210 F. Supp. 2d 592 - Baker v. Horn’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “(1) failure to timely move for an identification line-up of all purported witnesses; (2) failure to request appointment of an investigator or to conduct an investigation himself; (3) failure to call witnesses who previously stated that Baker was not observed at the location of the crime; (4) failure to cross-examine identification witness Crosby; (5) failure to cross-examine identification witness Dolan; (6) failure to explain to Baker that unless he testified in his own defense, his statement given to the police following his arrest would be deemed to have been voluntary; (7) failure to argue in support of motion to suppress that one detective testified that he was not present at the interrogation while a second detective testified that the first detective was present; (8) failure to move to sever Baker's trial from trial of co-defendants; (9) failure to list as a reason for a new trial objections to the prosecutor’s closing argument; (10) failure to object to the trial court’s charge regarding: (A) the fact that Baker did not testify; (B) "reasonable doubt”; (C) the verdict report; (11) failure to request trial court to instruct jury regarding tentative identifications of photographs by Dolan, and to request cautionary instruction regarding Crosby’s failure to identify Baker by photograph; (12) failure to advise Baker of presence of Stanford Saunders on the jury panel; (13) failure to question prospective jurors concerning their racial bias, and failure to object to prosecu”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 383 F. Supp. 2d 720 - Baker v. Horn

2. “The exhaustion requirement mandates only that the state courts be afforded a full and fair opportunity to address federal claims. Baker afforded the state courts this opportunity. He fully briefed the factual and legal bases of the claims contained in his petition of 1/15/97 to the PCRA court and to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court on appeal. Thus, he “fairly presented” his claims to the state courts for their consideration. Given that Baker’s “request to dismiss” is not fairly supported by the record, I reject the Commonwealth’s argument that Baker somehow failed to properly exhaust his claims because of the purported “request to dismiss.” As long as the claims were “fairly presented” to the state courts, the courts’ decision not to reach the merits of the claims does not defeat a finding that the claims were properly exhausted.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 383 F. Supp. 2d 720 - Baker v. Horn

3. “the Third Circuit has held in more than one capital case, and with respect to more than one Pennsylvania procedural rule, that as long as the possibility existed at the time of a prisoner’s default that the Pennsylvania courts might apply the relaxed waiver rule to the prisoner’s PCRA petition, Pennsylvania law did not clearly foreclose substantive review of claims in the petition, even if the claims were otherwise procedurally defaulted. That the state courts might apply the relaxed waiver rule to a PCRA petition remained a possibility until the Pennsylvania Supreme Court expressly renounced the practice on November 23, 1998 in Commonwealth v. Albrecht, 720 A.2d at 700. 11”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 388 F. Supp. 2d 489 - Thomas v. Beard