Coffey v. Commonwealth’s Empirical Analysis
1969
Citation profile
3 federal appellate · 36 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 43 later decisions — most recently July 2018 · most notably Matthews v. State (1985), State v. Sullivan (1982)
3 federal appellate · 36 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Relies on Marshall v. Commonwealth
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 43 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“In Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 219-221 , 116 S.E.2d 270, 273-274 (1960), sentences imposed upon the accused were suspended, but there was no provision in the sentencing court’s order that the suspensions were on condition of good behavior. It was contended that the court was without power to revoke the suspensions in the absence of such a condition. In construing Code §§ 53-272 and 53-275 and in holding the contention of the accused to be without merit, we said: “While the language of the suspensions does not in terms include a condition of good behavior, that condition is implicit in every such suspension and constitutes the origin and purpose of the suspension and probation statutes ____When a trial court suspends a sentence it ‘does not make a contract with the accused, but only extends to him the opportunity which the State affords him to repent and reform’.... ” “... [W]e now hold, in view of the purpose and history of the statute and the liberal construction to be given it, that the proper construction is that the phrase ‘during good behavior’ qualifies the power to suspend, as well as the power to place ‘on probation under the supervision of a probation officer,’ and that good behavior is a condition of every suspension, with or without probation, whether expressly so stated or not.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority“Obviously, the order suspending the sentence is poorly worded. However, implicit at the time of the suspension of November 7, 1966, was the condition that the defendant be of good behavior, even though the period of supervised probation did not then begin to run. The effect of the trial court’s order was to fix two periods to which the condition of good behavior attached, both within the framework of Code §§ 53-272 and 53-275. The first was a period of suspension without probation to commence November 7, 1966, the date the sentence was suspended, and to run until the defendant began supervised probation. The second was a period of suspension with probation to run for five years. And it is immaterial that termination of the first period and the simultaneous beginning of the second may have occurred earlier or later depending upon whether the word “release” in the court’s order means release from the penitentiary or release from parole. In either event, the condition of good behavior was in effect at the time the defendant committed the new offenses in June, 1967. 209 Va. at 763 & 764, 167 S.E.2d at 345 .”
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““While the language of the suspensions does not in terms include a condition of good behavior, that condition is implicit in every such suspension and constitutes the origin and purpose of the suspension and probation statutes . . . When a trial court suspends a sentence it ‘does not make a contract with the accused, but only extends to him the opportunity which the state affords him to repent and reform’ . . . “. . . [W]e now hold, in view of the purpose and history of the statute and the libera] construction to be given it, that the proper construction is that the phrase ‘during good behavior’ qualifies the power to suspend, as well as the power to place ‘on probation under the supervision of a probation officer,’ and that good behavior is a condition of every suspension, with or without probation, whether expressly so stated or not. “. . . Clearly, we think, § 53-272 was not intended to authorize the suspension of sentence in any and all criminal cases without regard to the subsequent behavior of the defendant. * ■» * * * -» “It seems entirely clear that the failure of a defendant to be of good behavior, amounting to substantial misconduct, during the period of the suspension would provide reasonable cause for revocation of the suspension whether or not good behavior was expressly stated to be a condition of the suspension . . .” [Emphasis added]”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.