¶1(dissenting). On the basis of Miranda v. Arizona (1966), 384 US 436 (86 S Ct 1602, 16 L Ed 2d 694, 10 ALR3d 974), and Escobedo v. Illinois (1964), 378 US 478 (84 S Ct 1758, 12 L Ed 2d 977), the majority opinion holds that it was reversible error to admit the testimony of detective Snyder for impeachment purposes. If Snyder’s testimony was inadmissible under the Miranda and Escobedo standards, it was not admissible for impeachment purposes, People v. Hosack (1969), 16 Mich App 552, and I would concur in reversal.
¶2However, defendant concedes that he was not in custody when he made the statement related by Snyder and that Miranda, supra,does not apply. On this record, which discloses an offense January 1, 1967 that was reported to the police in July, 1967, and the purported inadmissible statement made during a casual investigation July 28, 1967 with no formal charge against defendant until November 3, 1967,1 am unable to say that proceedings against defendant had reached the adversary or accusatory stage on July 28,1967. In my view, neither Miranda*450nor Escobedo, supra,applies to this ease and Snyder’s testimony was properly admitted.
¶3In addition, defendant contends that the trial judge employed an improper method in determining the credibility of witnesses and that he failed to give the proper weight to the presumption of innocence.
¶4With respect to the first error alleged in the preceding paragraph, defendant concedes that a trial court sitting without a jury is the trier of fact and must determine the credibility of witnesses, and that normally an appellate court will not review questions of credibility. In this instance, however, defendant contends that the trial judge determined the credibility by using a method which employed as its test information collateral and not germane to the lawsuit in question, employed as its test information based on personal information known only to the trier of fact, and a method that indicated a predisposition of the trier of fact to a particular finding of credibility depending on the community status of the witness involved. In support of this contention, defendant cites excerpts from the oral decision of the trial judge given from the bench at the conclusion of the trial. These excerpts taken out of context lend some credence to defendant’s position, but when the oral decision is read in its entirety, it does not support defendant’s position. I find no error in this regard.
¶5Further, defendant says the proof of the prosecution was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of innocence, and therefore the trial judge failed to give that presumption its proper weight. On this record, there is no doubt that the crime charged was committed, and the record contains ample evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant committed it. This overcomes the presumption.
¶6I would affirm the trial court.