereof) Per Contract 19040 in Company Files”

We are informed, without contradiction, that the contract 19040, which is made a part of the policy by reference, contains an itemized invoice from the State Department of Social Welfare which listed the number and location of passenger cars to be included in the policy. A policy endorsement also provided coverage for vehicles which might be acquired during the policy period. The coverage under the policy is clearly set out.

This case is not the usual unilateral contract situation wherein the rule of liberal construction is applied. This policy was issued to meet the requirements of the state; the coverages and limitations thereon were clearly defined and the policy was accepted by the state and the premium paid on those conditions.

The policy, of course, incorporates by reference to the statutes, the provisions of K. S. A. 74-4701, 74-4707 to 74-4713, inclusive. Briefly, automobiles to be insured are designated by 74-4707 as “vehicles owned, operated, maintained or controlled by the said agency.” The terms relate to the agency not to an employee of the agency. The interpretation of the statutes so as to extend the *490coverage to any automobile owned, borrowed or rented by an agency while operating in the course o£ his employment puts a tremendous, if not impossible, task on an underwriter to calculate a premium for the coverage of such a risk, which will actually have to be based on the number of employees rather than on the number of automobiles owned or controlled by the agency. The effect of the court’s interpretation of the statutes may well be to foreclose the acquisition of insurance by a state agency. Certainly, the coverage of such a risk was not intended by the parties to this contract of insurance, nor was it, in my opinion, contemplated by the legislature. This court has no right to enlarge the scope of a statute nor to amend it by judicial interpretation. (Schroder v. Kansas State Highway Commission, 199 Kan. 175, 428 P. 2d 814.)

It may be argued with merit that a state agency should assume full responsibility for liability coverage of all of its employees while operating any automobile in the course of their employment. If such a policy is to be adopted it should be accomplished by specific legislative declaration, followed by the negotiation of a contract of insurance which provides such coverage.

I would affirm the judgment of the trial court.

Fontron and Fromme, JJ., join in the foregoing dissenting opinion.

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