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210 F.2d 373

Docket No. 14581.

In re Collins

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals

Decided Feb. 9, 1954.

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals · decided 1954-02-09

Cited by 1 later decisions — most recently February 1954

1 federal appellate ·

1 counsel of record

Relies on In Re Disbarment Proceedings · Duke v. Committee on Grievances of the Supreme Court · In re Claiborne

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Opinion by (per_curiam) · Decided 1954-02-09

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¶1*374John O. Collins, Ancon, Canal Zone, for appellant.

¶2Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and HOLMES and RIVES, Circuit Judges.

¶3PER CURIAM.

¶4This appeal is from a disciplinary order entered in the United States District Court of the Canal Zone in a proceeding instituted by and based upon matters occurring in the presence and within the knowledge of the court, in cause No. 3708-Civil, In the Matter of the Suspension or Disbarment of John 0. Collins, a Member of the Canal Zone Bar.

¶5Finding and adjudicating that the said Collins had “failed to maintain the respect due to the Courts of justice and judicial officers required under Title 4, Section 47, Sub-section 2, of the Canal Zone Code,1 and that he has used offensive and insulting language to the Court in open Court and in Chambers in the presence of the Court”, the order, reciting that it is “made in spite of his failure to show any acts in mitigation and failure to apologize, having in consideration his extreme age and long membership of this bar”, suspended the respondent “as such attorney and counsellor from the practice of law in the Canal Zone and all the Courts thereof for a period of two years”.

¶6The respondent, who appears here by brief, did not deny below, he does not deny here, that in the chambers and presence of, indeed directed to and at, the judge, he acted intemperately and inadvisedly, and used the offensive and insulting language and epithets as found by the judge. He insists, though, that he did not use the words attributed to him in the court room, and that the circumstances, under which the words uttered in chambers were uttered, at once provoked and mitigated their utterance.

¶7His real contentions, however, are: (1) that, while what he did was in law and in fact contemptuous and would have supported a contempt order, it was not grounds, within the Canal Zone Code, for disbarment or suspension; and (2) that the judge was disqualified by bias from hearing and acting in the matter and should, upon Collins’ affidavit of disqualifications, have recused himself.

¶8 A careful examination of the Codal provisions,2 under which the proceeding was brought and maintained, and of the many decisions,3 dealing with proceedings of this kind and controlling here, leaves us in no doubt, in the light' of the undisputed facts that the district judge was authorized, under the Canal Zone Code, to proceed, and ought to have proceeded, as he did;4 that nothing in the affidavit filed by Collins showed, or tended to show, that the district judge was in law or in fact disqualified; that in fact and in law he was not disqualified; and that the order appealed from should be affirmed.

¶9In view, however, of the fact that in concluding his brief, the,appellant stated:. “Collins begs pardon from Judge Crowe-(regardless of the outcome of this appeal) for the obnoxious terms used in-anger by him in the office of the Judge-on the afternoon of March 5, 1953”; and of the further fact that the order-was not punitive but disciplinary, our-mandate will provide that “the affirmance of the order is without prejudice-to, and in no manner impairs the full and. *375continuing right of the district judge, if at any time, upon sufficient and satisfactory apology and amends being made, he desires to do so, to modify or mitigate the order, or to revoke it or set it aside.”

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