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← 21 F.3d 1508 - Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado

Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado’s Empirical Analysis

21 F.3d 1508 · 1994

Citation profile

36
cited by 36 later decisions
1
states following
January 2025
most recently cited

18 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 36 later decisions — most recently January 2025 · most notably Theodore Smith v. David Plati the University of Colorado (2001), Shero v. City of Grove (2007)

18 federal appellate · 2 district · 1 state decisions

2101994200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 28 U.S.C. § 1291 · 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Civil Rights Act of 1871 / Section 1983 (Ku Klux Klan Act))

Relies on Gideon v. Wainwright · Sherbert v. Verner · Central Hudson Gas Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York · Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc. · Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 36 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. “The State’s interest in protecting privacy is directly advanced when the State no longer allows access to the names and addresses of those charged with misdemeanor traffic violations and [Driving Under the Influence]. Further, refusing access to such information reasonably directly advances the State's interest in lessening the danger of overreaching by solicitors where potential solicitation recipients may be particularly vulnerable.”
    3 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the dissent
  2. “Although criminal justice records themselves do not constitute speech, the Colorado Legislature has drawn a regulatory line based on the speech use of such records. [The challenged statute] disallows the release of records to those wishing to use them for commercial speech, while allowing the release of the same records to those having a noncommercial purpose. Because commercial speech is protected under the First Amendment (though it is accorded lesser protection than ‘core’ First Amendment speech), and because such speech includes direct mail solicitation, what we have in the end is a content-based restriction on protected speech.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
  3. “At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech to come within that provision’, it at least must concern lawful activity and not be misleading. [2] Next, we ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. [3] If both inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted, and [4] whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.