¶1dissenting: Except on the matter of damages awarded by the jury in this case, I approve the court’s opinion. To me a verdict of $450,000 on the facts in this case shocks the conscience. But on the record here presented the damages awarded are also subject to challenge on other points.
¶2The court in approving the amount of damages awarded in this case specifically set forth evidence showing $315,460 as direct economic loss from future earnings over a period of 46 years because of injuries sustained by Warren E. Hampton, calculated on the *588basis of an earned median income of all employed male citizens in the United States, 14 years of age and over, in the year 1966. The plaintiffs’ expert witness on economics who testified concerning the loss of earnings was Ronald Calgaard. After giving considerable testimony he reduced the loss of future earnings to an estimated present worth by using a 5% interest rate to discount the $315,460. According to his calculations the estimated present worth of such future loss of earning capacity was $119,227.
¶3To increase the present estimated worth of lost future earnings the witness then added an average annual rate of inflation at 5% per year, compounded. He explained the effect of increasing the present worth of the estimated future loss of earnings “at five percent per annum per year over the 46 years of his [Warren E. Hampton’s] working lifetime, . . . was just exactly equal to the assumed rate of discount” with which he was working.
¶4In the court’s opinion the sum of $315,460 was evidence of the item of damage described as “Lost earning capacity (median).” In my opinion this is erroneous. If the jury in determining the amount of damages discounted Warren E. Hampton’s loss of earnings at 5% (assuming this to be the proper rate), the proper damage for loss of future earning capacity had a present worth of $119,227. Using this approach the damage assumed by the court as shown by the evidence for this item is excessive by $196,233.
¶5On the other hand, if the jury accepted the expert testimony of Ronald Calgaard at its face value and allowed $315,460 as the loss of future earnings over a 46-year period, it took into consideration the inflationary factor built into that figure by the witness, resulting in a verdict incorporating an item of damage for inflation in the amount of $196,233.
¶6Although the record discloses no objection made by the appellant to testimony of the expert witness on the inflationary factor, it quite definitely resulted in an award of damages by the jury based upon speculation.
¶7It is generally held an award for future loss of earning capacity should be reduced to present value. (Frankel v. United States, 321 F. Supp. 1331 [E. D. Pa. 1970]; and Missouri-Kansas-Texas Railroad Co. v. Edwards, 361 P. 2d 459 [Okla. 1961].)
¶8Other jurisdictions have generally considered evidence of future inflationary trends as speculative, and therefore incompetent evidence for a jury’s consideration. Lost future earnings should be *589based on present economic facts. (Raines v. New York Cent. R. Co., 129 Ill. App. 2d 294, 263 N. E. 2d 895; and Sleeman v. Chesapeake and Ohio Railway Company, 414 F. 2d 305 [6th Cir. 1969].)
¶9In the Sleemancase the court said:
“The District Judge did, as appellant asserts, decide to award damages without reducing them to present worth. He did so because he held that inflationary trends would offset any present worth reduction. See Gowdy v. United States, 271 F. Supp. 733 (W. D. Mich. 1967).
“ ‘[I]n computing damages recoverable for the deprivation of future benefits, the principle of limiting the recovery to compensation requires that adequate allowance be made, according to circumstances, for the earning power of money; in short, that when future payments or other pecuniary benefits are to be anticipated, the verdict should be made up on the basis of their present value only.’ Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly, supra at 491, 36 S. Ct. at 632.
“To date Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Kelly has not been amended or overruled, and it was error to fail to apply it to the computation of future earnings.
“As to the inflationary trend offset, this record provides no evidentiary basis for the decision of the District Judge. Gowdy v. United States, supra, in which the District Judge arrived at the same conclusion after hearing some economic testimony is not authority for the offset in this case, since it has been reversed on other grounds. Gowdy v. United States, 412 F. 2d 525 (6th Cir. 1969). Nor do we encourage the trial courts of our circuit to explore such speculative influences on future damages as inflation and deflation.
“Of course, the nation’s economic history since the 1930’s would appear to make the use of present wages as the standard for loss of future earnings somewhat unfair to plaintiffs. But as to the future, the inflation versus deflation debate rages inconclusively at the highest policy levels of our government, in national electoral campaigns, in learned economic journals and is exemplified in the daily gyrations of the stock markets. The debate seems unlikely to be resolved satisfactorily in one personal injury trial. And if testimonal [testimonial] resolution of this factor bearing on the future is attempted, the door is opened to similarly speculative and debatable offsets tending in other directions. See McWeeney v. New York, N. H. & H. R. R., 282 F. 2d 34 (2d Cir. 1960).
“Harper & James accurately describes the past history of this debate and the present prevailing view:
“ ‘Future trends in the value of money are necessarily unknown and so always render such damages speculative in a way we cannot escape. If the estimates represent a straight-line projection of present living costs, they will be frustrated by fluctuations either way. If prophecy of change is heeded, frustration will follow if no change, or the opposite change, occurs. When courts have consciously grappled with the problem they have either found all prophecy too speculative and so, perforce, have taken the equally speculative course of betting on a continuance of the status quo; or they have made intuitive and not always very wise judgments that present conditions represent a departure from some imaginary norm to which they think we shall rapidly *590return. It is not at all clear that courts would be willing to hear experts oii the matter, or that they would get much real help if they did. For the most part the problem — which is inevitably present in every case of future loss— is not analyzed and the present value of money is assumed to be the proper basis.’ II F. Harper & F. James, The Law of Torts §25.11 (1956). . . .”
(pp. 307,308.)
¶10The appellant in its brief challenges the damages awarded on the ground the total award included over $300,000 for pain and suffering. On the record here presented an analysis of the jury’s award is made difficult because no special verdict was requested nor was an itemization of the damages awarded given. The appellant has no doubt incorporated the $196,233, above mentioned, in the $300,000 total. Conceding that it is difficult to place a value on pain and suffering, an award of damages for future pain and suffering must be based on probable expectancy of life in the plaintiff's injured condition. (See Crecelius v. Gamble-Skogmo, Inc., 144 Neb. 394, 13 N. W. 2d 627 [1944].) The testimony of Raymond W. Stockton, M. D. projected a 20-year life expectancy for the plaintiff Warren E. Hampton due to his injuries.
¶11In Ahlstrom v. Minneapolis, St. P. & Sault Ste. Marie R. Co., 244 Minn. 1, 68 N. W. 2d 873 (1955), an award of over $70,000 for pain, suffering and disability of a 21 year old man with a life expectancy of 40.75 years was held to be excessive. There the trial verdict was $275,000 but was reduced to $175,000. The injuries sustained by the plaintiff there, also a paraplegic, were similar to those sustained by Warren E. Hampton in this case.
¶12In my opinion the jury was confused by the evidence on damages when it rendered a verdict of $450,000.
¶13Under all of the facts and circumstances presented by the record herein, it is submitted $200,000 of the amount awarded by the jury should be remitted, or the defendant granted a new trial on the issue of damages.