Public-domain · open source
OpenJurist
← 211 F.2d 742 - United Mine Workers v. Patton

United Mine Workers v. Patton’s Empirical Analysis

211 F.2d 742 · 1954

Citation profile

77
cited by 77 later decisions
2
cited 2 times by the Supreme Court
8
states following
March 1985
most recently cited

47 federal appellate · 3 district · 10 state decisions

How this case has been cited

Cited by 77 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently March 1985 · most notably Smith v. Wade (1983), Local 20, Teamsters, Chauffeurs & Helpers Union v. Morton (1964)

47 federal appellate · 3 district · 10 state decisions

3401954196019701980decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

Relationships

Applies 15 U.S.C. § 15 (§ 4 of the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914) · 28 U.S.C. § 1732 · 28 U.S.C. § 1733 · 29 U.S.C. § 106 (Norris-LaGuardia Act) · 29 U.S.C. § 141 (§ 1 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)) · 29 U.S.C. § 159 (§ 9 of the National Labor Relations Act) · 29 U.S.C. § 185 (§ 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act)) · 29 U.S.C. § 187 (§ 303 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act))

Relies on Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. · Story Parchment Co. v. Paterson Parchment Paper Co. · Palmer v. Hoffman · United Mine Workers of America v. Coronado Coal Co · United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America v. United States Bay Counties Dist Council of Carpenters

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 77 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

  1. ““Section 2(2), 2(13), and 301(e): The conference agreement in defining the term employer struck out the vague phrase in the Wagner Act ‘anyone acting in the interest of an employer’ and inserted in lieu thereof the word ‘agent’. The term agent is defined in section 2(13) and section 301(e), since it is used throughout the unfair labor practice sections of title I and in sections 301 and 303 of title III. In defining the term the conference amendment reads ‘the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently ratified shall not be controlling.’ This restores the law of agency as it has been developed at common law. “These amendments are criticized in one breath as imposing too harsh a liability upon unions for the acts of their officers or representatives and as too mild with respect to the liability of employers for the acts of their managerial and supervisory personnel. Of course, the definition applies equally in the responsibility imputed to both employers and labor organizations for the acts of their officers or representatives in the scope of their employment. “It is true that this definition was written to avoid the construction which the Supreme Court in the recent case of United States against United Brotherhood of Carpenters placed upon section 6 of the Norris-La Guardia Act which exempts organizations from liability for illegal acts committed in labor disputes unless proof of actual instigation, participation, or ratification ”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  2. ““The chief argument of defendants in support of their motion for directed verdict is that there is no evidence that they authorized or ratified the strikes upon which plaintiffs rely for recovery. It is true that there is no evidence of any resolution of either the United Mine Workers or District 28 authorizing or ratifying the strikes. There is evidence, however, that the strikes were called by the Field Representative of the United Mine Workers, who was employed by District 28, and that he was engaged in the organization work that was being carried on by the international union through District 28, which was a mere division of the international union. Members of the union are members of local and district unions as well as the international; and of the $4 monthly dues paid by them, $2 goes to the international union, $1 to the local union and $1 to the district organization. It is clear that in carrying on organizational work the field representative is engaged in the business of both the international union and the district and that both are responsible for acts done by him within the scope and course of his employment. Stockwell v. United States, 13 Wall. 531, 545-548 , 20 L.Ed. 491 ; Hindman v. First Nat. Bk. of Louisville, 6 Cir., 112 F. 931 , 57 L.R.A. 108 ; Oman v. United States, 10 Cir., 179 F.2d 738 ; United States v. Waters, 7 Cir., 194 F.2d 866 ; Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Hedrick, 181 Va. 824 , 27 S.E.2d 198 ; 2 Am.Jur. 279; A. L. I. Restatement of Agenc”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage
  3. “when Congress has intended that damages in excess of the actual damage sustained by the plaintiff may be recovered in an action created by statute, it has found no difficulty in using language appropriate to that end”
    2 later decisions quote this exact passage

How this case has been treated — in progress

Whether each later court followed, distinguished, criticized, or overruled this decision. The treatment classification (task #35) runs highest-cited cases first and lights up here as it reaches this one.