Owens v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

56 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““* * * the defendant has ordinarily thirty (30) days from the entry of a verdict or judgment to file a motion for a new trial, subject to time modifications by the rules of the trial court. T.C.A. see. 27-201. If the judgment is entered some time subsequent to the entry of the verdict (i. e., not on the same day, but on a subsequent day), the defendant has thirty (30) days after the entry of the judgment to move for a new trial. Neely v. State, 210 Tenn. 52 , 356 S.W.2d 401 (1962). Also, unless the rules of the trial court state otherwise, the motion for a new trial, to be seasonably made, does not have to be in writing and does not have to state the reasons or grounds for the motion. Shettles v. State, 209 Tenn. 157 , 352 S.W.2d 1 (1961). The Shettles case also holds that this Court cannot consider trial court rules unless they are proved on the trial below and are incorporated in the bill of exceptions. “In Shettles, the oral language used in the 'motion’ for a new trial was (as evidenced by the minutes of the court): “ ‘Thereupon the defendant, through her counsel of record, moves the Court for a new trial herein, which motion is set for hearing on August 2, 1960. ’ “In the case at bar, the oral language, as evidenced by the minutes of the court on the day the verdict and judgment were entered, is: ‘Thereupon the defendant by his attorney gave notice of motion for a new trial. ’ In the case at bar, the written motion and the grounds therefor was filed, argued, and overrule”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 58 Tenn. App. 457 - Hendrix v. City of Maryville

2. ““While it is indisputable that the affidavit must contain the nature of the informant’s information, it is, according to Gallimore v. State, 173 Tenn. 178 , 116 S.W.2d 1001 (1938), nevertheless the office of the magistrate issuing the warrant to determine himself what particular or specific facts will justify his exercise of discretion — so long as there is some material evidence before him. Lea v. State, 181 Tenn. 378 , 181 S.W.2d 351 (1944), reiterates this point. It is clear, then, that the facts stated in the affidavit, i.e., the facts upon which the affiant bases his reasonable belief, are not subject to contradiction at the trial for the purpose of suppressing the evidence secured by means of the warrant. This is so because the magistrate determines the verity of the facts, at least he is supposed to, before he issues the warrant. He performs a judicial act which is not subject to review unless there are no material facts upon which he based his discretion. O’Brien v. State, 205 Tenn. 405 , 326 S.W.2d 759 (1959); Solomon v. State, 203 Tenn. 583 , 315 S.W.2d 99 (1958). The United States Supreme Court recognized, in the case of Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 , (1964), that an affidavit could not be based on the mere conclusions of an informant, something the Supreme Court of Tennessee has recognized for at least forty years. Nevertheless, since Ker v. State of California, 374 U.S. 23 , 83 S.Ct. 1623 , 10 L.Ed.2d 726 (1963), announ”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 4 Tenn. Crim. App. 41 - Poole v. State

3. ““The United States Supreme Court recognized, in the case of Aguilar v. State of Texas, 378 U.S. 108 , 84 S.Ct. 1509 , 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964), that an affidavit could not be based on the mere conclusions of an informant, something the Supreme Court of Tennessee has recognized for at least forty years. “In Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 , 80 S.Ct. 725 , 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960), it was held, inter alia, that hearsay is an acceptable basis for probable cause so long as it is corroborated by other information, or so long as there is ‘a substantial basis for crediting the hearsay.’ (Of course, as Aguilar holds, this hearsay must be direct observation as to facts from the informant and not just the informant’s unsupported conclusions.)” Owens v. State, 217 Tenn. 544 , 399 S.W.2d 507 (1965).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Smith