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← 209 W. Va. 39 - Pleasants v. Alliance Corp.

209 W. Va. 39 - Pleasants v. Alliance Corp.’s Empirical Analysis

2001

Citation profile

32
cited by 32 later decisions
4
states following
March 2015
most recently cited

2 federal appellate · 28 state decisions

Relationships

Relies on Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine · Batson v. Kentucky · Wainwright v. Witt · Swain v. State of Alabama · Hernandez v. New York

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The “mistake of judgment” jury instruction, which this Court first approved in Dye v. Corbin, 59 W.Va. 266 , 53 S.E. 147 (1906), wrongly injects subjectivity into an objective standard of care, is argumentative and misleading, and should no longer be used to instruct the jury concerning the relevant standard of care in a medical malpractice action. Accordingly, we hereby overrule Dye v. Corbin, 59 W.Va. 266 , 53 S.E. 147 (1906), and its progeny, insofar as those cases approve the giving of a “mistake of judgment” instruction.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “A health care provider who exercises ordinary skill and care while keeping within recognized and approved methods within the standard of care is not negligent because [of] a reasonable and honest mistake of judgment. On the other hand, it is no defense for a health care provider to say that he exercised his best judgment, if that judgment breached the standard of care.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  3. “A doctor is not negligent if he selects one of several or more approved methods of treatment within the standard of care. In other words, if there is more than one generally recognized method of diagnosis or treatment and no one method is used exclusively or uniformly by all physicians, a physician is not negligent if, in the exercise of his medical judgment, he selects one of the approved methods within the standard of care-even if you believe in retrospect that the alternative chosen may not have been the best method of treatment-as long as he utilizes that method of treatment in a non-negligent manner as otherwise instructed by the Court.”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the dissent

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.