State v. MILAM’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

14 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 16 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “We do not know from the record whether Autry was still in the witness chair or had taken a seat beside his counsel when the State first requested permission to further examine him. However, we do not think that matters. The State had not closed its case. The State had the right to examine him, as a matter of procedure, by cross-examination or to lay a predicate, subject to limitations, in the sound discretion of the trial judge. It is not claimed here by Autry that, as a matter of procedure, the action was not justified. The argument is that Autry's constitutional rights were violated. Amend. V of the Constitution of the United States provides that no person "* * * shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." Article 3, Section 26, Mississippi Constitution of 1890, contains a provision that in criminal prosecutions an accused "shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself." However, it seems to be recognized by all of the courts that this immunity can be waived by the accused, and that he does so when he takes the stand and testifies on the merits of the case. The rule is stated in this language in 58 Am.Jur., "Witnesses", p. 80, section 96: "An accused may waive his constitutional immunity from giving testimony against himself by offering himself as a witness. By electing to testify, the accused subjects himself to cross-examination and impeachment, and makes permissible comment by the prosecuting attorney upon his testimony. When he vo”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. Hentz v. State

2. “The courts have recognized realistically and for a long time this situation-type of pressure on a witness. There apparently have not been any cases involving the particular facts of this case, but analogous to it in this sense is the almost unanimous agreement that in the trial of a criminal case it is improper for the prosecuting attorney or the court in the presence of the jury to call upon the defendant or his counsel to produce a document as being in his possession. See note, 110 A.L.R. 101 (1937). In Powell v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 1937, 167 Va. 558 , 189 S.E. 433, 436 , this occurred, for example, and the Court held that “Whenever the accused * * * is forced to testify for fear that adverse infer- enees might be drawn from his failure, then he has not volunteered as a witness and has not waived his rights. Such waiver only follows where liberty of choice has been fully accorded”. The same type of protection should be applicable to testimony in grand jury proceedings. ( 210 Miss. 25, 26 , 48 So.2d at 596 ).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 242 So. 2d 414 - Moore v. State

3. “The protection of important constitutional privileges such as that against compulsory self-incrimination must encompass the subtle as well as the apparent. It is the responsibility of the courts to examine carefully the merits of every claim of this privilege. (210 Miss, at 24, 48 So.2d at 596 ).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 242 So. 2d 414 - Moore v. State