21 Va. App. 150 - Commonwealth v. Carter’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

21 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 21 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““In assessing the constitutionality of a statute, [a court] must presume that the legislative action is valid.” Perkins v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 7, 14 , 402 S.E.2d 229, 233 (1991). “Generally, the words and phrases used in a statute should be given their ordinary and usually accepted meaning ... .” Woolfolk v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 840, 847 , 447 S.E.2d 530, 534 (1994). “If a statute can be made constitutionally definite by a reasonable construction, the court is under duty to give it that construction.” Perkins, 12 Va. App. at 14 , 402 S.E.2d at 233 (quoting Pederson v. City of Richmond, 219 Va. 1061, 1065 , 254 S.E.2d 95, 98 (1979)). When, as here, a statutory challenge does not implicate a constitutionally protected right, the “narrow question is whether [the legislation] is vague as applied to the defendant[s’] conduct ... .” Woodfin v. Commonwealth, 236 Va. 89, 92 , 372 S.E.2d 377, 379 (1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1009 (1989). “The burden is on the challenger to prove die alleged constitutional defect.” Perkins, 12 Va. at 14, 402 S.E.2d at 233 . hi undertaking a void-for-vagueness analysis, [courts] are guided by a well established two-prong test. First, a penal statute, “when measured by common understanding and practices,” must define the proscribed conduct with sufficient particularity to “warn a person as to what behavior is prohibited... ”Stein v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 65, 69 , 402 S.E.2d 238, 241 (1991). Secondly, the statutory language must not encou”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Commonwealth v. Dick

2. “Manifestly, potential endangerment of a child or children is the gravamen of the offense, and the instant charges arose from a perception by law enforcement officials that the conduct of each defendant may have threatened the “life, health or morals of such children____” By using the term “may,” the legislature criminalizes any act which presents a “possibility” of physical or moral harm to the child. Thus, guided by subjectivity and personal predilection, police and prosecutors in this instance concluded that the factually diverse conduct of each defendant possibly endangered the life, health or morals of minors then in their custody. This determination may have resulted from individual moral imperatives, unique perspectives on the specific conduct, or defendants’ mere status. Whatever the motivation and however well-intentioned, the vague and inclusive statutory language clearly failed to adequately inform law enforcement of the precise conduct prohibited by Code § 40.1-103, thereby accommodating arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 23 Va. App. 53 - Mosby v. Commonwealth

3. “However, “ ‘an act may be valid in one part and invalid in another, and ... that invalid part may be ignored, if after such elimination the remaining portions are sufficient to accomplish their purpose in accordance with the legislative intent____’” Because we find that the offending language of Code § 40.1-103 is severable, the remainder of the statute is undisturbed by this opinion.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 23 Va. App. 53 - Mosby v. Commonwealth