¶1 The defendant has abandoned all other exceptions save the one with respect to the final judgment, and presents the single question'as to the power of the court to change the original judgment and impose a longer prison sentence.
¶2 The general power of the court over its own judgments, orders, and decrees in both civil and criminal eases, during the existence of the *449 term at which, they are first made, is undeniable. Ex parte Lange, 18 Wall., 163.
¶3 Until the expiration of the term the orders and judgments of the court are in fieri, and the judge has power, in his discretion, to make such changes and modifications in them as he may deem wise and appropriate for the administration of justice, and to this end he may hear further evidence, in open court, both as to the facts of the case and as to the character and conduct of the defendant. In re Brittain, 93 N. C., 587; S. v. Manly, 95 N. C., 661; S. v. Stevens, 146 N. C., 679; Cook v. Tel. Co., 150 N. C., 428.
¶4 The defendant, however, contends that when a portion of the first judgment has been complied with, as by the payment of the fine imposed, a different rule should obtain, in accord with the just principle that no man should be twice punished for the same offense. 8 R. C. L., 244; S. v. Crook, 115 N. C., 760; S. v. Warren, 92 N. C., 825; Ex parte Lange, supra.
¶5 But here the court had power to punish by both fine and imprisonment. There was no modification of the sentence with respect to the payment of a fine and costs and restitution of the stolen property. Though the fine lawfully imposed in both judgments was paid, no part of the prison sentence had been served. In no view could the defendant be said to have been required to suffer twice for the same offense.
¶6 The modification of the judgment during the term was within the power and the sound discretion of the trial judge.
¶7 Judgment affirmed.