Turner v. People's Ferry Co.’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

1 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““As I have before said, none of the premises occupied by the complainant were any part of the original shore. They were a part of the harbor of the eity of New York, and far below even low-water mark. Riparian rights do not attach, as a matter of course, to a grant of such lands under tide water. A right of wharfage in such cases, as an incorporeal hereditament, must be derived either from the express terms of the grant, as in Langdon v. Mayor, etc., 93 N. Y. 129 , 150, and in Marshall v. Guion, 11 N. Y. 461 , or from the clear and manifest intent of tiie grant, as shown by tiie surrounding circumstances, such as prior use, or the declared intention of the grant. Langdon v. Mayor, 93 N. Y. 129 , 144; Voorhees v. Burchard, 55 N. Y. 98 ; Huttemeier v. Albro, 18 N. Y. 48 . In the absence of an express grant of wharfage, or of such manifest intention, the city or the state, as the case may be, may make successive grants of its lands under water, each in front of tiie former, to different grantees, without any violation of the rights of either; and neither the first nor the last grantee will accpiire any exclusive riparian privileges. None of such grantees are in any proper sense riparian owners at all, and riparian rights do not attach to such grants. Weber v. Harbor Com’rs, 18 Wall. 57 , 67, 21 L. Ed. 798 . In tills state, where the common law on this subject prevails, and tiie state is owner of the soil below high-water mark, it was long since settled that a grant of such lands”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Southern Pac. Co. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co.

2. “"* * * none of the premises occupied by the complainant were any part of the original shore; they were a part of the harbor of the city of New York, and far below even low-water mark. Riparian rights do not attach, as a matter of course, to a grant of such lands under tide-water. A right of wharfage in such cases, as an incorporeal hereditament, must be derived either from the express terms of the grant, [citations] or from the clear and manifest intent of the grant, as shown by the surrounding circumstances, such as prior use, or the declared intention of the grant [citations]. In the absence of an express grant of wharfage, or of such manifest intention, the city or the state, as the case may be, may make successive grants of its lands under water, each in front of the former, to different grantees, without any violation of the rights of either; and neither the first nor the last grantee will acquire any exclusive riparian privileges. None of such grantees are in any proper sense riparian owners at all; and riparian rights do not attach to such grants. Weber v. [Board of] Harbor Com'rs, 18 Wall. 57, 67 [ 21 L.Ed. 798 ]." (Emphasis is supplied.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. TRUSTEES OF INTERNAL IMPROVE. FUND v. Claughton