¶1concurring specially.
¶2I concur with the majority opinion’s conclusion that the trial court properly denied the defendant’s motion to suppress, because the evidence sought to be suppressed resulted from Wilson’s voluntary submission to a urine test. As pointed out in the majority opinion, Wilson, after being advised of her implied consent rights, volunteered that the test results would be positive. I disagree, however, with the majority’s statement that under Georgia law, the flight of a defendant’s companion may be considered as evidence of the defendant’s guilt for the purpose of determining probable cause to arrest.
¶3As support for that proposition of vicarious guilt, the majority quotes from Scott v. State, 193 Ga. App. 74, 75 (1) (387 SE2d 31) (1989). However, Scottwas a two-judge decision, with one judge concurring in the judgment only, and it constitutes a physical precedent only. Rule 35 of the Rules of the Court of Appeals.
¶4State v. Grimes, 195 Ga. App. 773, 774 (1) (395 SE2d 42) (1990), cited by the majority opinion is inapposite as it relates to flight by the defendant and there was no flight by defendant in the case sub judice.
¶5Further, it does not appear that the cases cited in Scottactually purport to set forth such a proposition. In Muckle v. State, 165 Ga. *889App. 873, 875 (303 SE2d 54) (1983), the defendant himself attempted to flee the scene, and the flight of his co-defendant was merely one of several factors considered to be consistent with the hypothesis of the defendant’s guilt. In Mendez v. State, 185 Ga. App. 1 (3) (363 SE2d 262) (1987), we rejected the defendant’s contention that the flight of a co-defendant constituted evidence of the defendant’s innocence. In Brown v. State, 190 Ga. App. 38 (378 SE2d 357) (1989), the flight of the defendant’s known traveling companion was but one of several factors considered together with the defendant’s own behaviors in determining probable cause to arrest the defendant.
¶6Aside from Scott, this court has never formulated the broad proposition that in some circumstances the flight of a defendant’s companion indicates guilt of the defendant. I cannot join in the majority opinion’s present attempt to do so.
¶7The majority opinion also concludes that the most favorable construction of the evidence supports a finding that the police conducted an appropriate pat-down search of the defendant. However, as noted even by the prosecutor during the hearing on the motion to suppress, the police officer described an actual search of the defendant. For that reason, I also disagree with the majority’s conclusion on that point. Nevertheless, even if a full blown search occurred, inasmuch as that search uncovered no evidence, no harm resulted.