Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

21 Cal. 227

Williams v. Young

California Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1862

California Supreme Court · decided 1862-07-01

The facts of this case are briefly as follows: In October, 1854, one Harrell sold and conveyed the premises described in the complaint to one B. B. Young, then the husband of the defendant, for the consideration of eight hundred dollars—two hundred dollars of which were paid in cash, and for the balance two promissory notes of the grantee were given, payable to the order of Harrell. These notes were immediately indorsed over to the plaintiff.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1862-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 5 later decisions — most recently November 1979

5 state decisions

30186218701880189019001910192019301940195019601970decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Field, C. J. delivered the opinion of the Court

¶1Norton, J. concurring.

¶2This case is covered by the decision recently rendered in Baum v. Grigsby. The plaintiff seeks to enforce a vendor’s lien upon the premises described in the complaint as assignee of a portion of the unpaid purchase money. Such lien, as we have held in the decision mentioned, is not a specific absolute charge upon the property, but only an equitable right of the vendor to resort to it in case the purchase money is not paid. It is a right which does not spring from any agreement of the parties, but is the mere creature of a Court of Equity. It rests upon the natural justice of permitting the vendor to subject the property, which he has transferred, to the payment of the debt which constitutes the consideration of the transfer, there being no distinct and independent security taken for such debt. It is an equitable right which can be asserted only by one who has thus parted with his property. It is, therefore, the personal privilege of the vendor, given solely for his security, and is in its nature unassignable. (See cases cited in Baum v. Grigsby.)

¶3It follows, that the judgment of the District Court must be reversed, and that Court directed to dismiss the action; and it is so ordered.

/21/cal/227 · .json · Public domain