21 Md. App. 269 - Spease v. State’s Empirical Analysis
1974
Citation profile
2 federal appellate · 28 state decisions
How this case has been cited
Cited by 30 later decisions — most recently May 1993 · most notably 24 Md. App. 128 - Andresen v. State (1975), United States v. Vento (1976)
2 federal appellate · 28 state decisions
Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.
Relationships
Applies 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2517 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986) · 18 U.S.C. § 2518 (Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986)
Relies on Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics · Mapp v. Ohio · Weeks v. United States · Linkletter v. Walker · Alderman v. United States
Most-quoted passages
The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.
“‘It seems clear under the general law of search and seizure that if some of the items obtained satisfy the requirements of the law, the mere fact that other objects beyond the permissible ambit of the search must be suppressed, does not require that all of the evidence must be necessarily so treated.’ ””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““The great weight of authority and, in our judgment, the sounder reasoning maintains that the failure to minimize requires only the suppression of those conversations which should not have been seized and not the suppression of those conversations which were appropriately seized.””
2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority““Whether dealing with conversations or with tangible items, the issue is one of particularity — that language of the Fourth Amendment stating that the only valid warrants are those ‘particularly describing .. . the things to be seized.’ The classic case on point is Marron v. United States, 275 U. S. 192 , 48 S. Ct. 74 , 72 L. Ed. 231 (1927). In that case, certain ledgers and other papers not particularly described in a search and seizure warrant were held to have been improperly seized under the warrant; other items which had been particularly described, however, were admitted into evidence. More recent applications of the Marrón principle, mandating only the partial suppression of things wrongfully seized and not derogating from the admissibility of those things rightfully seized, are United States ex rel. Nickens v. LaVallee, 391 F. 2d 123 (2nd Cir. 1968); United States v. Dzialak, 441 F. 2d 212 (2nd Cir. 1971); and Brooks v. United States, 416 F. 2d 1044 (5th Cir. 1969).”
1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
How this case has been treated — in progress
Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.