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21 F.2d 587

In re Carter

New York Western District Court

Decided June 22, 1927.

New York Western District Court · decided 1927-06-22

Cited by 3 later decisions — most recently June 1958

2 federal appellate · 1 state decisions

2 counsel of record

Relies on Johanns v. . Ficke

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1927-06-22

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¶1Livery stable keepers <@^8(3)— Lien of garage owner on automobile for repairs and supplies furnished held not lost by surrender of car to owner for temporary use (Lien Law N. Y. § 184).

¶2Under Lien Law N. Y. § 184, the lien of a garage owner who made repairs on, and furnished gasoline and supplies for, an automobile, held not lost by permitting the owner to take the car for temporary use under an agreement to return it.

¶3In Bankruptcy. In the matter of Donald H. Carter, individually and doing business as the Carter Clothing Company. On review of an order of the referee.

¶4Finding ordered to conform to opinion.

¶5Lee Fassett, of Wellsville, N. Y., for petitioner.

¶6William Duke, Jr., of Wellsville, N. Y., for creditor First Trust Co.

¶7HAZEL, District Judge.

¶8The bankrupt owned a Nash automobile which he had, during a period of about eighteen months, taken to petitioner, a garage owner, for repairs and to obtain gasoline and supplies, amounting to $133.74. On March 13, 1926, the bankrupt again took his automobile to petitioner’s garage, where it again was repaired. On completion of said repairs, petitioner asserted a lien upon the automobile for the above-mentioned amount, and said he would keep the car in his possession. The bankrupt, who is a cripple and unable to walk normally, then requested permission to use the motorcar for a limited time until another car belonging to him could be put in running condition by petitioner, when the Nash ear would be returned.

¶9On Mareh 9, 1926, an execution was is*588sued against 'the bankrupt to the sheriff upon a judgment'obtained by the First Trust Company of Wellsville, N. Y., for $7,861.30, and subsequently, on March 16, 1926, while the Nash ear was in the bankrupt’s possession, under his consent agreement with petitioner, the deputy sheriff made a levy. The bankrupt said nothing about petitioner’s lien for repairs- and supplies, but requested that he be permitted’to use the ear for an hour, he to return the' ear to where it then stood. Instead he drove the car to the petitioner’s garage and left it there.

¶10The question is whether, by permitting the bankrupt to take the motorcar and use it for a limited time, petitioner’s lien under section 184 of the Lien Law was lost.

¶11The referee held that by parting with possession the lien was lost, and the levy by the sheriff was paramount. I am unable to adopt this view.

¶12In Willys-Overland Co. v. Prudman Automobile Co. (Mun. Ct.) 196 N. Y. S. 487, which was an action to replevy an automobile sold to one Schliffler by plaintiff, Sehliffler having paid part of the purchase price in cash, and given a chattel mortgage for the remainder, a . different conclusion was reached. Defendant, .in that ease, conducted a public garage, stored said automobile, and furnished gasoline for it. While the car was in defendant’s possession; he asserted a ga'¿•ageman’s lien on it, and then surrendered the ear to Schliffler. Plaintiff claimed that the chattel 'mortgage was a paramount lien on the -automobile, and -that defendant had lost Ms lien, if any,' by not keeping it in continuous possession. The court said:

“This, latter .contention I do not think is sound, and is authoritatively disposed -of by the ease of Johanns v. Fieke, 224 N. Y. 515, 519, 121 N. E. .358, 360, where the Court of Appeals, construing an identical section (183), applicable to livery stable keepers,” “said that: ‘It was within the legislative comprehension that unbroken ’ * possession by’ livery stable keepers ‘was impracticable.’ That ease determined that the ‘statute’ was intended to protect livery stable keepers .against * the common law that interruptions of actual, continuous * ' possession were inconsistent with the existence of a lien. I conclude, therefore, that the defendant did not lose his lien” by permitting Schliffler to use the car.

¶13In Rapp v. Mabbett Motorcar Co., 201 App. Div. 286, 194 N. Y. S. 203, Judge Sears, in construing section 183 of the Lien Law, said that the provision “has changed the common law in respect to livery stable keepers, and section 184 of the Lien Law has changed the common law in respect to garage keepers. In both eases the temporary surrender of the chattel to the owner does not terminate the bailment or invalidate the lien.”

¶14These adjudications are thought to cover the facts of the instant case by analogy. Accordingly, the lien was not lost by surrendering temporary possession. The finding of the referee must conform to this holding. So ordered.

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