209 W. Va. 627 - Walls v. Click’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

4 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Established precedent dictates that a deed takes effect from its actual or constructive delivery. Jones v. Wolfe, 203 W.Va. 613 , 509 S.E.2d 894 (1998); Parish [Parrish] v. Pancake, 158 W.Va. 842 , 215 S.E.2d 659 (1975). In Jones , this court explained that ‘[r]ecording of the deed is not critical and acknowledgment is not essential to its validity.’ 203 W.Va. at 615 , 509 S.E.2d at 896 . In syllabus point three of Bennett v. Neff, 130 W.Va. 121 , 42 S.E.2d 793 (1947), this Court explained that ‘[d]elivery of a deed by the grantor with intent that it take effect as his deed and its acceptance, either express or implied by the grantee are essential to its validity.’ In Garrett v. Goff, 61 W.Va. 221 , 56 S.E. 351 (1907), this Court reiterated its earlier holding that ‘[t]o constitute a delivery of a deed, the grantor must by act or word, or both, part with all right of possession and dominion over the instrument with the intent that it shall take effect as his deed.’ Id. at 230 , 56 S.E. at 355 quoting Gaines v. Keener, 48 W.Va. 56 , 35 S.E. 856 (1900). Thus, effective delivery of a deed must include (1) transfer of possession of a valid deed satisfying all required formalities, and (2) intent of the grantor to divest himself of title. As this Court recognized in Evans v. Bottomlee, 150 W.Va. 609 , 148 S.E.2d 712 (1966), ‘[n]o particular form of delivery is required.’ Id. at 623 , 148 S.E.2d at 721 . ‘A deed may be manually given by the grantor to the grantee, yet this is not n”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 226 W. Va. 296 - Montgomery v. Callison

2. ““Prior to 2006, Rule 50(b)stated that if the court did not "grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all the evidence,” the court was considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court’s later decided legal questions raised by the motion. Most courts interpreted this language to require movants to make pre-verdict motions for judgment at the close of all evidence as a prerequisite to filing a renewed motion for judgment under Rule 50(b). As a result, a party who made a motion for judgment after an opponent’s opening statement or at the close of the opponent's evidence, was required to reassert the motion at the close of all the evidence or risk waiving the right to appellate review. The 2006 amendments to Rule 50(b) deleted the phrase "at the close of all the evidence” to clarify that it is not a requirement that the motion be made specifically at the close of all the evidence. The amendment was intended to reflect the fact that many courts permitted post-verdict motions for judgment despite the movant’s failure to reassert a previously made Rule 50(a) motion at the literal "close of all the evidence.” Nevertheless, many judges expressly invite motions at the close of all the evidence, and the amendment was not intended to 'discourage this useful practice.’ Fed. R.Civ.P. 50(b), Committee Note of 2006.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 226 W. Va. 296 - Montgomery v. Callison