Serrano v. Serrano’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

60 state decisions

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 60 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. “[A]bsent an explicit statement that Congress intends to preempt state law, courts should `infer such intent where Congress has legislated comprehensively to occupy an entire field of regulation, leaving no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where the state law at issue conflicts with federal law, either because it is impossible to comply with both, or because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of congressional objectives.'”

   2 later decisions quote this exact passage
   e.g. Borges v. Greenwich Federal Sav. L., No. Cv-91-0504458s (Feb. 2, 1993) · 1993 Conn. Super. Ct. 8225 - Carrone v. Chieppo Charters, Inc., No. Cv 93-0343419-S (Oct. 8, 1993)

2. “[S]tate courts have been allocating the exemption for decades. Moreover, as the defendant concedes, state courts developed the practice long before the Internal Revenue Code made explicit reference to it by adopting the first version of § 152(e) in 1967. In light of the great deference accorded to state courts in the area of domestic relations, we are persuaded, as the courts in a significant number of jurisdictions have held . . . that Congress would have explicitly prohibited states from allocating the exemption if it had intended to do so. . . . [T]he purpose of the 1984 amendments was to extricate the Internal Revenue Service from the burdensome administrative function of determining the value of the child support contributions of the parties. The amendments accomplished this purpose by eliminating the exceptions that required a determination of how much the parties contributed. Thus, under the current version of § 152(e), the Internal Revenue Service no longer need determine whether a noncustodial parent to whom a state court has allocated the exemption has made child support contributions worth at least $600. In addition, the amendments eased the administrative burden on the Internal Revenue Service by requiring that a noncustodial parent claiming the exemption attach a declaration from the custodial parent promising not to claim the exemption, thereby ensuring that both parents could not simultaneously claim the exemption. The trial court’s order in no way frustrates t”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 43 Ark. App. 7 - Jones v. Jones

3. “Our analysis of whether state law frustrates the purpose of § 152(e) must start from certain well established principles of federal law. The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that, because the field of domestic relations has traditionally been regulated by the states, the standard for demonstrating a preempting conflict between federal law and a state domestic relations provision is high: “On the rare occasion when state family law has come into conflict with a federal statute, this Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination whether Congress has ‘positively required by direct enactment’ that state law be preempted. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 , [ 25 S.Ct. 172, 175 , 49 L.Ed. 390 ] (1904). A mere conflict in words is not sufficient. State family and family-property law must do ‘major damage’ to ‘clear and substantial’ federal interests before the Supremacy Clause will demand that state law be overridden.”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage
   e.g. 43 Ark. App. 7 - Jones v. Jones