Bracewell v. State

<p>1. The court did not err in allowing the witness Wynn to testify that he was jointly indicted with this defendant and had pleaded guilty to the same charge, the jury being sufficiently instructed that “any plea, he made would not bind the defendant.”</p> <p>2. An attorney is both competent and compellable to testify, for or against his client, as to any matter or thing, knowledge of which he may have acquired in any other manner than by virtue of his relations as ■ attorney, or by reason of his anticipated employment as attorney. Penal Code (1910), § 1037 (5).</p> <p>3. The charge of the court excepted to in ground 3 of the amendment to the motion for a new trial, when considered together with the general charge, fully and fairly instructed the jury on the subjects of presumption of innocence and burden of proof, and is not subject to any of the criticism made thereon.</p> <p>4. The court did not err in defining to the jury a principal in the first degree and a principal in the second degree, and in instructing them that all persons aiding and abetting in the perpetration of a misdemeanor are indictable as principals.</p> <p>5. The court sufficiently instructed the jury on circumstantial evidence and reasonable doubt, and the exceptions taken to the charge in grounds 5 and 6, complaining that the court failed so to do, are therefore without merit.</p> <p>6. The remaining ground of the motion for a new trial, not being argued in brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error, will be treated as abandonea.</p> <p>7. The evidence authorized the verdict, and the court committed no error in refusing the defendant a new trial.</p>