Davis v. State’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

5 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 5 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““When the court comes to the appellant, the jury are told that his evidence will be weighed by the same rules that apply to other witnesses, and ‘in addition you have the right to consider that he is the defendant.’ In other words the credibility of the appellant’s testimony was to be weighed by a different and harsher rule from that used in testing the credibility of other witnesses. The instruction tends to discredit the testimony of the appellant. It is equivalent to telling the jury that they must keep in mind the fact that the appellant is the defendant and interested in the result of the trial. It distinguished the appellant from other witnesses in the case, and leaves the inference that because he is the defendant, his testimony is not entitled to the same weight as that of other witnesses. Such instructions have always been held to constitute reversible error. * * * In the instant case the court, by its instruction Number 14, clearly singled the defendant out from other witnesses and clearly discredited his testimony by the use of the phrase, ‘in addition you have the right to consider that he is the defendant and interested.’ This statement at once directed the jury’s attention to the fact that the testimony of the defendant was to be weighed by a different scale from that of other witnesses, and therefore was not entitled to the same credit. The instruction was clearly erroneous and constituted reversible error.” 210 Ind. at 553, 556 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Garvin v. State

2. ““. . . [It] infers a ‘purpose and intention’ to kill although the killing may have occurred by reason of sudden heat, negligence, or by purely accidental means. * * * The first sentence in the instruction tells the jury that the purpose and intention to kill may be inferred from the act itself. This inference is made the basis in the next sentence for a further inference of malice. The instruction is based upon inferences not drawn from proved facts. The law is that malice may be inferred from the intentional use of a deadly weapon. But the intentional use must be established by fact, not by an inference based upon another inference.” (Emphasis added.)”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McCurdy v. State

3. ““The court instructs the Jury that if you should find from all the evidence in the case beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant Ward Davis did shoot and kill Annav France, using a deadly weapon in such manner as was likely to and did produce death, the purpose and intention on the part of the defendant Ward Davis to kill may be inferred from the act itself. And if you should further find from all the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that the killing was done purposely without sufficient justification, legal excuse, or reasonable provocation, then malice may also be inferred from such act.” 210 Ind. 550, 551-52 ; 2 N.E.2d 983 .”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. McCurdy v. State