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212 W. Va. 248

569 S.E.2d 769

Skaggs v. Eastern Associated Coal Corp.

West Virginia Supreme Court

Decided July 17, 2002

West Virginia Supreme Court · decided 2002-07-17

Key passage — most relied on by later courts

“No employer shall discriminate in any manner against any of his present or former employees because of such present or former employee’s receipt of or attempt to receive benefits under this chapter.”

quoted by 1 later decision, including 394 F. Supp. 2d 846 - Beasley v. MAYFLOWER VEHICLE SYSTEMS, INC.

Applies WV 23 § 23-5A-1

Relies on 212 W. Va. 288 - State Ex Rel. McKenzie v. Smith

Good law ✅— No negative treatment on recordhow we know

Decided 2002-07-17

How this case has been cited

Cited by 15 later decisions (2 by the Supreme Court) — most recently June 2019

9 state decisions

8020022010decided

Later decisions citing this case, by decade. The current decade is in progress, and our corpus holds fewer opinions from the most recent years, so the latest bars are undercounted — not a real decline.

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DAVIS, Chief Justice,

¶1concurring:

¶2(Filed July 17, 2002)

¶3In this case, the majority reversed an order granting summary judgment to the ap-pellee, Eastern Associated Coal Corp., and remanded the action to allow Mr. Skaggs to pursue his claim of discriminatory termination.1 I agree with this disposition. However, I have chosen to write separately because I strongly disagree with the majority’s partial reliance upon the decision in State ex rel. McKenzie v. Smith, 212 W. Va. 288, 569 S.E.2d 809 (2002), in resolving this appeal.

¶4McKenzie was wrongly decided and has no application to Mr. Skaggs’ case.2 The decision in McKenzie concerned the discretionary authority of the Commissioner to allow employers to submit a list of preferred vocational rehabilitation service providers. Thus, McKenzie has no relevance to the instant claims involving discriminatory termination. The issue posed by Mr. Skaggs was controlled exclusively by our prior decisions concerning discrimination under W. Va.Code § 23-5A-1 (1978) (Repl.Vol.1998), and this case should have been resolved on that basis alone.

¶5In view of the foregoing, I concur. I am authorized to state that Justice MAYNARD joins me in this concurring opinion.

¶6. Under W. Va.Code § 23-5A-1 (1978) (Repl.Vol. 1998) an employer may not terminate an employee as a result of the employee receiving workers' compensation benefits. The statute provides succinctly: "No employer shall discriminate in any manner against any of his present or former employees because of such present or former employee’s receipt of or attempt to receive benefits under this chapter.”

¶7. I dissented in McKenzie on the basis that the majority'did not have authority to rewrite workers’ compensation statutes, under the guise of the rule of liberality, in order to undermine the discretionary authority of the Commissioner of the Workers’ Compensation Division to allow employers to submit the names of preferred vocational rehabilitation providers. See State ex rel. McKenzie v. Smith, 212 W. Va. 288, 569 S.E.2d 809 (2002) (Davis, C.J., dissenting, with Maynard, J., joining).

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