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← 21 Kan. App. 2d 956 - State v. Prosper

21 Kan. App. 2d 956 - State v. Prosper’s Empirical Analysis

1996

Citation profile

4
cited by 4 later decisions
1
states following
April 2002
most recently cited

4 state decisions

Relationships

Applies 21 U.S.C. § 860 (§ 419 of the Controlled Substances Act)

Relies on Bibby v. United States · Gillespie v. Seymour · City of New York v. Seawall Associates · State v. Timley · State v. Donlay

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 4 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““(a) Except as authorized by the uniform controlled substances act, it shall be unlawful for any person to sell, offer for sale or have in such person’s possession with the intent to sell, deliver or distribute; cultivate; prescribe; administer; defiver; distribute; dispense or compound: (3) any hallucinogenic drug designated in subsection (d) of K.S.A. 65-4105, and amendments thereto or designated in subsection (g) of K.S.A. 65-4107 and amendments thereto or designated in subsection (g) of K.S.A. 65-4109 and amendments thereto; “Except as provided in subsection (b), any person who violates this subsection shall be guilty of a drug severity level 3 felony. “(b) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, upon conviction of any person pursuant to subsection (a) for an offense in which the substances involved were possessed with intent to sell, sold or offered for sale in or on, or within 1,000 feet of any school property upon which is located a structure used by a unified school district or an accredited nonpublic school for student instruction or attendance or extracurricular activities of pupils enrolled in kindergarten or any of the grades one through 12 and such person is 18 or more years of age, such person shall be guilty of a drug severity level 2 felony.” (Emphasis added.)”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““K.S.A. 1993 Supp. 65-4127a(d) requires that the structure or property be used by a unified school district or accredited nonpublic school. The statute contains no ownership requirement. Had the legislature intended to adopt an ownership requirement, it could easily have done so. It is not the function of the court to rewrite a statute under the guise of interpretation. [Citation omitted.] “Moreover, the legislature intended for the statute to protect children from the negative effects of drug use and drug dealing. [Citation omitted.] Children are exposed to those negative influences when drug deals are conducted near schools regardless of whether the school buildings are owned or leased by school districts.” 21 Kan. App. 2d at 963 .”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. ““[K.S.A. 60-455] is not autonomous on the. admissibility of evidence of past crimes since it is subject to the provisions of other rules relating, to-the admission of evidence. • . • ■ . “Kansas case law makes it clear the majority of prosecutors and trial courts have read K.S.A. 60-455 as though the exception in the last sentence were the rule, and when the proffered past crimes evidence bore some relevance to motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan; knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake, the gates of admissibility automatically swung open- under the theory proper instruction would correct any error of judicial discretion and would limit the jury’s consideration of the evidence to its proper role.' “Relevancy as the Single test of admissibility is disapproved from the very beginning of the evidence code. K.S.A. 60-407(/) provides all relevant evidence is admissible except as otherwise provided by statute. K.S.A. -60-455‘is such an exception generally prohibiting evidence of past crimes and takes precedence over 60-407(/):.... ' ■ “Although K.S.A. 60-445 refers to the exercise of discretion by the trial court when the evidence relates only to ‘surprise,’ it is a rule of necessity that the trial court may exclude any evidence which may unfairly prejudice a jury. Judge Gárd, in his comments following this.statute, states:- ‘Scattered among the Kansas decisions are cases which support the discretionary-power to exclude.'The rule is one of necessity. Trial judges and ”
    1 later decision quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.