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21 N.Y. St. Rep. 900

Brundage v. Rust

New York Supreme Court

Decided December 10, 1888

New York Supreme Court · decided 1888-12-10

<p>1. Executors and administrators—Accounting—When petition for cannot be maintained against surviving executrix.</p> <p>A petition for tlie settlement of the accounts of executors cannot he maintained against a surviving executrix, who never received any of the assets, the same being exclusively managed and controlled by her co-executor and she not having been guilty of negligence or bad faith.</p> <p>2. Same—Settlement of accounts—Defense to petition for accounting—Failure to enter order.</p> <p>That the petitioner and the deceased executor accounted before the surrogate, the executrix joining therein, and that a full settlement was then made, while said executor was solvent, which settlement had been for' many years acquiesced in, and that by a stipulation in writing then made between the accounting parties, an o:der was to he entered approving the account, though such order was never entered, is a good defense to such a petition. The fact that such account was not approved and passed hy the surrogate is not material.</p>

Decided 1888-12-10

Pratt, J.

¶1The answer of the defendant herein, which is admitted by the demurrer, sets forth two good defenses to the claim of the petitioner, to wit: First, that she never assumed or exercised any control over the estate of John P. Rust, or received any of the assets thereof as executrix, but that the same was exclusively managed and controlled by her co-executor, or Rodolphus B. Johnson; and second, that a full settlement has been had with the petitioner, and such settlement executed, and a final accounting had in the surrogate’s court.

¶2*903These defenses fully met the allegations of the petitioner, so far as this petition is concerned. There is no statemént in the petition of negligence or bad faith on the part of the defendant, and no claim that any funds have come into her hands since said settlement.

¶3• It would be manifestly unjust to hold the defendant responsible because she consented ■ to, or joined in, the accounts as filed by her co-executor, as she was induced to take that course at the solicitation of the petitioner, and the more so, as it is admitted that the co-executor was pecuniarily responsible at the accounting, and afterwards died insolvent.

¶4The fact that such account was not approved and passed by the surrogate is not material. The parties to the accounting consented to the entry of such an order, and this was as binding upon such parties as if the order had been entered.

¶5The parties have acted upon the faith of these proceedings for a long time, and are estopped from now questioning their validity as against each other.

¶6It follows that the order must be reversed.

¶7All concur.

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