212 Cal. App. 2d 646 - Jones v. Ayers’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

26 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 26 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““You are instructed that section 12509 of the California Vehicle Code which was in effect at the time of the accident reads as follows: “ ‘Any person who is over the age of 15 years and 6 months may apply to the Department for an Instruction Permit. The Department for good cause may issue to the applicant an Instruction Permit which shall entitle the applicant while having the permit in his immediate possession to drive a motor vehicle upon the highways for a period not exceeding six months when accompanied by, and under the immediate supervision of, a licensed driver 18 years of age or over. ’ “You are instructed that section 21701 of the California Vehicle Code which was in effect at the time of the accident provides in part as follows: “ ‘No person shall wilfully interfere with the driver of a vehicle or with the mechanism thereof in such a manner as to affect the driver’s control of the vehicle.’ “If a party to this action violated either of the statutes just read to you, a presumption arises that she was negligent. This presumption is not conclusive. It may be overcome by other evidence showing that under all the circumstances surrounding the event, the conduct in question was excusable or justifiable. “To prove that a violation of a statute such as that just read to you was excusable or justifiable so as to overcome the presumption of negligence, the evidence must support a finding that the person who violated the statute did what might reasonably be expected of a perso”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 228 Cal. App. 2d 8 - Reclusado v. Mangum

2. ““If the jury could, then, have concluded that Mrs. Smith herself was negligent, we must finally determine if the guest statute truncated her liability because she was a ‘person legally liable for the conduct’ of Debbie, and it was Debbie’s conduct that caused the accident. “We believe the Supreme Court decision in Benton v. Sloss (1952), 38 Cal.2d 399 [ 240 P.2d 575 ], is enlightening upon this issue: the case holds that the guest statute immunizes the ‘ “person legally liable for the conduct of such driver” ’ from a vicarious liability to the guest but not from direct responsibility for his own negligence. . . . Sloss sought the protection of the guest statute as to the plaintiff guests but the court said: ‘ [Veh. Code] Section 403 bars actions against the “driver” of a vehicle or against “any other person legally liable for the conduct of such driver.” The phrase “person legally liable” for the driver’s conduct is clearly intended to cover cases in which the owner is vicariously liable for the driver’s conduct because of the relationship of the parties, as principal-agent, or because of imputed negligence under [Veh. Code] section 402. ... Section 403 does not limit the common-law liability of the owner of a vehicle for his own negligence as owner.’ (P. 403; emphasis added.) “Respondents first contend that ‘it is for the negligence of the unfit driver that the owner of the car is liable even in a case of negligent entrustment. ’ ... But the negligence of Debbie is not a nec”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 228 Cal. App. 2d 8 - Reclusado v. Mangum

3. ““In that instance Menezes, the driver of the car in which plaintiff’s decedent was a guest, was traveling at a speed of about 60 miles per hour, 5 miles in excess of the prima facie speed limit. ‘The stop sign was plainly visible, and when they were over 200 feet from the intersection decedent said to Menezes, “Joe, look, there is a stop ahead.” Menezes did not look to his right or left as he neared the intersection and did not apply his brakes until immediately before the impact. He did not wear glasses and had not had any problem with his vision prior to the accident. ’ (P. 918.) The court said, at page 918: ‘The jury could have found that Menezes knew of the existence of the stop sign in sufficient time to avoid a collision by reducing his speed or stopping but that he decided to ignore the sign and proceeded into the intersection without attempting to abate his excessive rate of speed, without looking to the right or left, and without taking any other action designed to discover or avoid colliding with a vehicle approaching the intersection on Ortegalita. The evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s implied finding that Menezes drove his automobile with a wanton and reckless disregard of the possible results. [Citations.] Several cases holding that in the circumstances there involved it was not wilful misconduct to go through a stop sign are factually distinguishable. ’ ’ ’”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 224 Cal. App. 2d 290 - Hill v. Perry