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212 Ga. 292

92 S.E.2d 14

Anthony v. Penn

Supreme Court of Georgia

Decided March 12, 1956

Supreme Court of Georgia · decided 1956-03-12

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“Laws prescribe for the future. Unless a statute, either expressly or by necessary implication shows that the General Assembly intended that it operate retroactively, it will be given only prospective application.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 99 Ga. App. 280 - National Surety Corporation v. Boney

Relies on Estes v. Estes · Coffee v. Coffee · Wilkins v. Wilkins

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 1956-03-12

How this case has been cited

Cited by 27 later decisions — most recently March 2020 · most notably Donaldson v. Department of Transportation (1992), 131 Ga. App. 443 - Spengler v. Employers Commercial Union Insurance (1974)

27 state decisions

12019561960197019801990200020102020decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

View the full empirical analysis of this case →

Head, Justice.

¶1 Formerly a final decree for alimony,- unexcepted to, passed beyond the discretionary control of the trial judge, and he had no authority to modify its terms. Coffee v. Coffee, 101 Ga. 787 (28 S. E. 977); Wilkins v. Wilkins, 146 Ga. 382 (91 S. E. 415); Gilbert v. Gilbert, 151 Ga. 520 (107 S. E. 490); Estes v. Estes, 192 Ga. 100 (14 S. E. 2d 680); Roberson v. Roberson, 210 Ga. 346 (80 S. E. 2d 283). In the present case it is contended that the final decree rendered in 1942 may now be revised by the judge of the superior court under the act entitled, “Modification of Permanent Alimony Judgments,” approved March 9, 1955 (Ga. L. 1955, p. 630).

¶2 Retroactive laws are prohibited by the Constitution and statutes of this State. Constitution, art. I, sec. III, par. II (Code, Ann., § 2-302); Code § 102-104. The rights of parties as fixed by a solemn judgment, which has long since passed beyond the rules of law applicable to review, can not be vacated, abrogated, modified, or set aside under the contention that the General Assembly has modified the remedy applicable to such judgments. Moore v. Gill, 43 Ga. 388; Home Insurance Co. v. Willis, 179 Ga. 509 (176 S. E. 371).

¶3 Laws prescribe for the future. Unless a statute, either expressly or by necessary implication, shows that the General Assembly intended that it operate retroactively, it will be given only prospective application. Bond v. Munro, 28 Ga. 597; Moore v. Gill, supra; Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World v. Thornton, 115 Ga. 798 (42 S. E. 236); Bank of Norman Park v. Colquitt County, 169 Ga. 534 (150 S. E. 841); Moore v. Howard, 181 Ga. 605 (183 S. E. 495); Walker County Fertilizer Co. v. Napier, 184 Ga. 861 (193 S. E. 770); Smith v. Pindar Real Estate Co., 187 Ga. 229 (200 S. E. 131); Eibel v. Forrester, 194 Ga. 439 (22 *294 S. E. 2d 96). The act entitled, “Modification of Permanent Alimony Judgments,” neither expressly nor by implication shows a legislative intent that it should be applied to alimony judgments rendered prior to the passage of the act.

¶4 The demurrers of the defendant should have been sustained, and the action dismissed.

¶5 Judgment reversed.

All the Justices concur, except Wyatt, P. J., not participating.
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