<p>On the 10th of August, 1847, the Hon. George Coalter, judge of the third judicial district, granted a writ of habeas corpus on the petition of James Shirley, requiring Claiborne Steele to bring seven slaves before the judge, which the petitioner alleged Steele forcibly took out of his possession and unlawfully detained. The writ was returnable on the next day at the court-house of Warren county, and was directed to and executed by the coroner.</p> <p>At the time and place appointed Steele appeared and answered, that the slaves named in the petition were enumerated in a writ of injunction and seizure from the superior court of chancery, in the case of R. L. Mathews complainant, and James Shirley defendant, and the special direction on the writ was, that the sheriff of Warren county should keep these slaves until the defendant, or in his default, the complainant, should give bond for their safe keeping and delivery, to abide the further order of the court of chancery in the cause. That as sheriff of Warren county he seized these seven negroes and committed them to his jail, where they remained until the 15th day of July, 1847, without any bond being given or claimed by either complainant or defendant, during which time jail fees accrued to the amount of one hundred and forty dollars. On the 15th day of July, 1847, Shirley presented to him an order from the chancery court, which authorized Shirley to demand the negroes, and they would have been delivered to him upon the payment of the jail fees which had thus accrued, and for the payment of which respondent alleged the negroes were bound. He then held the negroes only for the purpose of compelling the payment of the fees due him, in all $205.75, for the keeping the negroes. The other fees due to him as sheriff he did not claim until the end of the chancery suit.</p> <p>The facts stated in this answer were admitted to be true. The order of restitution by Steele to Shirley, of the slaves seized by him, by virtue of the process in the case in chancery of Mathews v. Shirley, was read in evidence.</p> <p>The bill in chancery in the case of Mathews v. Shirley was also read; the substance of it was as follows : that James Shirley and his wife and children and others had fried a bill, on the chancery side of the circuit court of the United States for the southern district of Mississippi, against John Martin and others, and had obtained from the judge of that court a writ of injunction, restraining the defendants therein from proceeding to sell certain slaves named, (including the seven in controversy in this case,) under execution in their favor against James Shirley; the bill claiming the slaves as the property of the children of Shirley. This fiat was granted on condition that James Shirley should execute a bond in the penalty of five thousand dollars, with surety conditioned that the complainants should have the slaves forthcoming, to answer and abide any order or decree of that court in the cause. Mathews as surety for Shirley executed this bond with him and others, on Shirley’s solemn assurance that the slaves should be kept to abide such decree. On the execution of this bond the slaves were restored to Shirley’s possession in Tallahatchie county, where Shirley had had them at work on a plantation in that county. Since then, Shirley had abandoned his plantation and removed to Vicksburg, in Warren county, with his family, and was about also to move these slaves there, with the view of removing them from the state. That such Mathews believed was the intention of Shirley, who, in case his injunction against Martin and others was dissolved, would as Mathews feared and believed, remove the slaves and leave Mathews to pay the bond. That Shirley was insolvent. The bill prayed for injunction against Shirley’s removal of the slaves, and that unless he would give security that he would not do so, the sheriff of Warren county might seize them, &c. The chancellor granted a fiat in accordance with the prayer of the bill.</p> <p>It was then admitted, that on the 15th of July Shirley had demanded the slaves of Steele, and the latter refused to deliver them up unless his jail fees were paid him.</p> <p>Hereupon Steele objected to the jurisdiction of the judge ; the objection was overruled and exceptions taken. The judge then ordered Steele to deliver the slaves to Shirley; Steele again excepted and appealed. The appeal was prosecuted and dismissed (see 9 S. & M. 382,) and this writ of error afterwards allowed.</p> <p>They insisted,</p> <p>I. Under the statute, Hutch. Miss. Code, 1001, § 9, writs of error in cases of this sort are allowable. See Steele v. Shirley, 9 S. & M. 382.</p> <p>II. To entitle the applicant to this writ, the slaves must be taken or seduced out of his possession by force, stratagem or fraud, and be unlawfully detained in the defendant’s possession, (Hutch. Miss. Code, 1002, § 19.)</p> <p>1. In this case the slaves were neither taken nor seduced from petitioner’s possession by force, stratagem nor fraud. They were taken by the sheriff as such, under a fiat of the chancellor, on a bill regularly filed upon a subject over which by the constitution and laws he had full jurisdiction; whether providently or improvidently granted, the circuit judge had no right to determine ; nor has this court in this collateral way. Until reversed, the trial of the chancellor was legal, proper and conclusive; the sheriff was bound to obey it; and in obedience to it he took the slaves. He took them then by authority of law; and obtained their possession in neither of the modes pointed out by the statute.</p> <p>2. Nor were these slaves unlawfully detained, in such a manner that the circuit judge could take notice of it. If the sheriff was not entitled to his fees, the remedy of the petitioner was by motion to the chancellor. The chancery court had taken jurisdiction of the subject-matter; and the circuit judge could not interfere. The sheriff held the slaves legally, and he therefore detained them legally; non constat, that the chancellor had not reversed his order allowing the possession to petitioner, or had not required him to pay jail fees. The whole record was not before the circuit judge. Where one court has taken jurisdiction of a subject-matter within its jurisdiction, until a final decree, no other court can inquire collaterally into the exercise of that jurisdiction. Were the exercise of the power used in this case by the circuit judge sustained, all chancery suits for the trial of the right of possession to slaves, would be tried by habeas corpus. Hutch. Miss. Code, 762, § 50.</p> <p>• 3. But the sheriff was entitled to his jail fees. Hutch. Miss. Code, 487, 488, 489. He is entitled to receive his. pay for victualling negroes taken under attachment or execution; there is no limitation on this right. It is absolute; it does not depend on the order of court; it is not part of the costs for which the sheriff is entitled, from that party from whom they are adjudged. He is absolutely, and under all contingencies, entitled to his pay; and the negroes are necessarily liable to him for them. He who demands their possession must pay the fees. He has a lien on the slaves for their feeding. He is a bailee, like an innkeeper, livery stable-keeper, &c., and before the owner can recover the article he must pay charges, and look to the ultimate decree of the chancellor for his reimbursement. A contrary decision would subject unreasonably a sheriff to great risk of loss; would subject the slaves to the chances -of rigorous treatment, for the sheriff might not be able to advance the money for their support, and they might suffer in consequence; might in some cases ruin a sheriff, who had been required to take a large number of slaves into custody, and hold them for a long time.</p> <p>Cited Walk. Rep. 154; Acts of 1846, p. 210; of 1844, p. 120; 4'S. &M. 770; Dunlap’s Pr. 1120; H. & H. 538; Const. Art. IT. § 4; 2 Tidd’s Pr. 1188.</p>
