¶1concurring:
¶2(Filed July 17, 2002)
¶3In this case, the majority reversed an order granting summary judgment to the ap-pellee, Eastern Associated Coal Corp., and remanded the action to allow Mr. Skaggs to pursue his claim of discriminatory termination.
¶4McKenzie was wrongly decided and has no application to Mr. Skaggs’ case.
¶5In view of the foregoing, I concur. I am authorized to state that Justice MAYNARD joins me in this concurring opinion.
¶6. Under W. Va.Code § 23-5A-1 (1978) (Repl.Vol. 1998) an employer may not terminate an employee as a result of the employee receiving workers' compensation benefits. The statute provides succinctly: "No employer shall discriminate in any manner against any of his present or former employees because of such present or former employee’s receipt of or attempt to receive benefits under this chapter.”
¶7. I dissented in McKenzie on the basis that the majority'did not have authority to rewrite workers’ compensation statutes, under the guise of the rule of liberality, in order to undermine the discretionary authority of the Commissioner of the Workers’ Compensation Division to allow employers to submit the names of preferred vocational rehabilitation providers. See State ex rel. McKenzie v. Smith, 212 W. Va. 288, 569 S.E.2d 809 (2002) (Davis, C.J., dissenting, with Maynard, J., joining).