Walker v. D'ALESANDRO’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

3 federal appellate · 5 district · 65 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 73 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[E]ven if the picture were objectionable, we do not regard the censorship by the Mayor of pictures publicly exhibited in a City-owned building and the removal of such as he may deem objectionable, or his making adverse public comments thereon, as being either within the scope of his duties as Mayor or so closely related thereto as to be entitled to an absolute privilege by reason of his important public office. This Court long ago expressed opposition to the extension of the doctrine of absolute privilege (Maurice v. Worden, 54 Md. 233 ) to persons occupying offices not previously recognized as falling within the protection of absolute privilege. Though we are not deciding in this case whether or not the doctrine of absolute privilege should be extended to such an office as that of Mayor of a great city, we think that the same reasoning which underlies the reluctance to extend the offices to which the privilege applies, should also make us reluctant to stretch the field in which an absolute privilege may be invoked by adopting a very broad view of what may be deemed closely related to the general matters committed to the control or supervision of a public officer.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. 142 Md. App. 327 - Chinwuba v. Larsen

2. ““In reaching the conclusion that the defendant was entitled to an absolute privilege in respect of the acts and statements complained of, the trial court took judicial notice of certain provisions of the Charter of Baltimore City and of an ordinance of the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The Code provides for the methods of proof of such an ordinance, not that the court shall take judicial notice thereof; and the general rule is that courts do not take judicial notice of such ordinances. Code (1951), Article 35, Section 75; Central Savings Bank v. Baltimore, 71 Md. 515 , 18 A. 809 , 20 A. 283 ; Givner v. Cohen, 208 Md. 23 , 116 A. 2d 357 , and cases therein cited. The rule is not inflexible, as the Givner Case and Shanfelter v. Baltimore, 80 Md. 483 , 31 A. 439 , and McNally v. Moser, 210, Md. 127, 122 A. 2d 555 , show, where the ordinances have been considered below; and we shall comment upon the ordinance actually cited in the opinion of the trial court for much of the same reasons that ordinances not duly proven were considered in those cases.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Strickler v. Board of County Commissioners

3. ““The basis for immunity from liability by reason of privilege is that a public or social interest is to be served by according the privilege; and as Professor Prosser observes ([Prosser, Torts (2d ed. 1955)], § 16), ‘The sliding scale by which the law balances the interests of the parties to accomplish a social purpose is nowhere better illustrated than in the field of privilege.’ An absolute privilege is accorded to judicial proceedings and to legislative proceedings and to the activities of high executive officers____ As to executive officers, see Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 [ 16 S.Ct. 631 , 40 L.Ed. 780 ] (U.S. Postmaster General) and Matson v. Margiotti, 371 Pa. 188 , 88 A.2d 892 (State Attorney General).””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mandel v. O'HARA