Dewey v. Funk’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

32 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 32 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““[W]hen a party introduces inadmissible and prejudicial evidence, the opposing party may introduce similar evidence ‘whenever it is needed for removing an unfair prejudice.’ A litigant who draws from his own witness irrelevant testimony which is prejudicial to the opposing litigant ought not to object to its contradiction on the ground of irrelevancy.” 211 Kan. at 57 .”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. MacOmber · State v. Beans

2. ““If one party offers an irrelevant and therefore inadmissible fact which is received in evidence, may the other party offer similar facts whose only claim to admission is that they negate or explain or counterbalance the prior inadmissible fact? Wigmore on Evidence, 3d Edition, § 15, pp. 304, 305, 307, suggests there are three rules competing for recognition: ‘(1) The first is that the admission of an inadmissible fact, without objection by the opponent, does not justify the opponent in rebutting by other inadmissible facts; ‘(2) At the other extreme is a rule which declares that, in general, precisely the contrary shall obtain, i.e., the opponent may resort to similar inadmissible evidence; ‘(3) A third form of rule, intermediate between the other two, is that the opponent may reply with similar evidence whenever it is needed for removing an unfair prejudice which might otherwise have ensued from the original evidence, but in no other case. . . .’ We prefer the adoption of Rule 3. It provides the flexibility necessary to assure the issues will not be tried on uncontradicted, prejudicial testimony of an unimpeached witness, but avoids trial of nonprejudicial collateral matters.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Nixon

3. ““The latter statute makes distinction between traits of character and specific instances of conduct, a distinction not always easy to apply with respect to the use of drugs. Nonetheless the import is clear — evidence of traits of a witness’ character other than honesty or veracity or their opposites, as well as evidence of specific instances of the witness’ conduct relevant only to prove such traits of character, are inadmissible as affecting credibility. “The questions put to the witness here to which objections were sustained clearly were probing either for testimony that she was an addict (which she denied in an answer elicited over the state’s objection) or that she had taken drugs. Treating drug addiction as a trait of character as we think it must be, it is not one either of honesty or veracity or their opposites and hence evidence of the same is inadmissible. Likewise, evidence of specific instances of improper drug use relevant only to prove such trait is also inadmissible. A majority of the courts in other jurisdictions which have wrestled with the same problem have, in the absence of statute, come to the same conclusion. . . .””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. State v. Nixon