Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist

21 Ind. 210

Crain v. Hilligross

Indiana Supreme Court

Decided November 15, 1863

Indiana Supreme Court · decided 1863-11-15

<p>Practice — Dismissal.—Under §§ 363 and 365, of the code, 2 GL & H. 216, a plaintiff may, at any time before tbe jury retire, or the finding of the Court is announced, dismiss his action, without prejudice ; and a defendant, who has pleaded a set-off, must, as to that, be regarded as a plaintiff, and may, therefore, in like manner, dismiss as to his set-off.</p>

Cited by 2 later decisions — most recently November 1880

2 state decisions

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1863-11-15

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Worden, J.

¶1Action by Hilligross against Crain on an account.

¶2The defendant answered, amongst other things, in two paragraphs, by way of set-off. The cause was tried by the Court. After trial, and before the finding of the Court was announced, the defendant desired to dismiss his two paragraphs, setting up the set-off, but the Court refused to permit him to do so, and he excepted.

¶3This ruling, we think, was erroneous. A plaintiff’ has a *211right, at any time before the jury retire, or, where the cause is tried by the Court, before the finding of the Court is announced, to dismiss the action without prejudice. 2 E. S. 1852, p. 120, sec. 363. A defendant who pleads a set-off, is, in respect to such set-off, really and substantially a plaintiff. In respect to his sot-off, he is the actor, and his set-off is his cause of action. "Where a defendant pleads a set-off, the plaintiff must answer it, and can not get out of Court by dismissing or abandoning his action against the defendant. Sec. 865. In such cases, the defendant may have judgment against the plaintiff for the amount of his set-off, and in all cases where his set-off exceeds the plaintiff’s claim. It seems to us clear, that a defendant, in respect to a set-off pleaded by him, should be regarded as plaintiff, and that he comes within the spirit of the statute above cited.

L. & W. O. Sexton, for the appellant. Wm. A. Cullen, for the appellee.

¶4Per Curiam. — The judgment below is reversed, with costs.'

/21/ind/210 · .json · Public domain