Dobkin v. Chapman’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

8 federal appellate · 53 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 75 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “These lawsuits [do] not appear out of the blue; they are the consequence of serious accidents in which the defendants knew that [another] had been injured.... Anyone who drives a car knows that, after such an occurrence, he [or she] is likely to be served as a defendant. Due process does not require that defendants derive any advantage from the sedulous avoidance of any of these measures. Indeed, in an automobile case, no defendant need be without notice unless he chooses and wants to be; many an injured plaintiff, however, will go without recompense if, in a proper case, the standards of informative notice may not be relaxed.”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. 164 N.J. Super. 219 - Austin v. Millard · 201 W. Va. 433 - Hartwell v. Marquez

2. ““An elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding ... is notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections. . . . The notice must be of such nature as reasonably to convey the required information . . . and it must afford a reasonable time for those interested to make their appearance. . . . But if with due regard for the practicalities and pecularities of the case these conditions are reasonably met, the constitutional requirements are satisfied.” Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. (1950), 339 U.S. 306, 314-315 . “In Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. . . . we gave thorough consideration to the problem of adequate notice under the Due Process Clause. That case establishes the rule that, if feasible, notice must be reasonably calculated to inform parties of proceedings which may directly and adversely affect their legally protected interests. We there called attention to the impossibility of setting up a rigid formula as to the kind of notice that must be given; notice required will vary with circumstances and conditions. We recognized that in some cases it might not be reasonably possible to give personal notice, for example where people are missing or unknown.” (our emphasis) 352 U.S. at 115-116 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Mueller v. Mueller

3. “Notice and an opportunity to be heard are, of course, high among the traditional elements of fair procedure included in the concept of due process.... Due process is not, however, a mechanical formula or a rigid set of rules. Increasingly in modern jurisprudence, the term has come to represent a realistic and reasonable evaluation of the respective interests of plaintiffs, defendants and the state under the circumstances of the particular case.... Our law has long been comfortable with many situations in which it was evident, as a practical matter, that parties to whom notice was ostensibly addressed would never in fact receive it.... Plaintiffs, in cases of that kind, have been expected to do what they reasonably could to inform defendants — for example, to mail notice if the address is known — but, having done so, the negligible likelihood that the methods remaining to them would actually succeed has not deprived plaintiffs of effective rights of action.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Cadle Co. v. Jay