Berkovitz v. United States’s Empirical Analysis

Citation profile

27 federal appellate ·

Most-quoted passages

The sentences later courts lift from this opinion, ranked by how many decisions quote each — the parts of the opinion doing the work. These counts are smaller than the citation total above because most of the 30 citing decisions cite the case generally; a passage count includes only decisions quoting that exact language verbatim.

1. ““We think presumptive intent has no place in this case. A conclusive presumption which testimony could not overthrow would effectively eliminate intent as an ingredient of the offense. A presumption which would permit, but not require the jury to assume intent from an isolated fact would prejudge a conclusion which the jury should reach of its own volition. A presumption which would permit, the jury to make an assumption which all the evidence considered together does not logically establish would give to a proven fact an artificial and fictional effect. In either case, this presumption would conflict with the overriding presumption of innocence with which the law endows the accused and which extends to every element of the crime. Such incriminating presumptions are not to be improvised by the judiciary. Even congressional power to facilitate convictions by substituting presumptions for proof is not without limit.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mann v. United States

2. “[T]he fundamental error is that in a criminal case where the defense, as here, was good faith and absence of criminal intent, what was said had the effect of telling the jury as a matter of law that such proof was sufficient without more to show criminal intent, whereas this was one of the most important phases of the issues of fact that the prosecution was bound to prove beyond a reasonable doubt. The distinction is the difference between facts tending to establish guilt and telling the jury they may in effect consider guilt proven thereby. The Court undoubtedly may tell them they are entitled to consider the circumstances described in the charge as tending to prove intent but when it said that such intent was to be presumed from the facts stated, it necessarily shifted the burden thereafter to the shoulders of the accused to prove his innocence (emphasis in original).”

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. United States v. Chiantese

3. ““It had, of course, told the jury in other parts of the charge that the defendant was presumed to be innocent until proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt with full elucidation of what this meant. However, the error was in telling them that as a matter •of law they could presume criminal intent from the circumstances described in the questioned charge, without at the same time telling them they must consider all the evidence including that offered by defendant 'to disprove that intent, that the bur■den of proof never shifted and the ■Government, in spite of those circum- . stances, was required to prove the guilt of defendant beyond a reasonable doubt.””

   1 later decision quote this exact passage · from the majority
   e.g. Mann v. United States