State v. Herring’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

223 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 226 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “Although custodial state delays do not automatically require the dismissal of criminal charges in the demanding state, we would be remiss in our obligation to effectuate the IAD's purposes and principles if we were simply to ignore such a violation. Indeed ... under the IAD, officials of the custodial state act as the agents of the demanding state.... When, in somewhat similar circumstances, we sought to enforce a criminal defendant's right to have his appeal defended by the state with due diligence ... we found a useful analogy in the rules that have been developed to protect a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. So too [a] defendant's right to prompt IAD notification can appropriately be protected by invoking the balancing principles of Barker v. Wingo , 407 U.S. 514 , 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182 , 33 L.Ed. 2d 101 (1972), which determine when a deprivation of speedy trial rights requires dismissal of criminal charges against a defendant.... The four factors that form the matrix of a Barker v. Wingo [supra, at 530 , 92 S.Ct. 2182 ] analysis are: the length of the delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant's assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 182 Conn. App. 373 - State v. Crosby

2. “`The defendant bears a heavy burden of showing that the denial of severance resulted in substantial injustice, and that any resulting prejudice was beyond the curative power of the court's instructions. State v. Boscarino , supra , 721, quoting State v. King, supra , 302; State v. Silver , 139 Conn. 234 , 240 , 93 A.2d 154 (1952). State v. Herring , 210 Conn. 78 , 94-95 , 554 A.2d 686 , cert. denied, 492 U.S. 912 , 109 S.Ct. 3230 , 106 L.Ed.2d 579 (1989). [W]hether a joint trial will be substantially prejudicial to the rights of the defendant . . . means something more than that a joint trial will be less than advantageous to the defendant . . .' (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jennings , 216 Conn. 647 , 657-58 , 583 A.2d 915 (1990); accord State v. Herring , supra , 94-95.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 2003 Conn. Super. Ct. 2960 - State v. Fauci, No. Fst-95602 (Mar. 5, 2003)

3. “Article III of the IAD governs inmate requests for a prompt disposition of outstanding detainers. The centerpiece of Article III is subsection (a), which states that a prisoner shall be brought to trial within one hundred eighty days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition to be made of the indictment, information or complaint .... Failure to comply with Article III (a) mandates dismissal with prejudice of the underlying charges.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 182 Conn. App. 373 - State v. Crosby