N-J-B

Interim Decision #3309




                            In re N-J-B-, Respondent

                     Decided by Board February 20, 1997
                   Decided by Attorney General July 10, 1997

                           U.S. Department of Justice
                    Executive Office for Immigration Review
                        Board of Immigration Appeals

(1) The general effective date of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
  Act of 1996, Division C of 

 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”), is April 1,
  1997. Section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-627, creates an exception to the
  general effective date with regard to suspension of deportation for aliens with pending
  deportation proceedings and establishes a transition rule to be applied in these pending
  cases.
(2) Under the provisions of the IIRIRA transition rule, service of the Order to Show Cause
  ends the period of continuous physical presence prior to the acquisition of the requisite 7
  years.
(3) The respondent was served with an Order to Show Cause before the IIRIRA’s enactment
  and deportation proceedings are still pending. Inasmuch as the Order to Show Cause was
  served prior to the respondent’s acquisition of the 7 years’ continuous physical presence, she
  is ineligible for suspension of deportation under the transition rule.
(4) The Attorney General vacates the decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals pending
  her further determination.

FOR RESPONDENT: Ernesto Varas, Esquire, Miami, Florida

AMICUS CURIAE1: Robert B. Jobe, Esquire, San Francisco, California

AMICUS CURIAE¹: Sharon Dulberg, Esquire, San Francisco, California

FOR THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE: William C. Cox,
Appellate Counsel

BEFORE: Board En Banc: DUNNE, Vice Chairman; HEILMAN, HOLMES, HURWITZ,
FILPPU, COLE, and MATHON, Board Members. Dissenting Opinions: GUENDELSBERGER, Board Member, joined by SCHMIDT, Chairman; VILLAGELIU, Board Member;
ROSENBERG, Board Member; VACCA, Board Member.

HEILMAN, Board Member:
  1 This Board acknowledges with appreciation the thoughtful arguments raised in amici

curiae’s brief.

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    The respondent has timely appealed from that portion of the Immigration
Judge’s decision denying her applications for asylum, withholding of deportation, and suspension of deportation. The appeal will be dismissed.

I. CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PRESENCE AND THE ILLEGAL
       IMMIGRATION REFORM AND IMMIGRANT
            RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1996
   With respect to the respondent’s claim for suspension of deportation, the
record reflects that the respondent arrived in the United States on August 5,
1987, and that the Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing (Form I-221)
was served on August 27, 1993, less than 7 years later. The Immigration
Judge’s denial of suspension of deportation was based solely on the respondent’s failure to prove the requisite extreme hardship to herself. Subsequently, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act
of 1996, Division C of 

 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”),
was enacted on September 30, 1996. In light of this legislation, we must
decide whether the respondent still has the 7 years of continuous physical
presence necessary to be eligible for suspension of deportation. In other
words, we must determine whether, and if so to what extent, the requirements
of the transitional rule for aliens in proceedings, which is set forth in the
IIRIRA, apply to the pending appeal of the denial of this respondent’s application for suspension of deportation.
   By enacting the IIRIRA, Congress replaced the former suspension of
deportation relief with the new cancellation of removal. With these amendments, Congress clearly intended to limit the categories of undocumented
aliens eligible for such relief and to limit the circumstances under which any
relief may be granted. The general effective date for implementing the IIRIRA
amendments established under section 309(a) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at
3009-625, is April 1, 1997. Aliens placed in removal proceedings on or after
this date face generally higher standards to qualify for cancellation of
removal: a longer physical presence requirement; a more stringent standard of
hardship; and omission of consideration of hardship to the aliens themselves.
See Section 240A(b) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)). Section 240A(d) also provides special rules regarding termination and interruption of continuous physical presence, with the result that aliens seeking this
relief will face more stringent continuous physical presence requirements.2

 2 Section 240A(d) of the Act provides in pertinent part as follows:

     SPECIAL RULES RELATING TO CONTINUOUS RESIDENCE OR PHYSICAL
     PRESENCE.—
       (1) TERMINATION OF CONTINUOUS PERIOD.—For purposes of this section,
     any period of . . . continuous physical presence in the United States shall be deemed to
     end when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 239(a) or when the alien has
     committed an offense referred to in section 212(a)(2) that renders the alien inadmissible

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Interim Decision #3309


   II. THE GENERAL EFFECTIVE DATE UNDER SECTION
309(a) AND THE TRANSITION RULE UNDER SECTION 309(c)
   While establishing a general rule for the effective date of the IIRIRA, the
language utilized in section 309(a) of the IIRIRA indicates that exceptions to
the general effective date provision exist in this section and elsewhere. More
specifically, the general rule for effective date provisions established in section 309(a) is as follows:
   Except as otherwise provided in this section and sections 303(b)(2), 306(c), 308(d)(2)(D),
   or 308(d)(5) of this division, this subtitle and the amendments made by this subtitle shall
   take effect on [April 1, 1997] (in this title referred to as the “title III-A effective date”).
   (Emphasis added.)
   Thus, section 309(a) of the IIRIRA refers to the existence in section 309 of
exceptions to the general effective date of April 1, 1997. Similarly, section
309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-625, also refers to the existence of
exceptions to its general rule that the title III-A amendments do not apply to
aliens already in exclusion or deportation proceedings before April 1, 1997.3
Moreover, as will be further discussed below, these exceptions to the section
309(a)(1) general rule are not limited to transition rules having effect on
April 1, 1997, but also include transition rules having an earlier effective
date.
   Section 309(c)(1) is the general rule that the title III-A amendments do not
apply to aliens already in proceedings. As originally enacted (i.e., with the
“in proceedings as of the title III-A effective date” language), it was clear that
this rule was the general rule to apply beginning April 1, 1997, because one
would not know whether an alien was in proceedings “as of” that date until
April 1, 1997, arrived. This reading of section 309(c)(1) was made somewhat
less clear when a technical amendment revised the “as of” language to



      to the United States under section 212(a)(2) or removable from the United States under
      section 237(a)(2) or 237(a)(4), whichever is earliest.
        (2) TREATMENT OF CERTAIN BREAKS IN PRESENCE.—An alien shall be
      considered to have failed to maintain continuous physical presence in the United States
      under subsections (b)(1) and (b)(2) if the alien has departed from the United States for
      any period in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days.
  3 As originally enacted, section 309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA provided:


      TRANSITION FOR ALIENS IN PROCEEDINGS.—
        (1) GENERAL RULE THAT NEW RULES DO NOT APPLY.—Subject to the
      succeeding provisions of this subsection, in the case of an alien who is in exclusion or
      deportation proceedings as of the title III-A effective date—
           (A) the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and
           (B) the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be
         conducted without regard to such amendments.

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“before”4—because one can determine whether an alien is in proceedings
“before” April 1, 1997, without waiting until that date. Obviously all of the
cases presently before the Immigration Judges and this Board fall into this
category. However, reading section 309(c) in its entirety, we conclude that
the section 309(c)(1) general rule is still directed to aliens in proceedings on
April 1, 1997.
    Although there may be other reasons to reach this conclusion, the most
persuasive arises from the language of section 309(c)(3) of the IIRIRA, 110
Stat. at 3009-626. That paragraph allows the Attorney General, “[i]n the case
described in paragraph (1),” to reinitiate certain proceedings under the
IIRIRA. The Attorney General could not do this (reinitiate these cases) until
the effective date of the IIRIRA. Given this fact and the nature of the reference in paragraph (3) to paragraph (1), we are satisfied that the general rule in
paragraph (1) still focuses on the transition to take place on April 1, 1997.
This reading of the general rule is supported by the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, which states: “Subsection (c) [of section 309] provides for the transition to new procedures in the case of an alien
already in exclusion or deportation proceedings on the effective date.” H.R.
Rep. No. 104-828, § 309 (“Joint Explanatory Statement”).
    Reaching this conclusion regarding the scope of section 309(c)(1), however, does not in itself resolve the question before us because subsection
(c)(1) provides that its general rule is “[s]ubject to the succeeding paragraphs
of this subsection.” And, the succeeding paragraphs include not only rules
that come into effect on April 1, 1997, but other transition rules that came into
effect before that date. For example, it is inarguable that section 309(c)(4) of
the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-626, is clearly a transition provision that comes
into effect prior to April 1, 1997. Thus, one cannot simply point to the fact
that the section 309(c)(1) general rule pertains to what happens on the title
III-A effective date because the provision is subject to exceptions, some of
which are intended “to accelerate the implementation of certain of the
reforms in title III.” See 142 Cong. Rec. H12,293-01 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1996)
(comments of Rep. Smith).
    Accordingly, the question before us is whether the exception created in
section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-627, is a transition rule
only having effect on April 1, 1997 (as is the case, for example, with sections
309(c)(2) and (3)), or whether section 309(c)(5) is a transition rule with an
earlier effective date (as is the case, for example, with section 309(c)(4)) and
is intended to accelerate the implementation of a title III reform.
    Section 309(c)(5) provides:


  4 Congress passed a technical correction amending section 309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA on

October 11, 1996. Extension of Stay in the United States for Nurses Act, 

 Stat. 3656 (1996).

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Interim Decision #3309

   TRANSITIONAL RULE WITH REGARD TO SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION.—
   Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating
   to continuous residence or physical presence) shall apply to notices to appear issued before,
   on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
   We find that the natural reading of the language of section 309(c)(5) of the
IIRIRA is that it is a provision akin to section 309(c)(4), a transition rule
intended to accelerate a title III reform. Section 309(c)(5) creates an exception to the general effective date with regard to suspension of deportation for
aliens with pending deportation proceedings and establishes a transition rule
to be applied to such pending cases. Section 309(c)(5), which is specifically
captioned as the “Transition Rule With Regard to Suspension of Deportation,” incorporates paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Act
relating to continuous residence or physical presence and provides that these
paragraphs “shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the
date of the enactment" of the IIRIRA. In our view, particularly given the
additional limitation on suspension of deportation enacted in section
309(c)(7) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-627,5 it would take a somewhat
strained reading of this language to conclude that it was not intended to have
immediate effect.
   We do not disagree with any interpretation of the IIRIRA insofar as it recognizes the general effective date found in section 309(a) of the IIRIRA for
these amendments as of April 1, 1997. See Astrero v. INS, 

 (9th
Cir. 1996).6 Nevertheless, in specifically mandating that the new rules in sections 240A(d)(1) and (2) of the Act apply to “notices to appear issued before,
on, or after the date of enactment,” section 309(c)(5) carves out an exception
to the general effective date. [Emphasis added.] It further requires application of the new rules regarding termination and interruption of continuous
physical presence of sections 240A(d)(1) and (2) (which are not otherwise
generally effective) to aliens with pending deportation proceedings from the
September 30, 1996, enactment date.
   In the instant case, the respondent was served with an Order to Show
Cause initiating deportation proceedings on August 27, 1993, before the
IIRIRA’s enactment on September 30, 1996, and deportation proceedings
  5 Section 309(c)(7) of the IIRIRA states:


       LIMITATION ON SUSPENSION OF DEPORTATION.—The Attorney General may
       not suspend the deportation and adjust the status under section 244 of the Immigration
       and Nationality Act of more than 4,000 aliens in any fiscal year (beginning after the date
       of the enactment of this Act). The previous sentence shall apply regardless of when an
       alien applied for such suspension and adjustment
   6 We observe that in Astrero, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit did not

deal with the language of section 309(c)(1) as amended by the technical amendment. In
addition, the court’s discussion reads as though section 309(c) of the IIRIRA only creates
transition rules to come into effect on the general effective date of April 1, 1997, and does not
acknowledge in its opinion that the exceptions to section 309(c) include transition rules that
have an earlier effective date.

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                                                           Interim Decision #3309


are still pending. Thus, we must consider the effect, if any, on her suspension
application of sections 240A(d)(1) and (2), as triggered by section 309(c)(5)
of the IIRIRA. In this case, we find that there is no issue arising as to interruption of continuous physical presence in the United States. However, the provision of section 240A(d)(1) of the Act, which required termination of
continuous physical presence with the service of a notice to appear, is not so
readily resolved.

     III. INTERPRETATION OF “NOTICE TO APPEAR” IN
              SECTION 309(c)(5) OF THE IIRIRA
    We do not find the general effective date of section 240A of the Act, which
is established in section 309(a) of the IIRIRA, dispositive of the issue before
us. Because the provisions of section 240A(d)(1) and (2) are incorporated
into section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA, it is the effective date of section
309(c)(5), a transition rule of the IIRIRA, which we consider determinative.
Moreover, we note that section 309(c)(5) is not simply a rule accelerating the
effective date of paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Act; rather,
it is a substantive transition rule with regard to suspension of deportation that
applies the “special rules” enacted in sections 240A(d)(1) and (2) to notices
to appear issued before, on, or after the date of enactment of the IIRIRA.
    Section 240A(d)(1) of the Act provides, in pertinent part, that any period
of continuous residence or physical presence in the United States will be
“deemed to end when the alien is served a notice to appear under section
239(a).” Section 240A(d)(1) of the Act. Section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA
applies this provision to “notices to appear” issued on, before, or after the
date of enactment. We must thus determine whether the IIRIRA term, “notice
to appear,” utilized in section 309(c)(5), refers to a specific document or is a
more general term applicable to other documents which “initiate” proceedings. For an alien to be currently in deportation proceedings and thus trigger
application of this transitional rule, the alien necessarily must have been
served with an Order to Show Cause, constituting written notice of such proceedings. See section 242B of the Act, 8 U.S.C. § 1252b (1994). Up to the
present time, all respondents (this respondent included) have been served
with a document informally described as an “Order to Show Cause,” but formally titled an “Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing” (Form I-221).
This multi-page document orders a respondent to “appear for a hearing
before an Immigration Judge” to answer allegations and charges of
deportability.
    At the time deportation proceedings were initiated against this respondent,
there was no specific document known as a “Notice to Appear.” This term
was first used in section 304 of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-587, (creating
the new section 239(a)(1) of the Act, to be codified at 

(a)(1)),
which provides that initiation of proceedings for removal of an alien on or

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Interim Decision #3309


after April 1, 1997, begins with service of “written notice (in this section
referred to as a ‘notice to appear’)” and specifies the information to be
included in such notice.
   We find upon consideration of the statutory language and legislative history that an “Order to Show Cause and Notice of Hearing” and a “notice to
appear” are synonymous terms as used in section 309(c)(5). We thus consider
that service of an Order to Show Cause operates to terminate an alien’s period
of continuous physical presence. We find in this case that such service
occurred prior to the respondent’s acquisition of 7 years’ continuous physical
presence in the United States. She is therefore unable to satisfy the physical
presence requirement for eligibility for suspension of deportation. Consequently, we need not consider whether she has met the other statutory eligibility requirements for suspension of deportation or whether such relief
would be warranted in the exercise of discretion.
   In reaching this conclusion, we have taken a number of factors into
account. We note initially that if we found the term “notice to appear” to
encompass only documents identified specifically using that exact term, it
would relate to removal proceedings initiated after the date of enactment of
the IIRIRA or to proceedings converted under section 309(c)(2) of the
IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-626. Such an interpretation would render superfluous the language of section 309(c)(5) establishing implementation of
changes pertaining to physical presence for those in deportation proceedings
during the transitional period between the September 30, 1996, enactment
date and the April 1, 1997, general effective date. This conclusion necessarily
follows from the fact that no “notice to appear” could have existed to be
issued “before” or “on” the date of enactment of the IIRIRA. Moreover, an
alien made subject to the new IIRIRA procedures under the provisions of sections 309(c)(2) or (3) would no longer have an application for suspension of
deportation pending, which is the subject of the section 309(c)(5) transitional
rule. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that no provision of law should
be construed as rendering a word or clause surplusage. See Kungys v. United
States, 

 (1988); Colautti v. Franklin, 

 (1979);
Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 

 (1961).
   We also note that the Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of
Conference, accompanying the Conference Report on H.R. 2202, makes
clear that the rules under new sections 240A(d)(1) and (2) were intended to
“apply to any notice to appear (including an Order to Show Cause under current section 242A) issued after the date of enactment.” See Joint Explanatory
Statement, supra, § 309 (emphasis added).7
  7 The “issued after the date of enactment” language in the Joint Explanatory Statement

conflicts with the ultimately enacted language of section 309(c)(5). This was the language of
the engrossed House bill that was before the Conference Committee that was revised,
apparently at the 11th hour, to include the “before, on, or” phrase, which greatly expanded the
scope of section 309(c)(5).

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    It also follows that in order for the section 309(c)(5) exception to the transitional rule in question to have any independent meaning at all, it must apply
to aliens served with an Order to Show Cause prior to the date of enactment
and not otherwise converted under subsections (c)(2) or (c)(3). A statute
should be construed under the assumption that Congress intended it to have
purpose and meaningful effect. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. v. Pueblo of
Santa Ana, 

 (1985); Sutton v. United States, 

 (5th Cir. 1987). In this case, we find it sufficient to note that section
309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA expressly pertains to suspension of deportation for
aliens in proceedings during the transitional period between the date of enactment and the general effective date of April 1, 1997. This section provides
that the restrictions on physical presence be implemented prior to other
restrictions. See Matter of De La Cruz, 

 (BIA 1991).
We find the language of section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA, reflecting application to notices to appear “before, on, or after the enactment” of IIRIRA, to
constitute a directive or express command from Congress that it intended this
provision to apply to pending cases initiated prior to the date of enactment.
See Landgraf v. USI Film Products, Inc., 

 (1994). In addition,
we emphasize that fundamental principles of statutory construction mandate
our reliance on the plain meaning of the statute. We are required in our analysis to ensure a consistent and harmonious interpretation of the particular section and the statute as a whole.
    We can discern no substantive difference in the contents of the Order to
Show Cause and its successor document, the Notice to Appear, that would
militate in favor of a contrary interpretation. Moreover, we are not persuaded
that principles of statutory construction require us to conclude that the reference to a “notice to appear under section 239(a)” in section 240A(d)(1) of the
Act (emphasis added) should be read to restrict or qualify the description of
the term “notice to appear” in section 309(c)(5). Instead, we consider that the
cited reference to section 239(a) does no more than identify the section of the
Act in which the “notice to appear” was initially described. This language in
section 240A(d) would restrict its application to proceedings initiated with a
notice to appear under section 239(a) if the substantive section 309(c)(5)
transitional rule had not been enacted. But, the transitional rule, regarding
suspension of deportation gives this section 240A(d)(1) “special rule”
broader application.

                     IV. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
   In view of the extent to which the dissent has focused on certain aspects of
legislative history to buttress its arguments regarding the effect of section
309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA, we include a few additional observations about the
legislation and congressional intent. In making these observations, we do not
suggest that we find reliance on the legislative history necessary due to the

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presence of statutory ambiguity. Rather, we merely wish to illustrate that our
interpretation of the plain meaning of the legislation is supported by the legislative history. Similarly, given that our construction of the legislation is based
upon the natural reading or plain meaning of the statute, we decline to comment on every aspect of the dissent’s reading of the specific legislative history
it cites. However, in so doing, we do not intend to suggest that we accept the
dissent’s characterization or reading of the legislative history cited.
    We do observe, however, that the IIRIRA resulted from the reconciliation
by the Conference Committee of differing House and Senate bills on immigration reform. Both engrossed bills before the Conference Committee contained restrictions on accruing residence or presence in the United States for
suspension of deportation purposes. In our view, the restrictions in both bills
would have resulted in immediately effective reforms. The relevant amendments in the Senate bill would have taken effect “on the date of enactment”
and would have applied “to all aliens upon whom an order to show cause is
served on or after the date of enactment of the Act.” See 142 Cong. Rec.
S4196-03, § 150(d) (daily ed. Apr. 25, 1996). The relevant provision in the
House bill would have applied the restrictions “to notices to appear issued
after the date of enactment of the Act.” 142 Cong. Rec. H2378-05,
§ 309(c)(5) (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996). And, the Conference Report made clear
this provision would apply to “any notice to appear (including an Order to
Show Cause under current section 242A) issued after the date of enactment of
this Act.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-469(I), § 309 (1996), available in (emphasis
added); see also Joint Explanatory Statement, supra, § 309. While the scope
of this reform was vastly expanded by the last minute inclusion of the “before,
on, or” language into section 309(c)(5) of the House bill (to which the Senate
receded), we do not see how the addition of this more restrictive language
could be viewed as intending to transform the character of section 309(c)(5)
into a transitional rule that was not intended to have immediate effect.
    Moreover, we point out that the immigration reforms in question were
motivated by a desire to remove the incentive for aliens to prolong their cases
by ending the accrual of time in residence for suspension of deportation when
deportation proceedings were commenced. The legislative history reflects
that Congress was displeased with the ability of aliens to protract the deportation hearing process and thereby accrue time that could be counted toward
satisfaction of the continuous physical presence requirement. See H.R. Rep.
No. 104-469(I) (1996), available in 

, at 390 (noting that
“[s]uspension of deportation is often abused by aliens seeking to delay proceedings until 7 years have accrued[,] . . . even after they have been placed in
deportation proceedings”). This dissatisfaction evidently led Congress to
direct that the accrual of qualifying time would stop with the issuance of the
notice to appear. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-879 (1997) (noting that reforms in
the IIRIRA’s title III included ending the “accrual of time-in-residence on the
date an alien is placed into removal proceedings, thus removing the incentive

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for aliens to prolong their cases in the hope of remaining in the United States.
long enough to be eligible for relief”).
    Viewing these two factors in combination reinforces our reading of the
statutory language. The 6-month general delayed effective date for the
IIRIRA is a significant period during which time can accrue toward eligibility
as to some aliens in proceedings on the date of enactment or placed in proceedings shortly thereafter. And, in view of our determination that an Order to
Show Cause amounts to a notice to appear, regardless of when it was issued, it
is not apparent why Congress would want some aliens to continue to accrue
time for eligibility purposes (and others to remain eligible) during a 6-month
delayed effective date period, when Congress had already taken the significant step of directing that these particular new rules would apply to old cases.
In other words, Congress could not know which aliens might come up for
final adjudications during the 6- month delayed effective date. Due to its displeasure with the old rules respecting accrual of time, Congress decided to
apply the new rules to previously initiated cases, eliminating the ability of
aliens to qualify for relief. Congress evidently saw this particular problem of
time accrual to be significant enough to warrant an exception to its general
rule that the new law would not apply to cases initiated under the old law.
Given the intent of Congress to correct the problem to this degree, it makes little sense to construe the legislation in a way that would nevertheless perpetuate the very problem Congress sought to correct, even if only for the 6-month
delayed effective date period and even if only for the random subset of aliens
fortunate enough to obtain some final merits ruling during that period.
    In summary, we have examined the legislative history overall and find that
on balance our reading of the statutory language of section 309(c)(5) is consistent with the generally restrictive legislative intent—an intent to terminate
immediately the accrual of time-in-residence for suspension eligibility by
encompassing aliens in proceedings before the date of the IIRIRA’s enactment. We therefore find that under the provisions of section 240A(d)(1) of
the Immigration and Nationality Act added by the enactment of the
IIRIRA, as applied in the section 309(c)(5) transitional rule, the Order to
Show Cause must be deemed to end the period of continuous physical presence on August 27, 1993, the date it was served, prior to this respondent’s
acquisition of the requisite 7 years. Thus, the respondent in the instant case is
unable to satisfy the statutory physical presence requirement now in effect.
Because we find the lack of requisite physical presence dispositive in terms
of eligibility for suspension, we need not consider whether she has met the
other requirements for suspension of deportation eligibility.

    V. ASYLUM AND WITHHOLDING OF DEPORTATION
   We find no merit in the respondent’s assertion on appeal that the Immigration Judge erred in denying her applications for asylum and withholding of

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deportation because she was persecuted when she, as a teacher in Nicaragua,
refused to be forced to indoctrinate students with Marxist ideology. The
Immigration Judge’s denial of the respondent’s persecution claim is well
supported by the record. The respondent testified that she worked as a teacher
in Nicaragua for 20 years; that the educational system changed completely
such that if “one did not participate” with the army one would have a “great
problem” which she did not further describe; that she voluntarily resigned
from her job because of “pressures”; that she was never detained or threatened by the Sandinistas; and that she feels her “life would end” if she returned
to Nicaragua because she has no money or family there. She reported only
that before the Sandinistas came to power she was threatened by a “group of
young people” in the street. She made no mention in her testimony of being a
member of any organization or group, nor did she refer to having been
arrested, interrogated, convicted or sentenced, or imprisoned in her home
country. The respondent has not met her burden of proving that she has a
well-founded fear of persecution in Nicaragua and a fortiori she has failed to
satisfy the higher standard for withholding of deportation based on one of the
five statutory grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. See sections 101(a)(42)(A), 208(a),
243(h) of the Act, 

(a)(42)(A), 1158(a), 1253(h) (1994); INS
v. Elias-Zacarias, 

 (1992); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 

 (1987); INS v. Stevic, 

 (1984); Matter of Fuentes, 

 (BIA 1988); Matter of Mogharrabi, 

 (BIA 1987).
   Accordingly, the appeal will be dismissed.
   ORDER:           The appeal is dismissed.
DISSENTING OPINION: John W. Guendelsberger, Board Member,
in which Paul W. Schmidt, Chairman, joined.
   I respectfully dissent.

                                 I. FACTS
   The respondent in this case is a 51-year-old single woman from Nicaragua
who came to the United States in April 1987 on a tourist visa and remained
beyond the period of authorized stay. She was served with an Order to Show
Cause in August 1993. At a hearing before an Immigration Judge held on
August 17, 1994, the respondent presented claims for asylum and suspension
of deportation. The Immigration Judge found that the respondent had satisfied the 7-year physical presence requirement for eligibility for suspension of
deportation. He found, however, that although she had health problems
involving her kidneys, the condition complained of was not serious enough to
amount to extreme hardship for suspension of deportation. The Immigration
Judge also found that the respondent had not shown eligibility for asylum or
withholding of deportation.

                                      822
                                                                Interim Decision #3309


   The respondent filed an appeal of the Immigration Judge’s decision on
August 26, 1994. In her appeal, the respondent challenges the denial of asylum, withholding of deportation, and suspension of deportation. The only
issue raised on appeal concerning suspension of deportation is the question of
extreme hardship.
   On September 30, 1996, over 2 years after the respondent’s appeal, the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (“IIRIRA”) was
enacted.1 Although not raised in this case, the Immigration and Naturalization
Service has argued in other cases that the provisions of section 240A(d) of the
Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)), which were enacted by the
IIRIRA, should be applied retroactively. Notably, the instant case is not one in
which the Immigration Judge adjudicated the issue of physical presence after
the enactment of the IIRIRA. The Immigration Judge’s determination was
made in 1994. Thus the actual issues raised on appeal in this case have been
eclipsed by a question of applicability of recent legislation to an issue that all
parties considered resolved over 2 years ago. This dissent addresses the issue
of applicability of the IIRIRA provisions to the instant appeal.

                                      II. ISSUE
   The issue in this case is whether section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat.
at 3009-627, alters the general effective date provision in section 309(a) of
the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-625, for new section 240A(d). All agree that
section 309(c)(5) excepts section 240A(d) of the Act from the general rule in
section 309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-625, that title III-A provisions are inapplicable to cases pending on April 1, 1997. The question is
whether section 309(c)(5) applies as of the section 309(a) general effective
date, April 1, 1997, or on the date of enactment, September, 30, 1996.

                                 III. OVERVIEW
   The majority reads section 309(c)(5) to counter both the section 309(a)
general effective date and the 309(c)(1) general rule of nonapplicability. In
reaching this conclusion the majority reasons that Congress generally
intended to limit suspension of deportation and that a “natural reading” of
section 309(c)(5) calls for a restrictive interpretation. The majority fails to
consider the placement and purpose of section 309(c)(5) in the general structure of the section 309 effective date and transition rules and ignores the relevant legislative history. As one of six exceptions to the general rule of
nonapplicability in section 309(c)(1), the more “natural reading” of section
309(c)(5) is that it is an exception to the nonapplicability rule contained in
section 309(c)(1). When section 309(c)(5) is read with regard to its place in

  1 The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of

 Stat. 3009-546 (“IIRIRA”) (enacted September 30, 1996).

                                          823
Interim Decision #3309


the framework of section 309 and in light of its legislative history, it cannot
be applied to any pending cases until after April, 1, 1997, the IIRIRA title
III-A effective date.2
    In this case, the respondent applied for suspension of deportation under
the existing eligibility rules, submitted her evidence and met her burden of
proof as to 7 years of continuous physical presence in 1994. Now, after having adjudicated the continuous physical presence requirement, the rules have
been changed and the Service seeks to relitigate the issue of continuous physical presence. This case falls squarely within the situation described in
Landgraf v. USI Film Products, 

 (1994), in which legislation “attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” Legislation which has such an effect may not be applied retroactively
in the absence of a clear statutory directive. 

 Although the directive in section 309(c)(5) clearly alters the general rule of nonapplicability in section
309(c)(1), it does not change the effective date of section 240A(d) or any
other provisions of the IIRIRA. Under such circumstances, Landgraf
requires that the general effective date, April 1, 1997, control the applicability of new legislation to “events completed before its enactment.”

              IV. THE NEW PROVISIONS OF THE IIRIRA
   While this case was pending on appeal, the enactment of the IIRIRA created new provisions which will eventually replace the suspension of deportation provisions in section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,

(a) (1994), with a procedure to be known as cancellation of
removal and adjustment of status.3 See IIRIRA § 304, 110 Stat. at 3009-587.
The requirements for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status for
nonpermanent residents are patterned after those for suspension of deportation but contain heightened eligibility thresholds.4

   2 As pointed out in the dissenting opinion of Board Member Villageliu, even after April 1,

1997, there are certain pending cases which may not be affected by the section 240A(d)(1)
directive, i.e., those pending cases which have not been initiated by a “notice to appear under
section 239(a).”
   3 Among other changes, the new law merges exclusion and deportation procedure into a new

set of procedures to be known as removal proceedings which will be initiated by a “notice to
appear” pursuant to new section 239(a) of the Act (to be codified at 

(a)).
Suspension of deportation will be gradually phased out under the IIRIRA and replaced with a
form of relief from deportation to be known as cancellation of removal and adjustment of
status. The provisions for cancellation of removal and adjustment of status do not apply to cases
pending as of April 1, 1997, unless the Attorney General elects to exercise one of the two
options described in sections 309(c)(2) or (3) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-626. See IIRIRA
§ 309(c)(1).
   4 The requirement for continuous physical presence is increased from 7 years to 10 years;

the showing of hardship is elevated from “extreme” to “exceptional and extremely unusual”;
and hardship to the alien is eliminated from consideration. Compare section 244(a) of the Act
with new section 240A(b)(1).

                                              824
                                                                    Interim Decision #3309


   Section 304 of the IIRIRA contains provisions which will limit the
cumulation of time toward the physical presence requirement in the new procedure for cancellation of removal. See sections 240A(d)(1), (2) of the Act.
In particular, section 240A(d)(1) provides that “[f]or purposes of this section,
any period of continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the
United States shall be deemed to end when the alien is served a notice to
appear under section 239(a).” (Emphasis added.)5
   The majority finds that this limitation in section 240A(d)(1) applies to the
instant case. The majority reaches its conclusion by focusing upon language
in section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA which states:
   Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating
   to continuous residence or physical presence) shall apply to notices to appear issued before,
   on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.
If section 309(c)(5) is read in isolation, its “before, on, or after the date of
enactment” language may suggest that section 309(c)(5) applies to any case
pending after the IIRIRA’s September 30, 1996, enactment date. Before
jumping to such a conclusion, however, there is a threshold question as to the
effective date of section 309(c)(5) itself. This question must be answered by
considering the language and place of section 309(c)(5) in the overall structure of the section 309 effective date and transition rules. See K Mart Corp. v.
Cartier Inc., 

 (1989) (holding that construction of language
which takes into account the design of the statute as a whole is preferred).

          V. STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS OF SECTION 309
                      OF THE IIRIRA
   Section 309 of the IIRIRA provides a complex framework of effective
dates and transition rules. Examination of section 309 reveals two
benchmarks concerning the phasing-in of the various provisions of title
III-A:
   1. The general effective date in section 309(a): April 1, 1997;
   2. A general rule of nonapplicability in section 309(c)(1): Even after April
1, 1997, new rules do not apply to cases that were pending on the effective
date.
   The majority ignores the significance of the second benchmark in analyzing the language of section 309(c)(5). As explained below, section 309(c)(5)
sets forth an exception only to the second benchmark and is inapplicable to
any pending cases until the general effective date of the Act.



  5 Section 240A(d)(1) also deems continuous physical presence to have ended upon the

commission of specified offenses. Section 240A(d)(2) provides that breaks in physical
presence “in excess of 90 days or for any periods in the aggregate exceeding 180 days” will
interrupt continuous physical presence.

                                             825
Interim Decision #3309


            A. The General Effective Date in Section 309(a).
   The general rule for the effective date of sections 301 through 309 of the
IIRIRA is established in section 309(a), as follows:
   Except as provided in this section and sections 303(b)(2), 306(c), 308(d)(2)(D), or
   308(d)(5) of this division, this subtitle and the amendments made by this subtitle shall take
   effect on [April 1, 1997] (in this title referred to as the “title III-A effective date”).
IIRIRA § 309(a)(emphasis added).
   This overarching effective date provision in section 309(a) applies to all of
the amendments contained in IIRIRA section 304, including the new rules for
continuous physical presence in section 240A(d) of the Act.

     B. The General Rule of Inapplicability in Section 309(c)(1).
   The transition rules for the new IIRIRA provisions are contained in section 309(c). Section 309(c) contains a general rule of inapplicability in paragraph (1) and a number of exceptions to that rule in paragraphs (2) through
(7). The general rule of inapplicability in section 309(c)(1) of the IIRIRA
provides as follows:
   GENERAL RULE THAT NEW RULES DO NOT APPLY.—Subject to the succeeding
   provisions of this subsection, in the case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings before [April 1, 1997,]—
      (A) the amendments made by this subtitle shall not apply, and
      (B) the proceedings . . . shall continue to be conducted without regard to such
      amendments.
IIRIRA § 309(c)(1) (emphasis added). Thus the general rule of inapplicability contained in section 309(c)(1) is that any alien in deportation proceedings
before April 1, 1997, will continue to have the benefit of the rules for section
244(a) suspension of deportation even after the April 1, 1997, effective date.
    After April 1, 1997, there will be a two-track system of relief from deportation. Aliens in deportation proceedings prior to April 1, 1997, will continue
to be eligible for suspension of deportation under the requirements now contained in section 244(a) of the Act. Aliens placed in deportation proceedings
after April 1, 1997, will be subject to the elevated eligibility requirements of
cancellation of removal and adjustment of status in new section 240A(b). As
discussed in Board Member Villageliu’s dissent, the Attorney General may,
after April 1, 1997, elect to apply the new procedures of title III-A of the
IIRIRA to cases which were initiated prior to April 1, 1997. See IIRIRA
§ 309(c)(2), which directs that in such circumstances the previously issued
Order to Show Cause shall be “valid as if provided under section 239 of such
Act.”




                                             826
                                                                       Interim Decision #3309


         C. Exceptions to the Section 309(c)(1) General Rule of
                 Inapplicability in Paragraphs (2)-(7).
    Paragraphs (2) through (7) of section 309(c) spell out exceptions to the
general rule in section 309(c)(1) that the new IIRIRA provisions are inapplicable even after April 1, 1997, to aliens in proceedings before April 1, 1997.
Paragraphs (2) and (3) afford the Attorney General the option to elect to proceed under the new cancellation of removal provisions of the IIRIRA in specified cases. Paragraph (4) addresses judicial review of exclusion and
deportation proceedings. Paragraph (5) addresses suspension of deportation
cases. Paragraph (6) addresses a new exclusion provision as applied to family unity cases. Paragraph (7) refers to ceilings on grants of suspension of
deportation in any one fiscal year.
    As discussed above, the language of section 309(c)(5) counters the general rule of inapplicability in section 309(c)(1). The heart of the issue in this
case is whether section 309(c)(5) also alters the general effective date in section 309(a).

             D. The Reach of Section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA.
    Some of the paragraphs of section 309(c) address events occurring prior to
April 1, 1997. Section 309(c)(4) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-626, for
example, explicitly refers to cases in which “a final order of exclusion or
deportation is entered more than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.”6 Other paragraphs, such as (2), (3), and (6), apply only to events occurring after April 1, 1997. The Attorney General option to elect to apply new
procedures in paragraph (2) is explicitly limited to cases in which an evidentiary hearing “has not commenced as of the title III-A effective date.” Similarly, under paragraph (3), the Attorney General option to initiate new
proceedings could not occur before the provisions for these proceedings take
effect on April 1, 1997. Likewise, under paragraph (6), the new family unity
exception to a new exclusion provision has no applicability until April 1, 1997.
    Unlike the paragraphs described above, section 309(c)(5) is ambiguous as
to whether it applies from the effective date or the enactment date. We know
that section 309(c)(5) counters the general rule of inapplicability in section
309(c)(1) that proceedings underway before April 1, 1997, “shall continue to
be conducted without regard to [IIRIRA title III-A] amendments.” (Emphasis added.) The critical issue is whether section 309(c)(5) also countermands
the section 309(a) general effective date. The majority attributes a double
effect to section 309(c)(5) so that it changes not only the section 309(c)(1)
  6 It should be noted that section 309(c)(4) instructs as to the applicability of provisions of the

Immigration and Nationality Act in effect prior to passage of the IIRIRA in the case of final
orders entered more than 30 days after the date of the enactment of the IIRIRA. Thus, section
309(c)(4) does not modify the effective date of any provisions of the IIRIRA relating to judicial
review.

                                               827
Interim Decision #3309


general rule of inapplicability, but also the general effective date in section
309(a). The unresolved ambiguity presented by the language of section
309(c)(5) is whether it counters the section 309(a) effective date as well as
the section 309(c)(1) rule of inapplicability.
   Had Congress intended section 309(c)(5) to alter the general effective date
as well as the general transition rule, it could have clearly so directed. See, for
example, section 348(b) of the IIRIRA which, in amending section 212(h) of
the Act, provides:
   The amendment made by subsection (a) [A] shall be effective on the date of the enactment of
   this Act and [B] shall apply in the case of any alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of such date unless a final administrative order in such proceedings has been
   entered as of such date.
IIRIRA § 348(b), 110 Stat. at 3009-639 (emphasis added). Clause A of section 348 explicitly states the effective date. Clause B of section 348 specifies
which cases are affected on the effective date. Notably, section 309(c)(5)
lacks a Clause A specifying an effective date. It contains only the Clause B
instruction as to which cases are affected on the general effective date of the
Act. Had Congress intended to alter the general effective date in section
309(c)(5), it could have followed the pattern used in section 348, and section
309(c)(5) would have read:
   Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating
   to continuous residence or physical presence) [A] shall be effective on the date of enactment
   and [B] shall apply to notices to appear issued before, on, or after the date of the enactment
   of this Act.
Because of the omission of the above-emphasized language from section
309(c)(5), the general effective date of section 309(a) is not countermanded
by the language of section 309(c)(5). See also the directives in section
308(d)(2)(D), “effective upon enactment of this Act” and in section
308(d)(5), “[e]ffective as of the date of the enactment of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.” The omission of such plain language in section 309(c)(5) negates the majority claim that this section alters
the general effective date in section 309(a).
   The majority claims that the “before, on, or after the date of enactment”
clause in section 309(c)(5) would have no purpose were it not meant to alter
the general effective date in section 309(a). But in making this statement, the
majority overlooks or ignores the directives in sections 309(c)(1)(A) and (B)
that none of the new suspension rules shall apply even after the general effective date, April 1, 1997. Thus, section 309(c)(5) is not surplusage. It counters
the general rules of sections 309(c)(1)(A) and (B) in cases in which deportation proceedings were commenced before, and remain pending after, April 1,
1997.
   For these reasons, section 240A(d) is not effective until April 1, 1997, and
section 309(c)(5) does not apply to suspension applications which are considered prior to April 1, 1997.

                                             828
                                                          Interim Decision #3309


                     VI. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
    As originally enacted, the general transition rule in section 309(c)(1)
applied “to the case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings as of the title III-A effective date.” (Emphasis added.) Eleven days after
the IIRIRA’s enactment, a technical amendment struck and replaced the term
“as of” with the term “before.” See Extension of Stay in the United States for
Nurses Act, 

, 

 (1996).
    It was clear under the unamended version of section 309(c)(1), that section 309(c)(5) applied only after April 1, 1997, because one would not know
whether an alien was in proceedings “as of” that date until April 1, 1997,
arrived. This being so, the majority’s position can stand only if the technical
amendment, enacted on October 11, 1997, was meant to bring forward the
section 309(c)(5) effective date from April 1, 1997, to the date of enactment
of the IIRIRA, September 30, 1996. The majority has failed to demonstrate
such an intent and the legislative history indicates otherwise.
    The legislative history of the technical amendment strongly suggests that
it was not meant to alter the April 1, 1997, effective date for section 309(c)(5)
established in the IIRIRA. In explaining the technical amendment, Representative Lamar Smith, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and
Claims of the House Judiciary Committee, noted that the “as of the effective
date“ language in IIRIRA section 309(c)(1) conflicted with the reference in
section 309(c)(4) to cases in which final orders were rendered “30 days after
the date of the enactment,” thus delaying the prohibition of judicial review in
such cases until after title III’s general effective date. 142 Cong. Rec.
H12,293-01 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1996) (statement of Rep. Smith) (emphasis
added).
    Representative Smith stressed that it “was the clear intent of the conferees
that, as a general matter, the full package of changes made by this part of title
III [a]ffect those cases filed in court after the enactment of the new law, leaving cases already pending before the courts to continue under existing law.”

 (emphasis added). After noting that some reforms in title III were to be
“accelerate[d],” Representative Smith referred specifically to section
309(c)(4) which “calls for accelerated implementation of some of the
reforms made in section 306 regarding judicial review.” 

 There is no mention of section 309(c)(5) or changes to rules for suspension of deportation.
    Representative Smith referred to the legislative history in the Joint
Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference in explaining the
impact of the technical amendment. See H.R. Rep. No. 104-828 and 142
Cong. Rec. H10,841-02 (“Joint Explanatory Statement”). The Joint Explanatory Statement instructs that section 309(c) “provides for the transition to
new procedures in the case of an alien already in exclusion or deportation
proceedings on the effective date. In general, the amendments made by this
subtitle shall not apply and the procedures (including judicial review) shall

                                      829
Interim Decision #3309


continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments.” See Joint
Explanatory Statement, supra, § 309 (emphasis added).
   The technical amendment was needed to correct a specific and irreconcilable conflict in the language of subsections (c)(1) and (c)(4) of section 309.
Had Congress intended to go so far as to alter the effective date for the other
paragraphs of section 309(c), it could have done so easily and simply by
including language making all of the paragraphs of section 309(c) applicable
as of the date of enactment of the IIRIRA. Congress did not do so, and in light
of the explanation by Representative Smith for the changes made, the technical amendment should not be read to accomplish a sweeping change in the
established effective date without clear language calling for such a result.7

          VII. THE LANDGRAF PRESUMPTION AGAINST
                  RETROACTIVE LEGISLATION
   The United States Supreme Court in Landgraf v. USI Film 

 addressed the question of retroactive application of new statutes in
light of competing canons of statutory construction. The Court noted that
“the presumption of retroactive legislation is deeply rooted in our jurisprudence” and that retroactive effect will not be presumed in the absence of
“clear intent” by Congress. 

. As the Court
noted, “[C]lear intent assures that Congress itself has affirmatively considered the potential unfairness of retroactive application and determined that it
is an acceptable price to pay for the countervailing benefits.” 

.
   A statute has retroactive effect when “the new provision attaches new
legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.” 

. In
such a situation, it is not enough to search for a reasonable construction, or a
construction consistent with the perceived restrictive goals of the legislation,
or with a “natural reading.” The application of the new rules in section
240A(d) to this case would alter the determination made months before the
enactment of the IIRIRA that the respondent in this case had satisfied the eligibility requirement for continuous physical presence for suspension of
deportation.
   Here we have clear language setting an effective date on April 1, 1997.
Under the ruling in Landgraf, the general effective date in section 309(a) can
only be drawn forward by a clear and plain expression of congressional intent
to do so. In the absence of clear language advancing the effective date, the
general effective date of section 309(a) must be applied.

  7 The legislative history does not offer specific guidance as to the “before, on, or after”

language contained in section 309(c)(5). See 142 Cong. Rec. S4730-01, § 150, (daily ed. May
6, 1996) (relating to effective date of new “continuous physical presence” requirement in
Senate version of the H.R. 2202 bill); 142 Cong. Rec. H2378-05, § 309 (daily ed. Mar. 19,
1996) (relating to transition rule with regard to suspension of deportation in House version of
the H.R. 2202 bill).

                                             830
                                                          Interim Decision #3309


   In addition to the presumption of nonretroactivity, this case involves the
question of deportation, an area in which doubts as to the effective date of
section 309(c)(5) are to be construed in favor of the alien to take effect on the
IIRIRA’s general effective date. See INS v. Errico, 

 (1966)
(construing section 241(f) of the Act, 

(f) (1966), and indicating that doubts as to the correct construction of the statute should be resolved
in the alien’s favor even when interpreting provisions related to relief from
deportation); see also INS v. Cardoza- Fonseca, 

 (1987)
(noting the “longstanding principle of construing any lingering ambiguities
in deportation statutes in favor of the alien”); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 

 (1948) (stating that any doubts regarding the construction of the
Act are to be resolved in the alien’s favor); Matter of Tiwari, 

 (BIA 1989).

      VIII. THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT COURT DECISIONS
    Two federal circuit courts have recently rendered decisions in cases construing the effective date and transition rules of IIRIRA section 309. Both
decisions have ruled that broad language altering the section 309(c)(1) rule of
nonapplicability of the IIRIRA rules to pending cases did not modify the general effective date provision in section 309(a).
    The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has directly
addressed the issue presented in this case and held that under section
309(c)(5), section 240A(d) of the Act has no effect until April 1, 1997.
Astrero v. INS, 

 (9th Cir. 1996). The court in Astrero reasoned
that the fact that under section 309(c)(5) the “new requirements may apply
retroactively to trigger cutoff dates based on notices to appear issued prior to
April 1, 1997, does not change the effective date itself.” 

. In other
words, section 309(c)(5) is retroactive from the point in time that provision
takes effect, i.e., April 1, 1997.
    Similarly the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
recently addressed the question whether section 306(c) of the IIRIRA, 110
Stat. at 3009-612, changed the effective date provision in section 309(a) as
well as the general rule of inapplicability in section 309(c)(1). Lalani v.
Perryman, 

 (7th Cir. 1997).
    Lalani involved an appeal from a district court decision upholding a district director’s denial of a request for voluntary departure. The issue was
whether the IIRIRA’s new limit on court review enacted as section 242(g) of
the Act (to be codified at 

(g)) takes effect on the date of enactment or on the effective date. In regard to applicability of section 242(g), section 306(c)of the IIRIRA provided that the section should apply “without
limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings under such Act.” (Emphasis added.)


                                      831
Interim Decision #3309


    The Immigration and Naturalization Service argued that this language in
section 306(c) made section 242(g) immediately applicable from the date of
enactment, thus divesting the courts of jurisdiction over certain forms of litigation. The Seventh Circuit rejected the Service reading, and held that section 242(g) takes effect on April 1, 1997, according to the general effective
date provision in section 309(a). In so finding, the court reasoned that the reference to subsection (g) in section 306(c) “is meant only to provide an exception to section 309(c)’s general principle of non- retroactivity, so that when
IIRIRA comes into effect on April 1, 1997, subsection (g) will apply retroactively, unlike the other subsections.” Lalani v. 

(emphasis added).
    Notably, Lalani uses the same structural approach to interpreting sections
309(a) and (c) as does the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Astrero. The
court in Lalani also relied upon the presumption against advancing the general effective date in the absence of clear language when “the new provision
attaches new legal consequences to events completed before its enactment.”
Landgraf v. USI Film 

.
    Unfortunately, the majority decision in this case creates a nationwide split
in the treatment of applicants for suspension of deportation in pending deportation cases. In the Ninth Circuit, and likely in the Seventh Circuit, the courts
have recognized that section 309(c)(5) cannot be interpreted to take effect
prior to April 1, 1997. Without better reasons than those expressed in the
majority decision, this Board should not reach a result which imposes an earlier effective date in other jurisdictions nationwide.

                             IX. CONCLUSION
   For the reasons stated above, the provisions of section 240A(d) of the
IIRIRA should not apply to the continuous physical presence determination
in this case. This Board should, therefore, review the issue of extreme hardship raised on appeal.8
DISSENTING OPINION: Gustavo D. Villageliu, Board Member
   I respectfully dissent. While I fully agree with the dissent of Board Member Guendelsberger, as to the statutory scheme of section 309(c) of the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C
of 

 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-625 (“IIRIRA”) and its
effective date, I write separately to emphasize two points on which I disagree
with the majority’s conclusions.
   One, the interruption of continuous physical presence applies only when
an alien is placed in removal proceedings and seeks cancellation of such
removal under the new procedures. Two, the language “notice to appear
  8 I agree with the views expressed in the dissents of Board Members Villageliu and

Rosenberg.

                                       832
                                                          Interim Decision #3309


issued before, on, and after enactment” relied upon by the majority is merely
a jurisdictional provision precluding jurisdictional challenges when an alien
is placed under the new removal procedures by either the notice initiating
such removal proceedings under section 239(a) of the Immigration and
Nationality Act (to be codified at 

(a), or the notice that the
Attorney General has elected to convert a previously issued Order to Show
Cause into a notice to appear in removal proceedings. The latter option gives
sufficient meaning to the language “before enactment” without adopting an
overbroad interpretation inconsistent with the statutory language and its legislative history. Section 309(c)(2) of the IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-626,
specifies that the notice of hearing issued pursuant to section 235 or 242 of
the Act, 

 or 1252 (1994), shall be valid as if provided under
section 239.

      I. SECTION 240A(d)(1) DOES NOT INTERRUPT
   CONTINUOUS PHYSICAL PRESENCE IN ALL PENDING
                        CASES
   Section 240A(d)(1) of the Act (to be codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1))
does not mandate that all notices to appear interrupt continuous physical
presence. It specifically limits its application to cases where a notice to
appear under section 239(a), placing the alien in removal proceedings has
been issued. The pertinent language of section 240A(d)(1) of the Act, as
enacted by the IIRIRA states: “For purposes of this section, any period of
continuous residence or continuous physical presence in the United States
shall be deemed to end when the alien is served a notice to appear under section 239(a) . . . .” (Emphasis added.) The majority unconvincingly violates
the first rule of statutory construction that legislative intent should be ascertained from the plain meaning of the statute, by dismissing these crucial last
three words, which clearly limit the class of aliens to which it applies. See
INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 

 (1987).
   In addition, the majority opinion violates the rule of statutory construction
that no provision of law should be construed so as to render a word or clause
surplusage. Kungys v. United States, 

 (1988). It is also inconsistent with protecting settled expectations when new provisions attach new
legal consequences to past events, as a safeguard against unfairness in retroactivity, and with the rules for interpreting immigration statutes consistently
invoked by the Supreme Court and this Board, as pointed out in the dissent of
Board Member Rosenberg. Landgraft v. USI Film Products, Inc., 

 (1994); INS v. Errico, 

 (1966); Barber v. Gonzales, 

 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 

 (1948);
accord INS v. 

, and cases cited therein.
   Applying the well-settled rules of statutory construction, expressio unius
est exclusio alterius and ejusdem generis, to the statutory language, which

                                      833
Interim Decision #3309


states that all notices to appear are subject to the rules prescribed in section
240A(d)(1) of the Act, means that only a notice to appear under section
239(a) automatically interrupts physical presence, and by implication other
notices to appear do not, unless the Attorney General chooses to exercise the
option provided under section 309(c)(2) of the IIRIRA. See Matter of
Lazarte, 

 (BIA 1996); Matter of Beltran, 

(BIA 1992); 2A N. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction §§ 47.17,
47.23 (4th ed. 1985). This limited interpretation would be consistent with the
language of sections 309(c)(2) and (3) of the IIRIRA, which allow the Attorney General to treat a notice of hearing under sections 235 or 242 as if under
section 239 after a 30-day notice to the alien, or to terminate proceedings and
proceed instead under the new procedures. Section 309(c)(2) specifically
states that “[i]f the Attorney General makes such election, the notice of hearing provided to the alien under section 235 or 242(a) of such Act shall be
valid as if provided under section 239.” Note, however, that the option under
section 309(c)(2) is limited to cases where an evidentiary hearing has not
commenced before its effective date. Similarly, the Attorney General’s
option to terminate proceedings under section 309(c)(3) and proceed under
the new standards is limited to cases in which there has been no final administrative decision. Neither limitation makes sense under the majority’s ruling.

     II. SECTION 309(c)(5) IS ONLY A JURISDICTIONAL
    PROVISION WHICH PRESCRIBES THAT CONTINUOUS
        PHYSICAL PRESENCE MAY BE INTERRUPTED
   The majority’s reliance on the language of section 309(c)(5) of the
IIRIRA, 110 Stat. at 3009-627, for its overbroad interpretation of the interruption of continuous physical presence rules prescribed under section
240A(d)(1) of the Act is similarly unconvincing. Section 309(c)(5) is a jurisdictional provision, directing to the rules for interrupting physical presence
and precluding jurisdictional challenges to their potential retroactivity. All
that section 309(c)(5) prescribes is that an Order to Show Cause may interrupt continuous physical presence under section 240A(d)(1). Section
309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA states:
   Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 240A(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (relating
   to continuous residence or physical presence) shall apply to notices to appear issued before,
   on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act.

   The key passage to the majority’s opinion is that “in order for the section
309(c)(5) exception to the transitional rule to have any independent meaning
at all, it must apply to aliens served with an Order to Show Cause prior to the
date of enactment” and therefore, the retroactive interruption of physical
presence applies automatically to all cases. That is simply not true, and
assumes that section 309(c)(5) is an exception to the transitional rules. It is
also an incomplete syllogism that ignores the fact that the language of

                                             834
                                                          Interim Decision #3309


sections 240A(d)(1) and (2) of the Act describe a limited class of aliens
whose continuous residence or physical presence is deemed to be interrupted.
It does not interrupt continuous physical presence in all cases.
    No one disputes that the section 240A(d)(1) rules are applicable to Orders
to Show Cause issued before enactment of the Act. Our dispute is as to what
the “rules” command, and their effective date. I also do not dispute that the
section 240A(d)(1) rules may effect substantive changes regarding eligibility
for relief in cases pending before the April 1, 1997, effective date of the
IIRIRA. My argument is, instead, that such substantive changes take place
when the alien is placed in removal proceedings, and seeks cancellation of
such removal. That is what the statute mandates and the legislative history
reflects.
    Section 309(c)(5) of the IIRIRA, as enacted, does not state that the interruption of continuous physical presence applies to all cases, as it easily could
have and once did, as discussed below. Instead, it states that the rules in sections 240A(d)(1) and (2), as to whose physical presence is interrupted,
applies to all cases. It directs us to section 240A(d)(1) of the Act and thereby
precludes jurisdictional challenges by aliens who lose their eligibility for suspension of deportation in removal proceedings and challenge its ex post facto
application. The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference, H.R. Rep. No. 104-828 (“Joint Explanatory Statement”), on section
309 of the IIRIRA, while discussing the Attorney General’s discretionary
election to apply the new proceedings, specifically stated that although the
IIRIRA’s amendments did not apply to pending cases, its language was
meant to retain jurisdiction over aliens served with notices of hearing and
Orders to Show Cause.
    If an alien is placed in deportation proceedings pursuant to an Order to
Show Cause before the IIRIRA takes effect, and is subsequently given a
notice under section 309(c)(2) that the Attorney General intends to treat his
Order to Show Cause as a notice to appear under section 239(a) of the Act,
then he is subject to the interruption of continuous physical presence mandated by section 240A(d)(1). This limited class of aliens for whom the Attorney General exercises the section 309(c)(2) option is clearly made up of
“alien(s) served with a notice to appear (treated as if) under section 239(a).”
Therefore, it is not true that section 309(c)(5) has no meaning unless we adopt
the overbroad majority ruling in this case. As explained in Board Member
Guendelsberger’s dissent, the exceptions to the April 1, 1997, effective date of
the IIRIRA in sections 309(c)(2), et seq., are meant to address the rules applicable to cases pending on April 1, 1997, not September 30, 1996, unless
another provision of the IIRIRA specifically directs otherwise. Astrero v. INS,

 (9th Cir. 1996); accord Lalani v. Perryman, 

 (7th
Cir. 1997); Rodriguez v. Wallis, 

 (S.D. Fla. 1997).
    A section 239(a) notice to appear initiates removal proceedings and interrupts continuous physical presence pursuant to section 240A(d)(1) for

                                      835
Interim Decision #3309


purposes of cancellation of removal. Similarly, a properly exercised notice of
election under section 309(c)(2) subjects a deportable alien to removal procedures, which the index to IIRIRA at title III, subsection A, specifies are sections 239, et seq., of the Act.1 In removal procedures, the formerly deportable
alien is subject to the section 240A(d)(1) interruption of continuous physical
presence because section 309(c)(5) specifies that such rules apply to notices
to appear issued before, on, or after enactment of the IIRIRA. The Order to
Show Cause is deemed a notice to appear under section 239(a) because the
Attorney General has elected to proceed against him pursuant to section 239,
et seq., the language of section 240A(d)(1) limits such an interruption to
aliens against whom a notice to appear under section 239(a) has been issued,
and section 309(c)(2) specifies that the Order to Show Cause has the same
jurisdictional effect as a notice under section 239.

                        III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
    The legislative history of the IIRIRA is consistent with the above interpretation and inconsistent with the majority’s interpretation. It reflects that the
interruption of continuous physical presence was initially introduced as
applicable to removal proceedings, through section 240A(d)(1), and to suspension of deportation applications through section 309(c)(5) as part of the
transitional rules for pending cases. Section 309(c)(5) then stated, “In applying section 244(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (as in effect before
the date of enactment of this Act) with respect to an application for suspension of deportation which is filed before, on, or after the date of the enactment
of this Act and which has not been adjudicated as of 30 days after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the period of continuous physical presence under
such section shall be deemed to have ended on the date the alien was served
an order to show cause pursuant to section 242A of such Act . . . .” HR 2202,
§ 309, available in Congressional Quarterly’s Washington Alert and
Westlaw, at 1995 CQ US HR 2202 (Aug. 4, 1995).
    The bill was subsequently reported on March 4, 1996, favorably by the
House Judiciary Committee with identical language in section 240A(d)(1),
but section 309(c)(5) had been amended to apply the section 240A(d)(1)
rules to suspension of deportation applications where the notice to appear
was issued after enactment of the Act. The Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No.
104-469(I) (1996) specifically stated that the “continuous physical presence
terminates on the date a person is served a notice to appear for a removal proceeding,” id. § 304 (emphasis added), and also stated that the rules of section
240A(d)(1) applied “as a criterion for eligibility for cancellation of removal”
  1 The Supreme Court has ruled that the title of a statute or section can aid in resolving an

ambiguity in the legislation’s text. INS v. National Center for Immigrants’ Rights, Inc., 

 (1991); Mead Corp. v. Tilley, 

 (1989); FTC v. Mandel Bros.,
Inc., 

 (1959); cf. 2A Singer, supra, §§ 47.01, 47.03, 47.14.

                                            836
                                                          Interim Decision #3309


to “any notice to appear (including an Order to Show Cause under current
section 242A) issued after the date of enactment of this Act.” Id. § 309
(emphasis added).
   On March 7 and 8, 1996, the bill was withdrawn from several committees
and reported from several other committees with amendments. The bill was
reported to the entire House on March 8, 1996, had identical language in section 240(d)(1), limiting its application to cases where a section 239(a) notice
to appear had been issued and section 309(c)(5) retained the language about
the applicability to suspension of deportation applications in its heading, but
deleted the operative language that the interruption of continuous physical
presence upon issuance of an Order to Show Cause applied to section 244(a)
applications. It therefore now meant that suspension of deportation applicants were subject to the section 240A(d)(1) rules which, as discussed above,
interrupted continuous physical presence only if a notice to appear under section 239(a) placing the alien in removal proceedings was issued. This was the
bill passed by the House of Representatives on March 21, 1996, after other
amendments on the House floor. See HR 2202, available in Congressional
Quarterly’s Washington Alert and Westlaw at 1996 CQ US HR 2202
(engrossed Mar. 21, 1996).
   The bill was placed in the calendar of the United States Senate on April 15,
1996, after its introduction by Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah as S. 1664 on
April 10, 1996. See S. 1664, available in Congressional Quarterly’s Washington Alert and Westlaw at 1996 CQ US S 1664 (reported in Senate Apr. 10,
1996). A critical difference in this bill is that section 244 of the Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, as amended, would be replaced by section
150(b) of that bill providing a new section 244 entitled “Cancellation of
Deportation; Adjustment of Status; Voluntary Departure.” Section § 150(b)
of that bill provided that continued physical presence was deemed to end
when an Order to Show Cause was issued. Id. § 150(b). However, section
150(d) of the bill, entitled “Effective Dates,” limited its application by stating
that the “amendments made by subsection (b) shall take effect on the date of
the enactment of this Act, and shall apply to all applications for relief under
section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1254), except
that, for purposes of determining the periods of continued residence or continuous physical presence, the amendments made by subsection (b) shall
apply to all aliens upon whom an order to show cause is served on or after the
date of the enactment of this Act.” Id. at § 150(d).
   On May 2, 1996, the Senate passed S. 1664 as an insert to H.R. 2202 and
sent it to the House of Representatives for concurrence. On May 20, 1996, the
House refused to concur in the Senate amendments and the bill was referred
to the Conference Committee. On September 25, 1996, the House agreed to
the Conference Committee Report on the language of the IIRIRA. On September 28, and 30, 1996, the House of Representatives and the Senate,
respectively, agreed to the language of the IIRIRA, as finally enacted, and it

                                       837
Interim Decision #3309


was signed by the President into law as part of the fiscal year 1997 spending
measure for the federal government that same day.
   In short, the language of the IIRIRA, as finally enacted, retained the
“notice to appear under section 239(a)" language of section 240A(d)(1);
deleted the operative language applying the interruption of continuous physical presence in section 244(a) applications in the original section H.R. 2202,
section 309(c)(5), and S. 1664, section 244(a)(2)(A); rejected the language in
the Senate bill limiting the interruption of continuous physical presence to
cases initiated after the enactment of the IIRIRA; and added the “before, on,
or after” language to section 309(c)(5). Consequently, it is clear that, pursuant to sections 240A(d)(1) and 309(c)(5), the interruption of continuous
physical presence applies to all cancellation of removal applications, regardless of how and when they were initiated, and does not apply to suspension of
deportation cases remaining in deportation proceedings. The applicability to
suspension of deportation applications was deleted and the section 239(a)
limitation was retained.
   The interpretation above is further supported by the Joint Explanatory
Statement. It explains that “[s]ection 240A(d) provides that the period of continuous residence or physical presence ends when an alien is served a notice
to appear under section 239(a) (for the commencement of removal proceedings under section 240).” Joint Explanatory Statement, supra, § 240A(d).
The very next paragraph further explains that the section 240A(e) limitation
on the number of grants per fiscal year applies to both cancellation of
removal and suspension of deportation. Id. § 240A(e). This specificity indicates that Congress was knowingly referring to both forms of relief distinctively and refutes the majority’s assertion that an Order to Show Cause and a
notice to appear under section 239(a) were synonymous terms with no substantive difference. The legislative history states that the rules under section
240A(d)(1) regarding continuing physical presence applied as a criterion of
eligibility for cancellation of removal. Id. § 309. It also states that the reforms
end “the accrual of time-in-residence on the date an alien is placed into
removal proceedings.” H.R. Rep. No. 104-879 (1997), available in 

. Finally, the committee specified, when discussing the purpose of section 309(c), that it was intended to retain jurisdiction over cases pending
when the IIRIRA was enacted, further suggesting its jurisdictional nature that
did not effect substantive changes on eligibility for relief absent a specific
directive to that effect elsewhere in IIRIRA. Joint Explanatory Statement,
supra, § 309.
   The majority’s contention that its “natural reading” of the statutory language is consistent with the legislative intent “to terminate immediately the
accrual of time for suspension eligibility” is illogical. Such an immediate termination of accrual time is more consistent with a prospective application of
the interruption of physical presence rule. Similarly, the majority’s argument
that the immigration reforms were motivated by a desire to remove the

                                       838
                                                                    Interim Decision #3309


incentive for aliens to prolong their cases by ending the accrual of time for
suspension is also more consistent with a prospective application. How can
you dissuade someone from doing something already done?
    The majority’s assertion that the reconciliation effected by Conference
Committee was between two bills prescribing the interruption of continuous
physical presence in suspension cases begs the question. Section 309(c)(5) of
the House bill, H.R. 2202, as passed on March 8, 1996, had already deleted
the operative language interrupting physical in determining eligibility for
suspension of deportation, and the interruption was described only as applicable as a criterion for cancellation of removal. The recession by the Senate
to the language of section 309 in the House bill thereby eliminated the last
remaining operative language which would apply the interruption of physical
presence in suspension of deportation determinations.
    Sections 309(c)(1)(A) and (B) of the IIRIRA explicitly state that regarding
aliens already in proceedings as of its effective date (April 1, 1997), its provisions do not apply and the proceedings shall continue to be conducted without regard to such amendments, except as to the limited classes of cases
described in subsection (c). This language further suggests that as to aliens
already in proceedings the provisions should be construed narrowly in accordance with the traditional rules of statutory interpretation. I do not question
the power of our government to repeal the rights of aliens whose applications
to remain here are pending. However, such a repeal must be clearly expressed
in the statute and not discerned from irrelevant implications inconsistent with
the statutory language and its legislative history. Matter of Grinberg, 

 (BIA 1994), and cases cited therein; 1A Singer, supra,
§§ 23.09, 23.10.
    If the words “under section 239(a)” were mistaken surplusage they could
have easily been deleted when Congress corrected section 309(c)(1) in the
Extension of Stay in the United States for Nurses Act, 

 Stat. 3656 (1996).2 Congress did not, and we should not by administrative fiat effectively deprive eligible aliens of their rights to be heard on their
suspension applications by imposing the inapplicable interruption rule. The
majority takes the curious position that it need not rely on the language of the
statute nor its legislative history, and that it cannot accept the reasoning of all
the courts that have interpreted the IIRIRA since it was enacted.3 I dissent

   2 Instead, Representative Lamar Smith, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Immigration and

Claims of the House Judiciary Committee, and the lead author of the IIRIRA, reaffirmed the
Joint Explanatory Statement as an accurate reflection of the views of the House of
Representatives and Senate conferees as to the interpretation of the IIRIRA section 309
transitional rules. See 142 Cong. Rec. H12293-01 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1996); cf. 2A Singer, supra,
§ 48.14.
   3 The majority uses the deleted operative language of the original section 309(c)(5)

introduced on August 4, 1995, as evidence of legislative intent that the interruption of
continuous physical presence applies automatically to all Orders to Show Cause. To the

                                             839
Interim Decision #3309


from such an unduly expansive view of our authority under 

(d)
(1996).

DISSENTING OPINION: Lory D. Rosenberg, Board Member
   I respectfully dissent.
   I join the well-reasoned dissents of my colleagues John Guendelsberger
and Gustavo Villageliu, each of whom thoughtfully and correctly interprets
the statutory language and legislative history to favor treating section
309(c)(5) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility
Act of 1996, Division C of 

 Stat. 3009-546,
3009-627 (“IIRIRA”), as a prospective rule of transition, applicable only
after April 1, 1997, in appropriate cases. As their opinions articulate, principles of statutory interpretation and controlling law warrant our reaching a
conclusion other than the one adopted by the majority in this closely split
decision.
   Although the majority may seek to cloak its argument within the premise
that the language interpreted here is plain, obviously it is not. Theoretically,
when the language is plain, we are to give effect to the intent of Congress by
giving the words used their ordinary meaning. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

 (1984); Matter of
Shaar, 

 (BIA 1996) (stating that when statutory language is
plain that is the end of the inquiry).
   Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., supra,
teaches that when Congress has not spoken plainly, and in that way ended the
inquiry, legislative history may be determinative. Id. at 843-44. It is also true
that even in determining the plain meaning of the words in a statute, and
thereby the intent of Congress, we may look to legislative history. INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 

 (1987).
   In either case, reliance on legislative history does not mean that an agency
can properly rely on statements that may have been made by individual legislators to the media or even offered as individual points of view on the floor of
Congress. What may have been intended by one supporter of an enactment
may not at all be the reason which prompted the vote of another supporter.
Certainly, consideration of legislative intent does not mean giving weight to
what an individual adjudicator may perceive as being Congress’ intent.
   Furthermore, we conduct our interpretation of statutory language mindful
of the canons of construction. To my knowledge, Congress has not yet overridden the holdings of many venerable Justices of the Supreme Court who
have noted that deportation is a harsh result, similar to exile. Bridges v.
Wixon, 

 (1945) (stating that deportation “visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work
contrary, such deleted text should be treated as evidence that Congress did not intend its
applicability. 2A Singer, supra, §§ 48.04, 48.18.

                                          840
                                                            Interim Decision #3309


in this land of freedom”); see also Fong Haw Tan v. Phelan, 

(1948) (recognizing that deportation is the equivalent of banishment); Jordan v. De George, 

 (1951) (equating deportation with a sentence
to life in exile); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 

 (1922) (describing deportation as akin to the loss of property or life or all that makes life worth living).
    Given these harsh consequences, when faced with a choice between two
readings of a deportation-related provision, the courts and, until now, this
Board have relied upon the sound principle that we resolve doubts in statutory construction in favor of the alien. INS v. 

 Barber v. Gonzales, 

 (1954); Fong Haw Tan v. 

; INS v. Errico, 

 (1966); Matter of Tiwari, 

 (BIA 1989).
    Congress has not legislated away the long-accepted canon of construction
that ambiguities in deportation statutes are to be construed in favor of the
alien. And this is not an invitation to do so, as any such attempt would be
likely to clash with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. This critical canon also is known as the “rule of
lenity.” As a practical matter, it means that in deportation matters, when the
law is less than clear, the benefit of the doubt goes to the noncitizen.
    My colleagues in the majority, whom I am certain are well aware of this
canon, nonetheless have chosen to overlook it in favor of acceding to what
they apparently view as the harsh, anti-alien legislative intent of the statute,
mandating and supporting their conclusion. I do not suggest that they harbor
any ill will towards noncitizens. I simply am forced to conclude that in their
opinion today, they communicate the message that, after the IIRIRA, the benefit of the doubt has been turned on its head. Like Alice in Through the
Looking Glass, what was the benefit of the doubt, now has become, the doubt
that any alien should receive a benefit.
    I dissent from such an interpretation.

DISSENTING OPINION: Fred W. Vacca, Board Member

  I respectfully join the dissents of Board Members John W.
Guendelsberger, Lory D. Rosenberg, and Gustavo D. Villageliu



              BEFORE THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
                       (July 10, 1997)

   Pursuant to 

(h)(1)(i)(1997), I direct the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) to refer to me for review its decision in Matter of N-J-B-
(A28 626 831) (Feb. 20, 1997), and I vacate the opinion of the BIA pending
my further determination.

                                        841