¶1 Touching the question of scienter, the court instructed the jury as follows: “It is necessary to establish either actual or implied knowledge. . . . This knowledge that the goods were stolen may be actual or it may be implied. . . . The test is as to the knowledge, actual or implied.”
¶2 This instruction, it would seem, was prejudicial to the defendant. S. v. Morrison, 207 N. C., 804, 178 S. E., 562. True, the jury is at liberty to infer guilty knowledge from circumstances justifying the inference, S. v. Wilson, 176 N. C., 751, 97 S. E., 496, but the knowledge inferred must be such as to bring it within the condemnation of the statute. S. v. Lowe, 204 N. C., 572, 169 S. E., 180; S. v. Stathos, 208 N. C., 456, 181 S. E., 273, properly interpreted, is accordant herewith.
¶3 Knowledge that the goods were stolen at the time of receiving them is an essential element of the offense. S. v. Barbee, 197 N. C., 248, 148 S. E., 249; S. v. Dail, 191 N. C., 231, 131 S. E., 573; S. v. Caveness, 78 N. C., 484.
¶4 The sufficiency of the warrant, as amended, is not questioned.
¶5 New trial.