Volume 21 — United States Reports

Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823), is a 6-to-1 ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States that held that the state of Virginia had properly entered into a compact with the United States federal government under Clause One of Article Four of the United States Constitution. This compact surrendered Virginia's claim to the area that eventually became the state of Kentucky, but imposed restrictions on Kentucky's ability to upset title to land sold or otherwise granted by the state of Virginia at the time of the compact. The Supreme Court held that legislation enacted by Kentucky that restricted these rights unconstitutionally infringed on Virginia's right to surrender the land in accordance with Article Four, Clause One.

This was an allegation, filed by the Spanish consul against the brig Nereyda, a public vessel of war belonging to the king of Spain, stating, that the vessel had been captured by the privateer Irresistible,- John O. Daniels, master, in violation of the laws, treaties and neutral obligations of the United States.

^Appeal from the Circuit Court of Rhode Island. The original bill, filed by the appellant, Hunt, stated, that Lewis Rousmanier, the intestate of the defendants, applied to the plaintiff, in January 1820, for the loan of $1450, offering to give, in addition to his notes, a bill of sale, or a mortgage of his interest in the brig Nereus, then at sea, as collateral security for the repayment of the money.

<p>Independent covenants. — Attachment.</p> <p>Where the acts stipulated to be done, are to be done at different times, the covenants are to be construed as independent of each other.1 Application of this principle to the peculiar circumstances of the present case.2</p> <p>Under the act of assembly of Maryland of 1795 (c. 56), if the defendant appears and dissolves the attachment, a declaration and subsequent pleadings, are not necessary, as in other actions, but the cause may be tried upon a short note.</p> <p>It seems, under the same act, that an attachment will not lie, in a case ex contract'd, for unliquida-ted damages, for the non-delivery of goods; but where the plaintiff is entitled to a stipulated sum of money, in lieu of a specific article to be delivered, an attachment will lie.</p>

Held: “ that a settlement, after marriage, in favor of the wife and children, by a person not indebted at the time, was good against subsequent creditors “ and that, although the settler was indebted, yet, if the debt was secured by mortgage, the settlement was good.” *109 In the case of Lush v. Wilkinson, the husband conveyed a leasehold estate in trust, to pay, after his decease, an annuity to his wife for life, and…

Held: occupied and possessed, in full sovereignty, by various independent tribes or nations of Indians, who were the sovereigns of their respective portions of the territory, and the absolute owners and proprietors of the soil; and who neither acknowledged nor owed any allegiance or obedience to any European sovereign or state whatever : and that in making settlements within this territory, and in all the other parts of…

Held: that the statutes of limitation of Massachusetts did not apply even to suits by the State government in the State Courts, and that the 34th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20. which provides, ' that the laws of the several States , except where the constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or provide, Shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in…

This cause came before the court upon a certificate of a division of opinion between the judges of the Circuit Court of Maine.

The facts (so far as necessary) are stated in the opinion of this court. February 11th. argued, that this case was distinguishable in its circumstances from that of The George, 1 Wheat. 408, 2 Ibid. 278, captui-ed by the same privateer, and adjudged by this court to be a collusive capture. argued upon the facts, with great minuteness and ability, to show, that the capture was made maid fide.

This was a hill of interpleader, filed by the South Carolina Insurance Company, in the court below, on the 25th of April 1816, against the appellants, and Gray It appeared by the pleadings and the evidence in the cause, that this policy had been made on the 6th of May 1811, by the respondents, the South Carolina Insurance Company, upon a vessel called the Abigail Ann, then lying in Savannah, on a voyage to Dublin, or a port in St. George’s Channel, for account of John H.…

Held: that he was entitled to recover. In debt, a less sum may be recovered than that demanded in the writ, where an entire sum is *130 demanded and it is shown by the counts, to consist of several distinct accounts, or where 'the precise sum demanded is diminished by extrinsic circumstances. ERROR to the Circuit Court of Maryland.

<p>ERROR to the Supreme Court of Vermont, for tbe county of Chittenden, being the highest court of law in that state.</p> <p>The plaintiff in error, Buel, brought an action of assumpsit against the defendant in error, Yan Ness, in the state court. The declaration was for money had and received, and money lent and advanced, to which defendant pleaded the general issue, and upon the trial, the jury found the following special verdict:</p> <p>That for the space of two years preceding the 15th day of February, in the year 1813, the said Samuel Buel was collector of the customs for the district of Vermont, having beeix theretofore duly appointed and commissioned by the president of the United States to that office, and sworn according to law, and taken upon himself the discharge of the duties of the office aforesaid ; that during the time the said Buel was collector of the customs aforesaid, a certain quantity of fur and wine was seized in the said district, by one Joshua Peckham, an inspector of the customs within the said district, acting under the authority of the said Buel, as collector as aforesaid, as forfeited to the United States, for having been imported contrary to law ; that the *said fur and wine, dui’ing the time the said Buel was collector as aforesaid, were duly libelled in the disti'ict coui’t of the United States for the district of Vermont; that at the term of said court, in which the said fur and wine were libelled, as aforesaid, one Zalmon Atwood preferred his claim to the said fur and wine, in due form, in the said court, and then and there executed to the said United States, a bond in the sum of $1202.64, being the value of the said fur and wine, as appraised according to law, and conditioned for the payment of the said sum to the United States, in case the said fur and wine should be condemned ; that afterwards, and while the said Buel was collector as aforesaid, to wit, at the term of the said court, holden at Rutland, within and for said district, on the 10th day of October, in the year 1812, such proceedings were had on said libel, that the said fur and wine were regularly condemned, as forfeited to the United States ; that on the said 15th day of February, in the year 1813, the said Samuel Buel was, by the president of the United States, removed from the said office of collector for the district of Vermont; that on the same day, the said Cornelius P. Van ISTess was duly appointed to the said office, and commissioned and sworn accordingly, and still continues to hold said office ; that on the 10th day of May, in the year 1813, the said sum of $1202.64 was paid into court, in discharge of the said bond, into the hands of Jesse Gore, Esquire, clerk of the said court ; that on the same day, the said sum of money was, *by the said Jesse Gore, paid into the hands of the said Cornelius P. Van Ness, Esquire, collector as aforesaid, to be by him distributed according to the laws of the United States ; that the said Cornelius P. Van Ness, on the first day of July, in the year last aforesaid, paid into the treasury of the United States one moiety of the said sum of $1202.64, and that the said Cornelius P. Van Ness retains the remainder of the said sum, as belonging to him, as collector as aforesaid, and to the inspector who seized the said goods, and to the person who first informed of the said offence, notwithstanding the said Buel, before the commencement of the said action, to wit, on the fifth day of June, in the year 1813, at Burlington aforesaid, did demand the same of the said Van Ness. And if, upon the whole matter aforesaid, by the jurors aforesaid, in form aforesaid found, it shall seem to the court here, that the said Cornelius P. Van Ness is liable in law for the non-performance of the promises in said declaration contained, in manner and form as the said Samuel Buel complains against him, then the said jurors further upon their oath say, that the said Cornelius did assume and promise, in manner and form as the said plaintiff, in his said declaration hath alleged, and they assess the damages of him, the said Samuel, by the occasion of the non-performance of the said promises and undertakings, at the sum of 1672.47, and find for him to recover the said sum, with his costs ; hut if upon the whole matters aforesaid, by the jurors aforesaid, in form aforesaid found, *it shall seem to the court here, that the said Cornelius P. Yan Ness is not liable in law, in manner and form as the said Samuel complains against him, then the jurors aforesaid, upon their oath say, that the said Cornelius P. Yan Ness did not assume and promise, in manner and form as the said Samuel hath alleged against him and find for him to recover his costs.</p> <p>Upon which, judgment was rendered by the state court for the defendant; and the cause was brought by writ of error to this court. The writ of error was issued by the clerk of the circuit court of Yermont, under the seal of that court, and in the usual form of writs of error to the judgments of the circuit courts of the United States.</p> <p>February 12th.</p> <p>argued, that the judgment of the state court was erroneous, upon the settled decisions of this court. The collector, under whose authority the seizure was made, was clearly entitled to the moiety of the forfeiture given by the collection act of 1799, c. 122, §§ 89, 91, and not the collector who was in office at the time condemnation was pronounced, and the money actually received. Jones v. Shore, 1 Wheat. 462.</p> <p>argued : 1. That the writ of error, in this case, was not, upon its face, to a final judgment of the highest court of law of the state. This court is a court of a Uimited and special jurisdiction, both by the constitution, and by the act of congress giving it appellate jurisdiction over the state courts, in certain cases. All persons who appear before it must bring themselves within the jurisdiction, either by the nature of the controversy, or the character of the parties. Durous-seau v. United States, 6 Cranch 307 ; Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 Dali. 8. The writ of error is the instrument by which the record is to be brought into this court, and it must, therefore, exhibit, on its face, the appellate jurisdiction.</p> <p>2. The writ does not appear to have emanated from the office of the clerk of this court, nor from any office authorized to issue it. The writ was issued by the clerk of the circuit court of Yermont. The act of May 1792, c. 137, § 9, directs the clerk of this court to send to the clerks of the circuit courts, the form of a writ of error, to be issued by the latter, under the seal of the circuit court. But this provision cannot apply to writs of error to judgments of the state courts.</p> <p>3. It is not stated in the writ of error, nor does it appear, that the supreme court of the state of Yermont is the highest court of law or equity in the state, in which a decision could be had. Non constat, but there may be another still higher appellate tribunal, where the cause might have been carried.</p> <p>4. The amount of the judgment is not sufficient to support a writ of error to this court. The 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, provides, that in all cases where this court has appellate jurisdiction from the judgments or decrees of the state courts, they may be re-examined on a writ of error “ in the same manner, and under the same regulations, and the writ shall have the same effect, as if the judgment or decree complained of had been rendered or passed in a circuit court.” One of those regulations is, that the matter in dispute must be of the value of $2000. And the policy of the law, or the supposed intention of the law-makers, cannot give jurisdiction by implication.</p> <p>5. But if these formal objections should be overruled, he insisted, that the decision of the state court was not against a right claimed under a statute of the United States, within the 25th section of the judiciary act of 1789, c. 20, since both parties claimed the sum of money in controversy under the same act of congress. If the state court has committed any error, it is merely in misconstruing an act of congress, and not in deciding against any right, title, privilege or exemption claimed by the plaintiff under it. The decision is in favor of a party so claiming, and where that is the case, this court has no jurisdiction. Gordon v. Galdcleugh, 3 Cranch 268 ; Matthews v. Zane, 4 Ibid. 382.</p> <p>6. The plaintiff was not entitled to judgment on the special verdict, because the inspector, who appears by it to have acted as seizing officer, must have been entitled by law to a proportion of the forfeiture, and therefore, the plaintiff could not have been entitled to the whole amount found by the jury.</p> <p>insisted, that it sufficiently appeared upon the record, that the judgment was final. The word judgment, implies that it was final, unless something appears to the contrary. The supreme court of Vermont is, in point of fact, the highest court of law or equity of that state. This court cannot compel a state court to represent itself as the highest court. It appears so to be, by the state constitution and laws ; they are not foreign laws, and this court is bound to take notice of them. They are expressly made núes of decision in the national courts, by the judiciary act. As to the amount in controversy, it is immaterial. The object of the provision was to produce perfect uniformity in the decisions upon the laws, treaties and constitution of the Union. It stands upon different grounds from that where the character of the parties alone gives jurisdiction. There, the sole object was to secure impartial tribunals, in controversies between citizens of different states, and between aliens and citizens. The case is within the very letter of the act. It does not appear, how the defendant claimed. It appears, that the plaintiff claimed under a statute of congress. The decision was against his claim, and that is sufficient. To determine otherwise, would be to defeat the whole object of the provision, which was intended to secure uniformity in the construction of the statutes of congress throughout the Union.</p>

Held: that the entry of a midwife in his books, in the ordinary course of his *business, of the birth of a child, accompanied by another entry in his ledger, of the charge for the service, and a memorandum of payment at a subsequent date, was admissible evidence of the time of the birth.

This was a suit brought by the *defendants in error against the plaintiff in error, in the court below, upon a promissory note made by him, dated the 26th of March 1818, for the sum of $10,000, payable to the order of one John Nelder, on the 1st of March 1820.

This was a bill in equity, filed by, and in the name of, the Attorney-General of Virginia, under the authority of a special act of the legislature of that state, passed on the 15th of February 1813. *The bill charged, that the legislature of Virginia, by an act passed in October session 1783, among other things, provided, that all persons holding officers’ and soldiers’ warrants, by assignment, should pay down to the principal surveyor, at the time of the delivery of such…

This was an allegation of forfeiture, in the district court of Delaware, against the British sloop Pitt, under the non-intercourse act of April 18th, 1818, c. 65, the first section of which provides, “ that from and after the 30th of September next, the ports of the United States shall be and remain closed against every vessel, owned, wholly or in part, by a subject or subjects of his Britannic majesty, coming or arriving from any port or place in a colony or territory of…

This was an allegation of forfeiture, in the court below, against the brig Mary Ann, for a violation of the act of March 2d, 1807, c. 77, prohibiting the importation of slaves into any port or place within the jurisdiction of the United States, from and after the first day of January 1808. The libel contained two counts.

This was a libel of information in the court below, against 422 casks of wine, imported in the brig Sarah, and afterwards seized at New Orleans, alleging a forfeiture to the United States, by a false entry in the office of the collector of the port of New York, made for the benefit of drawback, on re-exportation, and stating, that the seizure' was made on waters navigable from the sea by vessels *of ten or more tons burden.

This was an allegation of forfeiture, against the British ship Frances and Eliza, in the court below, for a breach of the act of congress, of the 18th of April 1818, c. 65, the first section of which is in these words : “ That from and after the 30th day of September next, the ports of the United States shall be and remain closed against every vessel, owned, wholly or in part, by a subject or subjects of his Britannic Majesty, coming or arriving from any port or place in a…

<p> Burden of proof. </p> <p>A case of forfeiture, under the 27th section of the registry of vessels act, of December 31st, 1792, c. 146, for the fraudulent use of a register, by a vessel not actually entitled to the benefit of it. Where the on-us probandi is thrown on the claimant, in an instance or revenue cause, by a primé facie case, made out on the part of the prosecutor, and the claimant fails to explain the difficulties of the case, by the production of papers and other evidence, which must be in his possession, or under his control, condemnation follows, from the defects of testimony on the part of the claimant.</p>

Held: that all must be joined in the suit. due to the parties defendant, to express the opinion, that I cannot discover any evidence of fraud in any part of their transactions. 19 (Parsons v. Neville, 3 Bro. Ch. Cas. 365. Cockburn v. Thompson, 16 Ves. 321. Sherritt v. Birch, 3 Bro. Ch. 229. Alward v. Hawkins, Rep. T. Finch , 113. Brown v. Rickets, 3 Johns.

Held: that a license from the government to sue might be presumed, there being no evidence to the contrary; and as to the general principle of the right of an alien to bring an action for real property, Mr. Justice Story said, that there was 'no pretence for holding that the mere alienage of the demandants would form a valid bar to the recovery in this case, suposing the two countries were at peace; for, however it might…

Held: that the word ' heirs ' was a word of limitation; and none of the brothers and sisters being alive at the death of the son, J. Bleakley, junior, the object of the power to sell had failed; their issue were not entitled, and a sale by the executors of Young conveyed no title; although it was admitted, that the power might be executed by Young's executors, if the object of sale had continued. a This decision was that…

Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823), also written M‘Intosh, is a landmark decision of the U.S. Supreme Court that held that private citizens could not purchase lands from Native Americans. As the facts were recited by Chief Justice John Marshall, the successor in interest to a private purchase from the Piankeshaw attempted to maintain an action of ejectment against the holder of a federal land patent. The case is one of the most influential and well-known decisions of the Marshall Court, a fixture of the first-year curriculum in nearly all U.S. law schools. Marshall's opinion lays down the foundations of the doctrine of aboriginal title in the United States, and the related doctrine of discovery.

Held: that the ship-owner could not be devested of his lien for freight, by such a transaction between the charterer and shipper, who were cognizant of the terms of the charter-party. b The case of Hutton v. Bragg , c which determined against the lien, in a case of a general letting of the ship, has been since overruled. d Mr. Sergeant , contra, contended, 1.

Held: that even this accidental connexion of the matter with the realty, was sufficient to rescue it from the operation of the wager of law. f (9) So, in debt for wages due for serving under the statute of labourers; as the service is compulsory and notorious, the defendant cannot wage his law.

*Eeror to the Circuit Court of Tennessee. This was an action of debt, brought in the court below by Haywood, the defendant in error, against Siglar and Nall, the plaintiffs in error, upon a judgment obtained against the intestate, William Nall, in the superior court for the district of Hillsborough, in the state of North Carolina, for the sum of $2980.05. The defendants pleaded, 1. Nil debet, and 2. Plene administravit.

<p> Tax sales in Washington. </p> <p>Under the 8th section of the act of 1812, to amend the act for the incorporation of the city of Washington, a sale of unimproved squares or lots in the city, for the payment of taxes, is illegal, unless such squares and lots have been assessed to the true and lawful proprietors thereof.</p> <p>The lien upon each lot, for the taxes, is several and distinct, and the purchaser of each holds his lot unincumbered with the taxes due on the other lots held by his vendor.</p> <p>*The advertisement must contain a particular statement of the amount of taxes due on each lot separately.</p> <p>If the sale of one or more lots produce the amount of taxes actually due on the whole, by the same proprietor, the corporation cannot proceed to sell further.</p>

This was an action of debt, brought in the circuit court for the district of Kentucky, by the defendants in error, against the plaintiffs, upon a bond in the penalty of $4000, with condition, that the said A. Sneed should prosecute with effect his appeal from a judgment of the Franklin circuit court, pronounced in a suit wherein the said Wister and others were plaintiffs, and the said A. Sneed was defendant, and should well and truly pay to the said obligees, all such…

<p>Action on record.</p> <p>No action of law will lie on the decretal order of a court of equity.</p>

moved to dismiss the writ of error in this case, for want of jurisdiction. He stated, that the plaintiffs below, Palmer and others, were described to be aliens, and subjects of the king of Great Britain, and tbe defendants, Gracie and others, to be citizens of the state of New York, and the suit was brought in the circuit court of Pennsylvania.