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21 Tex. 121

Secrest v. Jones

Texas Supreme Court

Decided July 1, 1858

Texas Supreme Court · decided 1858-07-01

Tried below before the Hon. James H. Bell. Action of trespass to try title, commenced in Colorado county, April 12th, 1853, by William J. Jones, against Washington Secrest and Larkin Secrest. The land sued for was-the upper half of share number two, allotted to John J. Tumlinson, one of the heirs of Elizabeth Tumlinson, deceased, in the division of the league and labor of land, granted to said Elizabeth by the Mexican Government, as her headright.

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1858-07-01

How this case has been cited

Cited by 19 later decisions — most recently December 1952

1 federal appellate · 18 state decisions

7018581860187018801890190019101920193019401950decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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Wheeler, J.

¶1The doctrine held by this Court, in repeated decisions, has been that obligations to make title, of the character of that from Wright to Fitchett, of the 24th of April, 1834, are executory contracts of sale, which do not have the effect of a conveyance to pass the title absolutely. (3 Tex. R. 473-4.) They evidence a contract of sale ; and they bind the obligor to make a conveyance, in case the obligee shall not make default in the performance of his part of the contract. But they do not pass the title absolutely. In case of the default of the vendee, the vendor may elect to abandon the contract, and recover back or alienate the land, upon giving notice to the vendee and his refusal to perform his part of the contract, although by its terms the making of the title and payment of the purchase money be not dependent covenants. (Browning v. Estis, 11 Tex. R. 237, and cases cited.) The Court therefore erred in the charge to the jury, that the effect of the instrument of the 24th of April, 1834, was that of an absolute deed or conveyance. The evidence would have well warranted the jury in finding that the price had been paid, especially after so great a lapse of time, and that thereby the title became vested absolutely in the vendee, Fitchett. But that was a question for the jury. If it had been left to them to decide, under instructions to the effect that if the purchase money was paid, the title became absolute in the vendee, and he had the power to sell and convey the title to the plaintiff, there would have been no ground to disturb the verdict.

¶2The objection that the Act of Partition, of the 19th of December, 1833, was not admissible in evidence, because not recorded, may be obviated by having it recorded in the proper county before another trial.

¶3*133The instrument of the 24th of April, 1834, from Wright to Fitchett must be held to have been properly admitted to record under the decision of this Court in the case of Paschal v. Perez. (7 Tex. R. 348.)

¶4As the case must be remanded, it does not become necessary to decide upon the effect of the evidence touching the question of possession, or title by limitation ; nor is it probable that it will become material upon another trial, as there can be but little doubt of the result upon the merits of the plaintiff’s title. The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded.

¶5Reversed and remanded.

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